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ABSTRACT 
 
In the politics of difference, the diversified female embodiments prompt 
contemporary feminist politics to depart from gender essentialism and draw attention 
to the heterogeneity of gender performances in the (re)conceptualisation of 'women'. 
As a democratic framework, feminist politics may become ossified and repressive, if 
the public arena fails to reflect the plurality of women and their political claims in the 
political participation and deliberation. Engaging in the feminist investigation into the 
theorisation of 'women', the thesis explores the reciprocal relationship between the 
construction of 'women' and the pluralisation of feminist politics, by articulating a 
'feminist politics of discursive embodiment'. I begin with Iris M. Young's idea of 
'gender seriality' to categorise 'women' as a social series, which is passively 
constructed through a practico-inert reality of gender and characterised by a passive 
member relationship, rather than a social group with common objectives and essential 
attributes. From which, I then draw on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological 
concept of 'the lived body' to sketch out how the female body is the material locus of 
gender imperatives and primary site of politicisation in gender seriality.  
 
After the serial womanhood and the gendered lived body are introduced in the first 
half of the thesis, the second part of articulating a feminist politics of discursive 
embodiment concentrates on how does the politicisation of different gender 
experiences from female embodiments pluralise feminist politics. I argue that the 
combination of a renovated understanding of female authority and an agonistic ethos 
as a political practice can facilitate democratic deliberations among wider 
interlocutors and, subsequently, a progressive and tolerant feminist politics. 
Specifically, Milan Women's Bookstore Collective's depiction of 'the symbolic 
mother' can shed lights on how politicising womanhood can recuperate the 
historically absent female relationship against patriarchy. Meanwhile, an agonist 
pluralism assists the (re)openness of temporal closures of that claimed political 
'womanhood'.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Woman and 'Women' in a World of Political Plurality 
 
Contemporary feminism has blossomed with the immense progression of digital 
technologies, social media and networking, resulting in diversified formations of 
engagement in a multifaceted world. There are inspiring individuals demonstrating 
brave acts: Wendy Davis, a Texas State Senator who filibustered for approximately 
twelve hours against restrictive legislation on abortion in 2013; Malala Yousafzai, an 
Afghan girl who survived a gunshot wound after she stood up to the Taliban for her 
right to be educated in 2012; and the three Nobel Prize laureates - Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf, Leymah Gbowee, and Tawakul Karman - who were recognised for their 
respective contributions to non-violent actions in support of women’s rights in 2011. 
Furthermore, women have collaborated across geographical boundaries: SlutWalk in 
2011, which was originated in Toronto, Canada, soon became a global sensation; and 
Amnesty International named 18
th
 August 2012 ‘Pussy Riot Global Day’ in support 
of the politically persecuted Russian activist musicians. The capacity to advocate 
issues and assemble alliances internationally also invites women to reflect on their 
diverse situations and different imaginations of women’s wellbeing. The topical 
controversy around the Muslim burqa and hijab, which has resulted in public bans on 
such Islamic clothing in several European countries, is a prominent example of the 
cultural clash of perceiving female bodies and sexual liberation differently. The 
ferocious confrontation between FEMEN and Muslim Women Against FEMEN 
(MWAF) also demonstrates the presence of socio-cultural complexities of perception 
and portrayal among women, in relation to the debate about the suitability of using 
topless female bodies to protest. The dissonance and concordance that are generated 
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by such corporeal performances contests the figurative boundary of ‘what signifies 
women as “women”’ and calls a simplistically unified conception of women as 
'women' into question. These heterogeneous politicisations of female corporeality set 
the scene for the conceptual investigation of this thesis. 
 
Intrigued by the diverse (re)significations of 'women' and their differing potentialities 
in contemporary democratic society, this thesis provides a theoretical articulation of a 
feminist politics of discursive embodiment. Specifically, this conceptual project 
offers a possible vision about how the revitalisation of contemporary feminist politics 
can be envisaged in relation to the rapid, intersectional changes of the global scenery 
of human society. In other words, it tackles the questions of how diversified female 
embodiments are derived from and substantiate the 'collectiveness' of women and, 
crucially, how such existential plurality can be projected onto the contingent 
landscape of contemporary feminist politics in a democratic society. I begin with a 
reconsideration of the concept of ‘women’, and argue that Iris M. Young’s 
articulation of gender seriality is constructive in rethinking the collectivity of women. 
The notion of serialisation disconnects the construction of women from a 
deterministic group identity and draws attention to the unceasing interaction between 
individuals and the historically-congealed world, which the political possibility to re-
imagine ‘women’ emerges. However, gender seriality alone is conceptually 
insufficient in theorising why is the construction of 'women' a political project of 
understanding plurality and how can the constituted tension between different 
articulations of 'women' be accommodated in a democracy. 
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To substantiate Young's initial conceptualisation of gender seriality, I investigate 
different constituents, namely the body, politicisations of gender, and agonistic ethos, 
in each chapter, in the hope of those detailed reflections can contribute to the existing 
literatures on Young's work and to the way that a pluralist feminist politics is 
theorised. In particular, I identify a conceptual gap of the understanding of female 
body in Young's theorisation of gender seriality and her other works on female 
experiences. The corporeality plays a vital role in the construction and maintenance 
of gender structures, as its actions reveal and conform the effects of gendering 
training. Meanwhile, the body is the fundamental site of gender deconstruction, as the 
individuals use it to defy and to reconfigure the hegemonic practices of gender. 
Owing to these, the body should not be construed as a passive entity awaiting 
instructions, but something that can reflect and project its intentions onto the world 
around it.     
 
While she briefly considered the role of the body in the construction of gender 
seriality, Young did not explicate its ontological status nor systematically scrutinise 
the normative and ethical dimensions of a gendered corporeality. However, her 
understanding of gender serialisation as a result of existential reciprocity between the 
individuals and the world provides a clear indication of the need to depart the 
consideration of female corporeality from the traditional Cartesian mind/body 
dualism, which has infused much of Western philosophical thinking. Her other works 
on female bodily experiences, such as pregnancy, throwing posture, and family home, 
also repudiate the idea of body as an indolent, material-laden subject. To deepen the 
initial development of serialised body and bridge the conceptual gap of Young's 
works, I draw on the phenomenological articulation of the live body in the course of 
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formulating a feminist politics of discursive embodiment. Specifically, I argue that 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's conceptualisation of the body as lived can broadens the 
analytical scope of how female bodies entwine both the particularisation and 
universalisation of gender in connection with embodiments and project such 
entanglements onto public life.  
 
In a more straightforward sense, this conceptual work aims to propound a detailed 
way of thinking about female embodiment as a political apparatus for revitalising 
feminist politics. I should note here that, by and large, the thesis focuses on reflecting 
the political ethos among women, rather than on governmental organisations and 
institutionalised political mechanisms, when mentioning the democratisation of 
feminist politics. This is not to suggest that the institutional dimension is 
inconsequential for feminist politics, i.e. a free public sphere where everyone has 
equal rights and fair access under constitutional protection. Having a functional 
democratic structure in place is indubitably crucial for the creation of a healthy 
feminist politics. However, the progression of a democracy and the attainment of its 
promised merits and virtues are critically hinged upon the general perceptions and 
beliefs of the populace, especially during the malfunction of political systems or 
when a society is in crisis.  
 
In an open letter regarding the enrolment of Norwegian mass killer, Anders Breivik, 
at the University of Oslo, the rector Ole Petter Ottersen compellingly points out that 
the trial of Breivik is a test for democratic society, and the outcome of such ferocious 
examination is subject to the will of the public 'to take responsibility for upholding 
democratic values, ideals and practices, including when these are challenged by 
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heinous act.'
1
 Such comment brings to light the importance of political ethos in the 
constitution of a well-functioning democratic politics. It is generally believed that 
institutionalised democratic mechanisms, such as the separation of powers, equal 
citizenship, and periodical elections, can lessen political corruption, public aggression, 
and the erosion of human rights, which may encourage amicable interactions and 
facilitate a positive relationship between citizens. Nevertheless, established 
democratic institutions and principles may turn into a hollow carcass or become 
secondary to illogical vengeances by the provocated when grave social disruptions 
unexpectedly happen or political conflicts polarise the community. Under such 
circumstances, the characteristics of the political ethos may grow to be a decisive 
factor in either the survival or shattering of the democratic system in crisis. That is, 
the robustness of a democracy and the true face of that community are most likely to 
be revealed in how citizens contend with their social differences as well as the 
disagreement on public issues which may arise from those differentiations. 
  
Owing to the above considerations, the last part of the thesis explores the political 
relationship among women, whose politicisations of discursive embodiments may 
differ from each other, pertaining to the democratisation of contemporary feminist 
politics. Put another way, the element of democratisation in the present context refers 
to the issue concerning what form of political ethos can facilitate feminist politics in 
being a free and equal public forum for its participants. More specifically, feminist 
politics as a democratic space should be a freely available sphere where women can 
and are enabled to translate their existential plurality into a political reality of 
diversification. Various feminist scholars, like Elizabeth Spelman, Iris Marion Young, 
                                                 
1
 Ole Petter Ottersen, 'Why Anders Breivik is welcome at our university,' the Guardian, 12/09/2013 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/12/anders-breivik-university-oslo>. 
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and Linda Alcoff, have ardently argued that the disputed attempt to locate a 
universalistic set of feminine qualities or female experiences may only reproduce 
internal exclusions and discriminations, owing to the intersection of gender 
differences and other social factors such as race, social class, and sexual orientation. 
The interconnection between gender and different societal components can create 
varied and dissimilar conditions for individual women, which situate those persons 
differently and reduce them to divergent experiences and interpretations of the 
gendered world. As the assorted individual encounters with gender occasion the 
desire to express differences on the grounds of gender liberation and equality, 
contemporary feminist politics may be prompted to work toward a pluralist path of 
democracy.   
 
Following from the above, I shall suggest that the revitalisation of feminist politics 
should be understood, on the one hand, as indicating that the socio-political 
differences among women and their politicisations under the universal sign of 
'women' should have the same opportunity to be presented and scrutinised. On the 
other hand, the political conflicts instigated by the different political comprehensions 
of the general name should be conceived and attended to in a positive and dynamic 
way. As the University of Oslo rector's statement on the matter of the enrolment of 
Breivik may have indicated, a controversial public confrontation in a society could 
undermine the democratic society. By analogy, I shall argue that the political 
disagreements between incongruous politicisations of 'women' can democratise 
feminist politics in so far as such confrontation signifies a crucial prospect to (re)open 
dialogues between the members and invites careful reflections and reassessments on 
operative socio-political principles and structures. In such a context, public 
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deliberation of the opposing visions and voices can ameliorate dissatisfactions and 
antagonisms and may prompt the existing political system to reform, in response to 
the change of the societal circumstances. In the thesis, such processes of 
democratisation are depicted through understanding how the term 'women' denotes 
both a common gendering operation in action and a specific political practice of 
gender simultaneously. Furthermore, the conceptual work pinpoints the female body 
as lived to unpack the universality and particularity of gender in the articulation of a 
feminist politics of discursive embodiment.  
 
With the overall picture of the thesis laid out, I shall now contextualise the themes 
further.  
 
1. THE GENDER PARADOX UNDER THE POLITICS OF  
    DIFFERENCE 
In an effort to disqualify biological determinism, feminists have been seeking to 
conceptualise womanhood from different approaches and have offered new 
terminologies to re-evaluate the historically oppressed situation of women. Patriarchy, 
for instance, is often identified as an unjust form of social system that contributes to 
the inequality between the sexes. The patriarchal system cultivates an asymmetrical 
power relationship between men and women by promoting male privileges in every 
aspect of society and relegating women to the position of otherness. While arguing 
male domination, male identification, and male-centred as the main characteristics of 
patriarchy, Bell Hooks and Allan Johnson both point out that it is a systematic 
  
8 
operation on both men and women and, therefore, should not be reduced to the 
actions of a particular group.
2
  
 
Although the term is useful in differentiating sexual discrimination from other forms 
of injustice like race and religion, Gayle Rubin argues that the implication of 
patriarchy is too universal and fails to provide alternative structures for the 
relationship between the sexes. She claims that 'it is important - even in the face of a 
depressing history - to maintain a distinction between the human capacity and 
necessity to create a sexual world, and the empirically oppressive ways in which 
sexual worlds have been organized. Patriarchy subsumes both meanings into the same 
term.'
3
 In order to underline the possibility of a sexually egalitarian system, Rubin 
advocates the use of 'a sex/gender system', which is 'the set of arrangements by which 
a society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity, and in 
which these transformed sexual needs are satisfied', rather than patriarchy.
4
 Such 
advocacy of a sex/gender distinction helps to facilitate the development of the idea 
that wo/men result from the somewhat innocent body being socially constituted. She 
also suggests that the sex/gender differentiation is 'a neutral term which refers to the 
domain and indicates that oppression is not inevitable in that domain, but is the 
product of the specific social relations which organise it.'
5
 The theoretical neutrality 
of the sex/gender system and its possibility to constitute particular social relations 
differently, for Rubin, render it a better term than 'patriarchy', which fixates on the 
disproportionate positions between the two sexes, to theorise the situations of women. 
                                                 
2
 See Bell Hooks, "Understanding Patriarchy", in Bell Hooks, The Will to Change: Men, Masculinity, 
and Love (Washington Square Press, 2004); and Allan G. Johnson, "Patriarchy, the System", in Allan 
G. Johnson, The Gender Knot: Unraveling Our Patriarchal Legacy (Temple University Press, 2005).  
3
 Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex”, in Rayna Reiter 
(ed.), Toward an Anthropology of Women (Monthly Review Press, 1975), p. 168. 
4
 Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex”, in Rayna Reiter 
(ed.), Toward an Anthropology of Women (Monthly Review Press, 1975), p. 159. 
.
5
 Ibid, p. 168.  
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In line with the differentiation of sex and gender, Kate Millett and Sally Haslanger 
both attribute gender differences to a causal connection between body and social 
norms.
6
 Moreover, Nancy Chodorow and Catherine MacKinnon further complicate 
the gender socialisation of the body respectively with the dualistic social assignments 
of feminine/masculine characteristics.
7
 In addition to this, an oppressor/oppressed 
model to describe the relation between men and women also emerges, in accordance 
with the increasing emphasis on the conceptual opposition between gender and sex, 
and then between masculinity and femininity. Such positional dichotomy is depicted 
as intrinsically interweaved with the patriarchal system and, habitually, men are 
presented as the privileged class who exercise power and inflict sexual objectification 
on the disadvantaged rank of women. For instance, MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin 
argue that there is an intense correlation between the constitution of female/male 
sexuality and gender inequality, in which the male consumption of female 
pornography constructs the general condition of men as dominant and women as 
subordinate.
8
   
 
On the one hand, the articulation of a sex/gender system and conceptual exploration 
of the constitution of femininity and women by early wave feminism certainly 
provide crucial insights into gendered relations of power, which deeply typify the 
development of human society. On the other hand, the sharp opposition between men 
and women, and understanding gender as a plain result of socialisation initiate 
                                                 
6
 See Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (Granada Publishing Ltd., 1971); and Sally Hanslanger, “Ontology 
and Social Construction”, Philosophical Topics, 1995:23. 
7
 See Nancy Chodorow, Reproducing Mothering (University of California Press, 1978) and “Family 
Structure and Feminine Personality”, in Nancy Tuana, and Rosemarie Tong (eds.), Feminism and 
Philosophy (Westview Press, 1995); and Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of State 
(Harvard University Press, 1989a). 
8
 See Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Harvard University Press, 1987) and “Sexuality, 
Pornography, and Method: Pleasure under Patriarchy”, Ethics, 1989b: 99(2); and Andrea Dworkin, 
Pornography: Men Possessing Women, (E.P. Dutton, 1989) and Intercourse (Free Press, 1997). 
  
10 
critiques of essentialism and prompt further debates around the sameness/difference 
between women. For example, Harris and Stone call into question MacKinnon's 
argument that sexual objectification is a shared condition in constituting female 
sexuality by criticising its lack of textual sophistication and sensitivity to the diverse 
backgrounds of women and men.
9
 Also, Martha Nussbaum and Leslie Green argue 
against MacKinnon's one-sided understanding of objectification under the absent 
contextualisation and contend that a person can be objectified positively and then 
become subjectified.
10
 Elizabeth Spelman's critique of the 'white solipsism', which is 
derived from Adrienne Rich on the issue of racism, is another representational 
assessment of contextual negligence in sexual realism. While feminism shares the 
pursuit of equality and freedom with civil rights/racial movements, Spelman observes 
a particular tendency among certain white feminists to generalise the social 
conditions of white middle-class Western women as a 'golden nugget of womanness', 
regardless of the specific socio-historical circumstances behind, for example, African-
American women or those in postcolonial countries.
11
 Owing to those criticisms, it 
becomes clear why the gender grouping of women by a general set of social features 
is problematic. The social generalisation of womanness, to symbolise through Rich's 
words on white solipsism, 'simply does not see non-white experience or existence as 
precious or significant, unless in spasmodic, impotent guilt-reflexes, which have little 
or no long-term, continuing momentum or political usefulness.'
12
 
 
                                                 
9
 See Angela P. Harris, “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory”, in D. K. Weisberg (ed.), 
Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations (Temple University Press, 1993); and Alison Stone, An 
Introduction to Feminist Philosophy (Polity Press, 2007). 
10
 See Martha Nussbaum, “Objectification”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1995:24(4); and Leslie 
Green, “Pornographies”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 2000:8(1). 
11
 Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman (Beacon Press, 1988), p. 159. 
12
 Adrienne Rich, On Lies, Secrets, and Silence (Norton, 1979), p. 23. 
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In addition, the quick distinction of biological sex from the social intervention of 
gender in early scholarly works also causes concerns about its somewhat simplistic 
nature, potential reinforcements of essentialist tendency, and unintended exclusions. 
Thomas Laqueur's work on the transition of scientific belief in late eighteenth century 
Europe from the one-sex model, which construes female genitalia as a mere 
biological variation of male genital, to the nowadays prevalent two-sex model, which 
consider man and woman to have different types of human anatomy, is an important 
indicator of the discursive arrangement between sex and gender.
13
 That is, such a 
paradigm shift regarding the biological study of human sexuality challenges the 
sexual realistic claim of sex as a natural fact by underlining the way that the scientific 
interpretations of sexual organs are modified, reflecting the attitude change towards 
methodical observations, rather than the tangible evolution of sexual anatomy. 
Furthermore, the establishment of sexual dimorphism conveys normative implications, 
as the systematic categorization assigns values of normality and abnormality to the 
human body with concrete polarity of the two sexes. It can then be argued that the 
normalisation of the wo/men differentiation delineates our scope of knowledge of the 
human body by turning other forms of sexuality into something ‘wrong’ or 
unintelligible. The normalisation of supposedly scientific explanations of sexuality 
thenceforth may entail what Michel Foucault speculates as the ‘power/knowledge’ 
interplay. That is, as Foucault articulates, power produces historically specific 
mechanisms to manufacture different forms of knowledge which function as true in 
                                                 
13
 See Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender From the Greeks to Freud (Harvard University 
Press, 8th ed., 1994); and Helen King, "The mathematics of sex: one to two, or two to one?," Studies in 
Medieval and Renaissance History: Sexuality and Culture in Medieval and Renaissance Europe, 3rd 
series, 2005:2, 
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particular time and space and, in turn, is maintained via the materialisation of those 
truth discourses in human activities and existences.
14
  
 
A further account of power relations and its disciplinary function in the gendering 
process will be considered in Chapter 3. Additionally, I will further contextualise 
sexual dimorphism in connection with the dualistic inclination in traditional Western 
philosophy in the later sections, especially with reference to how the female body is 
not only underestimated, but also absent historically when conceived from within the 
Cartesian mind/body dualism. Here, I will continue to address the issues of how 
conceptual ambiguity and social differences trouble the feminist quest for 
‘womanness’. Relating to sexual dimorphism and knowledge as a production of 
power play, Anne Fausto-Sterling notes the limitations of the dichotomous 
construction and its constraints on linguistic expressions by pointing out the 
anatomical evidence of at least three other types of sexuality, which are generally 
simplified under the terms 'intersex' in standard medical literatures and the fe/male 
polarity, with the mixture of biological features across the fe/male spectrum.
15
 What 
the five-sexes classification intends to problematise is a discursive discrepancy 
between social norms and scientific facts. That is, while the co-existence of fe/male 
sexual organs in a single individual is recognised medically, such reality is hardly a 
social actuality, as the intersex body is often being obliged to be 'corrected' or simply 
                                                 
14
 See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, (ed.) 
Colin Gordon and (trans.) Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper (The Harvester 
Press, 1980). 
15
 Additionally, three major sexual classes are listed in her 1993a article and Fausto-Sterling provides 
specific names for each category beside their medical terminologies. The refined five sexes spectrum 
includes: 'herms' for true hermaphrodites, who have one testis and one ovary; 'merms' for male 
pseudohermaphrodites, who have testes and part of the female genitalia but no ovaries; 'ferms' for 
pseudohermaphrodites, who have ovaries and part of the male genitalia but no testes; and, finally, the 
sexes of men and women. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, “The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are Not 
Enough”, The Sciences, 1993a:33; Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men 
(Basic Books, 2
nd
 ed., 1993b); “The Five Sexes: Revisited”, The Sciences, 2000a:July/August; and 
Sexing the Body (Basic Books, 2000b).  
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being ignored by social practices or mechanisms. Sex-reassignment surgery on 
intersex infants can be argued to be one of the common examples that demonstrate a 
lack of social tolerance towards intersexuality. For being an intersex as a life choice is 
generally unintelligible for both the parents and the doctors, not to mention the 
subjectivity of the newborns, who undertake the surgical procedure, which bears no 
significance in this case. Meanwhile, Fausto-Sterling argues that the medical 
operation, as well as remedial researches on intersexuality, tend to fortify the exercise 
of sexual dimorphism and the rhetoric of ab/normal body, as the objective of both 
items tend to be 'assigning the young mixed-sex child to the proper gender' to 'assure 
proper psychosexual development', rather than offering an alternative outside of the 
two-sex model.
16
 
 
Another example which illustrates how the sex/gender dichotomy is discursively 
installed and essentialised in the social world is that of the ‘Identity Screening 
Regulations’ for air travellers in Canada, 2011. Issued under the programme of 
'Passenger Protect', the new transportation policy caused controversy as one of the 
items states that '5.2 (1) An air carrier shall not transport a passenger if ... (c) the 
passenger does not appear to be of the gender indicated on the identification he or she 
presents'.
17
 Although no social groups nor descriptions of differences between the 
documented and the presented gender are specified, the above sections limit the 
freedoms of movement and expression of transgender groups, as the definition of 
'transgender' itself defies the content of new regulations.
18
 Furthermore, it has been 
                                                 
16
 Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p. 46. 
17
 For the detail of 'Identity Screening Regulations' (SOR/2007-82), visit: laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2007-82/index.html.    
18
 See Althia Raj, ‘Canada Identity Screening Regulations: Transgendered Community Effectively 
Banned From Flying,’ Huffington Post, 31/01/2012 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/01/31/canada-air-travel-transgendered-
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the case that not every member of the transgender community would choose full sex-
reassignment surgeries in order to change their gender designation on official 
documents, owing to various concerns such as surgical risks, financial limitations, or 
prolonged mental health referrals.
19
 Under such circumstances, a transgender 
passenger might be unable to acquire a health care professional document, which is 
required by the indicated legislation for travelling under different genders, and, 
arguably, is subliminally confined by state regulations without valid charges.
20
 What 
the particular clause of identity screening policy in question has obliquely underlined, 
to consider the Foucauldian construction of 'power/knowledge', is a normative 
imperative between the physical appearance and biological sex of a person. That is, 
while no descriptive traits are stipulated, the indicated passage presumes a tactical but 
institutionalised understanding about what constitutes appropriate presentations of 
gender, which is shared by airport screeners and passengers in the indicated case.  
 
To illustrate the above point of gender as a normative imperative: consider a 
transgender traveller whose documented sex is male with an identifiable Adam’s 
apple and wearing heavy make-up and in a dress that shows cleavage. Although no 
                                                                                                                                           
community_n_1245598.html>; Matthew Kassel, 'A New Rule In Canada Appears To Ban Transgender 
People From Boarding Planes, Business Insider, 02/02/2012 <http://www.businessinsider.com/a-new-
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external specifications are outlined in the identity screening regulation, it can be 
reasonably anticipated that the established knowledge of binary gender would compel 
the airport screener to ask the passenger in question for further clarification of their 
gender. It could be argued by the screener that this particular flight customer fails to 
demonstrate their gender correctly, as their physical appearance exhibits a major clash 
of feminine and masculine characteristics. Upon the request for clarification, however, 
the transgender passenger might produce a professional medical document to 
'legitimise' the physical contradiction as a transitional step before a full sex-
reassignment surgery. Following that, it would be logical to presume that the traveller 
prepares the health certificate beforehand, because they already 'know' that their 
appearance does not necessarily conform to the generalised two-sex model and such 
divergence might prevent them from air travel under Article 5.2(1), if they fail to 
obtain the required document. The depicted scenario helps to elucidate how the 
intelligibility and functionality of the identity screening policy are deeply embedded 
in a hegemonic construction of binary gender, while the exact determinants of 'male' 
and 'female' are left up to the airport screeners' discretion. In other words, a major 
discrepancy between 'the incapability of defining essential characteristics of two 
genders' and 'the ability to judge whether a gender is conformed correctly by a person' 
can be detected from the illustrated situation of gender identification under the 
'Identity Screening Regulations'.  
 
The above suggested inconsistency between a person's ability to define and to judge 
gender indicates an indefinite, complicated construction of the gender/sex hegemony. 
Feminist explorations of effects and operations of that dominance should be looking 
to move beyond a linear, standardised, and irreversible approach. As pointed out 
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earlier, neither biological determinism nor social essentialism provides an apposite 
and sensible consideration of the sex/gender relationship. This is because both 
accounts rest upon a universalistic theorisation of gender as a biological/social 
constituent which has invariant effects that uniformly differentiate all women from 
men. The universality of sexual dimorphism, such as in the format of feminine and 
masculine personalities or sexualities, thus risks explaining gender differences by 
reinforcing a stereotypical sameness of women and of men respectively. Under such 
circumstances, the shared knowledge matrix of biological sex and gender imperative 
is being substituted with another discursive structure of power, rather than being 
opened up for retrospection and renovation. In particular, a one-dimensional, 
generalised understanding of gender construction leaves little room for the 
acknowledgement of individual subjectivity and collective diversity. Meanwhile, the 
rigid concentration on locating elemental gendering factors in certain 
social/biological dimensions may underestimate the interconnectivity of the body, 
social discourses, and the materiality in the multifaceted and miscellaneous processes 
of gendering. Specifically, the universalistic approach has a propensity for 
discounting the activeness of the body in the consolidation and the transgression of 
gender. The thesis will further elaborate the significance of the body in later chapters. 
 
2. RECOGNISING DIFFERENCES UNDER SAMENESS 
As the rise of the politics of difference and the subsequent political advocacy of 
pluralism gradually became influential in contemporary multicultural democracy, the 
understanding of gender difference also evolved from a flat interpretation of different 
sexualities, to a more delicate and versatile articulation that pertains to a variety of 
social differences such as race, religion, and perceptions of ab/normal bodies. 
  
17 
Popularised alongside a series of consciousness-raising social movements in the late 
1960s, the politics of difference may be conceived as a counter-reaction to the 
liberalist claim of 'equality as sameness', which suggests that democratic institutions 
and mechanisms should be difference-blind toward every citizen. Instigated by the 
problem of discrimination, the traditional egalitarian perspective on equality argues, 
to paraphrase Angela P. Harris, that 'differences' should be a distinction that make no 
difference.
21
 Particularly, the criterion of 'sameness' exemplifies distributive justice 
and the presumption of equality, which justifies fair distributions of common goods 
as a practice of non-discrimination on the grounds of available information in relation 
to the notions of universal reason and morality of equal respect.
22
 The liberal 
egalitarian conception of equality that promised sameness, of course, then laid a 
crucial cornerstone for the establishment of democracy, as many previously excluded 
or marginalised social groups, such as women, African-Americans, and LGBT+ 
community, have been invoking this very principle to fight their political demands for 
inclusion and equality in the public sphere. In short, the practice of the principle of 
'equality as sameness' effectively eliminated institutional, formal barriers toward 
inclusion, especially in political and legal systems.
23
  
 
Regardless of the notable contribution of the conception of 'sameness', the continued 
phenomenon of disproportionate presentations of previously privileged groups and 
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formerly disadvantaged factions in the public sphere invites critical debates about 
whether the practice of 'sameness' represents the full picture of equality. In recent 
years, the lack of correspondence between social groups remains evident in various 
domains of human society including politics, economy, and the workplace. For 
instance, while women comprise approximately 50% of the global population, female 
legislators constitute less than 22% of the overall amount of parliamentary members 
in the world, according to the Intra-Parliamentary Union in 2014.
24
 Similar 
imbalances are found in the private sector of employment, revealed, for instance, 
when the internet search engine giant, Google, released its workforce data in May 
2014.
25
 Latinos and African-Americans make up around 30% of American populace, 
but they only form a mere 5% of the total employees in the corporation.
26
 Meanwhile, 
white males make up an overwhelming 61% of the entire staff and a 72% absolute 
majority of the management level. Additionally, a 2015 report on world poverty by 
Oxfam International presents a staggering prediction that the richest 1% of the world 
will control over 50% of the global wealth by 2016, with the other 99% sharing the 
less than half of worldwide resources.
27
 As mentioned earlier, it is the procedural 
justice that the liberal egalitarian conception of 'equality as sameness' concentrated 
upon, in which non-discriminatory distribution of social goods is prioritised and 
contributing the improvement of general equality. Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue 
that the asymmetrical outcomes of those examples are incidental inequalities, 
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therefore bringing into question  the effectiveness of the 'sameness' principle in 
attaining distributive justice. 
 
Although the intentional dismissal of contextual differences of individuals and groups 
efficiently extends the range of equal citizenship in a democratic society, what is at 
stake here is that the act of discharging differences may at the same time write off the 
opportunity to resolve the legacy of former discriminations, as the very causes of 
unfairness are being disregarded, or even suppressed, in connection with the 
'insignificance' of those individual/group differences. More precisely, the general 
equalisation of individuals by simply dismissing social differences may thwart the 
opportunity of addressing the origin of asymmetrical power relations between 
dominant and marginalised groups, which may continue to have an effect on their 
social status under the practice of the 'equality as sameness' principle. Take gender 
equality as an example: the historical exclusion from citizenship and the traditional 
gender division of labour, such as 'men are breadwinners and women are 
homemakers', in a patriarchal society have patently confined women to private sphere 
and family-orientated responsibilities, as well as having placed them in a 
disadvantageous position regarding control over common resources and access to the 
decision-making process. While women are entitled to the same socio-political rights 
as their male fellows under the realisation of 'equality as sameness', the liberal 
egalitarian principle itself does not, or even attempt to, transpose the historically 
established disproportionate influence of the two sexes, as the character of gender 
bears no significance under the standard of 'sameness'. Following this, how does a 
woman, let's say, compete for a political office with her male counterpart on an equal 
footing, since she does not have the same amount of resources nor the same organised 
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social networks at her disposal as her male competitor? Specifically, how does she 
counterbalance the patriarchal discrimination against women, when she has the legal 
right to do so but remains excluded from the existed and functioning power circle, 
which is dominated by men?  
 
Aside from second wave feminism, similar lines of enquiry were also pursued by 
other marginalised social groups and minorities, such as African-Americans, 
aboriginal groups, and LGBT+ communities, during the wide-ranging political 
movements of the 1970s. As pointed out earlier, it is not the equalisation effect under 
the practice of 'sameness' that the activists and critics of the liberal egalitarian 
conceptualisation of equality aim to problematise here. The removal of discriminative 
differentiations in terms of treatment and opportunities is a crucial action towards the 
realisation of a just democracy within which the fact of whether every individual is 
being furnished with the same quantity of material goods and services becomes the 
essential parameter of equality. Michael Walzer characterises such conceptualisation 
of equality as 'simply equality' and, furthermore, argues that its singular measurement 
cannot cope with the intricate conversion process of diverse social goods without 
forceful interventions from 'a centralized and activist state'.
28
 'Equality is a complex 
relation of persons, mediated by the goods we make, share, and divide among 
ourselves; it is not an identity of possessions. It requires then,' as he asserts, 'a 
diversity of distributive criteria that mirrors the diversity of social goods.'
29
 Walzer 
then proposes a 'regime of complex equality' to target the oppressive mechanisms that 
dominate the different distributions of common goods in the respective spheres.
30
 
Through acknowledging the plurality of distributive criteria for social goods and 
                                                 
28
 Michael Walzer, Sphere of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, 1983), p. 16. 
29
 Ibid, p. 18. 
30
 Ibid, Chapter 1. 
  
21 
services, it advances deep reflections on the correspondence between existential 
circumstances and human relations. Moreover, the delineation of different general 
spheres helps to identify the relevance of certain social constituents and prevents 
advantageous transferences of special consideration from one area to another.   
 
The contrast between 'simple equality' and 'complex equality' helps to highlight the 
inadequacy of the liberal egalitarian conceptualisation of 'equality as sameness' in 
exposing the history-laden, multifarious power relations that condition diversified 
human existences. Echoing Walzer's advocacy on complex criteria for distributive 
justice, various scholars also argue for a changed conceptualisation of equality, 
namely 'equality as difference', to, not overthrow, but complement the blind spot of 
the principle of 'equality as sameness'. In a broad understanding, what distinguishes 
the idea of 'equality as difference' from the conception of 'equality as sameness' is the 
particular emphasis on the normative significance of social differences with regard to 
the construction of individual/group identity and equality. On the one hand, it is 
observable that the world we live in is already organised by multifarious social 
structures and patterned relations between social groups at both macro and micro 
levels. Individuals are born into an established, structured environment and integrate 
the conditions of their social positions into the development of individual identity to 
some extent. Derived from this, social differences are considered to be positive and 
pertinent to individuals and should be recognised in certain aspects, even when the 
conditioning effect of those differences cannot be measured with conclusive precision. 
On the other hand, social differences are intrinsically intertwined with socioeconomic 
stratifications, in which social groups are being situated in relatively 
privileged/disadvantaged social positions in accordance with their unintended 
  
22 
possession of those differences. That is, to use Melvin M. Tumin's definition of social 
stratification, social differences also signify the 'arrangement of any social group into 
a hierarchy of positions that are unequal with regard to power, property, social 
evaluation, and/or psychic gratification'.
31
 Such structural differentiation transforms 
these descriptive differences into terrains of power.     
 
The transformation of social differences into frontiers of power has manifested itself 
in various forms in different societies. Throughout human history, power structures of 
social differences produce discriminative measures and non-voluntary impositions, 
which lead to unequal outcomes at both the material and the discursive level. The 
history of the slave trade that occurred between Africa and Western Europe and North 
America is an evident example. In the abhorrent 'business' across the Atlantic, racial 
differences are translated into an arbitrary measurement of human worthiness, in 
which certain racial groups are commercialised and estimated in monetary term by 
the members of another race. The process of commodification of particular racial 
differences creates a master/slave relationship between the racial groups involved and, 
subsequently, such articulated status of superiority and inferiority manifest 
themselves in aspects such as physical space and individual mentality. In terms of 
public facilities and services, African-Americans were spatially and institutionally 
separated from White Americans in places like the armed forces, schools, and public 
transportation, where they were allocated with less resources and inferior equipment. 
The historical practice of enslavement and racial segregation continues to structure 
and impact on issues like human capital transmissions, underclass cultures, and 
racialised discourses of welfare policy in contemporary American society.  
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The historical problem of inequality becomes trickier for exploration and remediation 
when the entanglement of social differences and the interconnection of social 
structures are taken into account. In addition, the issue of race is further complicated, 
owing to the interconnectivity of social structures, which situates individuals in a 
criss-crossed social position. For instance, Susan Bordo argues a ‘triple burden of 
negative bodily associations’ for the sexualised and racialised body of an African-
American woman, in which her sex 'represents the temptations of the flesh and the 
source of man's moral downfall. By virtue of her race, she is instinctual animal, 
undeserving of privacy and undemanding of respect. ... But by the legacy of slavery 
has added an additional element to effacements of black women's humanity. For in 
slavery her body is not only treated as an animal body but is property, to be "taken" 
and used at will [of the slave owner].'
32
   
 
Bordo's words on the multiple layers of negative connotations of a black female body 
echo the feminist critique of gender essentialism and underline the problem of 
equality as sameness. As an African-American woman, her gender differences place 
her in submission to the fellow African-American male and yet the racial differences 
alienate her status from other White women, while the combination of both 
differentiations distance her even more drastically from the position of White men. 
Therefore, it is problematic to tackle the unjust discrimination and injurious 
stereotyping that an African-American woman may encounter within the social 
hierarchy by merely concentrating on either the axis of race or of sexuality. For there 
are different modes of power relationship at work at each layer of suggested negative 
bodily connotations and their overall interactions constitute the distinct social 
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position of African-American women. With regard to this, the conception of 'equality 
as sameness' as the singular principle for a just society is problematic, as it fails to 
recognise the historical imprints that structure existing social relations and the 
implicit discursive imperatives that are denoted in the physical characteristics of 
individual body. 
 
3. THE ABSENCE OF EMBODIED AUTHORITY 
It is noteworthy that the significance of corporeality in the constitution of the social 
world has often be undervalued in traditional Western philosophy. This is the result 
of the influential Cartesian dualism that constructs a hierarchical relationship where 
the spiritual mind is conceived as superior to the material body. Some have argued 
that this philosophical principle contributes to gender inequality as it attributes the 
leading mind to men and the reactive body to women. This Cartesian dichotomy 
continues to have an effect. Given this, is it achievable for female corporeality to 
break with the historically inscribed passivity and inferiority? If so, how can one 
delineate the pluralist relationship between female embodiments and feminist politics? 
Additionally, as it will become clear in my later discussion, the Milan Women's 
Bookstore Collective (MWBC) offers a provocative argument: in comparison with 
men, a sense of female authority is missing in the history of women living in a 
patriarchal system.
33
 For the MWBC, such a female authority is conceived as a 
symbolic, collective figure who cultivates her figurative presence throughout history 
and signifies social connections between women in a public arena. Nevertheless, the 
patriarchal system interferes with the development of female authority via socio-
cultural imperatives, which position men as primary guardians and mediators of 
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society. For instance, the idea that 'men are breadwinners and women are 
homemakers', in collaboration with women's material dependency on their husbands 
or male relatives under primogeniture, indirectly excludes women from the 
opportunity to participate in public forums. Or, to reflect on the wedding tradition of 
the father giving away the bride, in relation to the economy exchange between the 
families of the newlywed:
34
 the 'give away' can be read as symbolising a public 
demonstration of power transference between two men, as well as in different 
generations, and a new social connection of males is established.  
 
In comparison, the prerogatives of women scarcely find similar occasions to manifest 
or be recognised publicly in the history of women. Although some may argue that the 
traditional maternal, nurturing role in family life bestows women with moral 
superiority, the domestication of women in the private sphere inevitably yields their 
problematic absence in public forums and human history, which excludes women 
from political participation and, arguably, reproduces their inexperience or lack of 
political skills in issuing concerns or in redressing unbalanced power relations 
openly.
35
 The idea of a symbolic mother, is thus advocated by the MWBC as a social 
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force to counterbalance the historical patriarchal hierarchy, which celebrate the 
legitimacy of the father-son relationship and dismiss the mother-daughter connection 
in both public and private domains. Democratic politics, with its emphasis on liberty 
and equality, requires the participants to be active and visible in public forums, to 
articulate and judge political claims, and to be able to form alliances strategically. 
Since contemporary democracy is developed upon and with the intention of rectifying 
past injustices and prejudiced social systems, how do women rise to the political 
challenge, with regard to the pacification of the female body under Cartesian dualism 
and the historical exclusion of female power? The historical absence of ‘public’ 
women continues to condition the hierarchy between men and women and the gender 
status quo in democratic societies, where, for instance, the numbers of women in 
parliaments and corporate management roles remain disproportionate in comparison 
with men. For existential plurality to obtain political significance, it requires 
individuals to take public action in relation to such plurality. Only then does 
corporeality become not only the fundamental conduit that laboured with 
embodiments which stimulate and inform political rhetoric and behaviours, but also 
the initiator of those political actions. If, as the MWBC argues, the historical-
congealed female authority potentially gives visibility to a collective sense of 
legitimacy of sexual differences between women, how does female corporeality break 
with the traditionally inscribed inertness and being validated as a political subject to 
renovate the asymmetric power relation between the sexes?  
 
Furthermore, as the disagreement between FEMEN and MWAF and many other cases 
indicates, feminist politics is complicated by internal complexity and individual 
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struggles, which are derived from diversified embodied experiences, in relation to the 
general categorisation of gender inequality. Under such circumstances, how may 
female bodies utilise themselves as an open means to deliver the contingent and 
relational politicisation of female embodiments in public forums, so pluralising 
feminist politics democratically? I use 'democratic pluralisation' to describe a positive 
political relationship between corporeal embodiments of women and feminist politics 
so that the internal complexity of 'women' - a term that refers to a particular social 
collective with distinctive historicity - would not be dismissed or suppressed under 
general political claims that are made in its name. For each politicisation of 'women' 
entails certain specifications and exclusions in consideration of how such a political 
demand is contextually initiated. To thwart the authoritarian installation of a political 
particularity, political actors should be able to conceive such political construction as 
a temporal, contingent frontier open to future deliberation and reformulation. 
However, such political practice cannot simply be preserved and facilitated by 
institutionalising political mechanisms; it requires a specific political ethos. 'Political 
ethos' refers to a particular set of political beliefs, rhetoric, and relations that are 
shared by a collection of individuals, which reflects the general attitude towards 
political deliberations and conflicts as well as attitudes towards political 
competitors.
36
 Since female corporeality is entwined with feminist politics, what 
political ethos can divert feminist politics from ossification and grasps the 
contingency and particularity of politicisation? 
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Derived from the heterogeneous presentations of female embodiment, the above 
contextual questions may be compressed into a simple but challenging enquiry: how 
does 'women' become political? The general term of 'women', as discussed earlier, 
contains an particular aggregation of individuals who cannot be defined by essential, 
universal features and make 'plurality' an comprehensible expression via respective 
corporeal existences. Conceived thus, the collective imagination of women stands in 
an existential relationship with individual corporeality on the one hand; and on the 
other hand, the individual embodiments find their intelligibility through the common 
languages related to 'women'. While the body channels individuality to collectiveness, 
how does female corporeality produce feminist politics when its socio-political 
legitimacy and authority are undermined by the philosophical subordination of body 
to mind? With the symbolic 'absence' from public sphere, how do women transcend, 
to draw on MWBC's words, 'the fear of judging and being judged' and haul 'female 
desire out of its reticence'?
37
 The idea of symbolic, collective authority can be 
connected with the empowerment and liberation of women, in a sense that it signifies 
a counterbalance to patriarchal power and a figurative authentication and 
legitimisation of women's rights to provide alternative interpretations of the world 
and human relations.
38
 Thus, in the political attempt of converting 'absence' into 
'presence', how can feminist politics maintain plurality and democratically cultivate a 
collective confirmation of female authority at the same time? 
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4. A POLITICAL PATH TO EMBODIED DIFFERENCES 
Acknowledging the essence of female corporeality in the constitution of feminist 
politics, the thesis aims to offer an explorative theorisation of, as I term it, a feminist 
politics of discursive embodiment. It investigates the existential relationship between 
individual woman and women as a social collective and, subsequently, the political 
connection between the plurality of women's embodiments and feminist politics. 
Specifically, the thesis tries to tackle the question of how 'women' can be construed as 
a feasible and intelligible social category that produces diversified bodily experiences, 
while recognising it as a political question generated by corporeal existence and its 
power to produce materially and discursively. Owing to this, it is crucial to take a step 
back and look into the principal constituents of that social collective, namely the 
individual female body. Such enquiry into the body, I shall argue, will have to focus 
on how it enters into the existing world with its developing structures and, most 
importantly, to cultivate relationships with not only the changeable surroundings, but 
also each other. The co-existence of individuals in the same world raises the issue of 
politics, in view of the fact that a collective life involves making decisions about 
resource distribution, institutional arrangements, and community vision. The political 
issue is further complicated by the fact that individuals are placed in different social 
positions in relation to the historical-congealed structures of the world. Communal 
life is intersected by social tags like ethnicity, gender, age, disability etc., which 
render individuals as relatively privileged or disadvantaged compare to one another. 
Under such circumstances, politics, as an art of governing, is laden with discrepant 
human relationships and perceptions of the world and, consequently, political 
participants must deal with the power relations and conflicting visions within the 
community.  
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Democracy, as one of the collective forms of political governance, is praised for its 
establishment upon the concepts of freedom and equality and its aspirations to amend 
privileges and disadvantages, via encouraging mass participation and providing fair 
accesses to everyone. As pointed out earlier, the principle of 'sameness', which is 
deeply instigated by the concept of 'discrimination', has been predominant in the 
political ideas and practices of equality, especially in the area of law and its 
enforcement.
39
 Such 'sameness' criterion resonates with the presumption of equality, 
which justifies fair distributions of common goods as a practice of non-discrimination 
on the ground of available information in relation to the notions of universal reason 
and morality of equal respect. Feminists and multiculturalists criticise such a 
conception of equality for unintentionally reproducing inequality and oppression, 
because the sameness criterion ignores the pertinent differences among individuals 
and the pre-existing structural inequality of opportunity and social status that 
constrain them.
40
 Take the workforce data of Google that was released in May 2014 
as an example:
41
 although there are equality and diversity charters in its manifesto, 
Google, as a global corporation founded in a long-standing democracy, the United 
States, has only 30% of women in the overall workforce and only 21% of them 
occupy a leadership role. In terms of ethnicity, white male domination continues to be 
an evident phenomenon, as that particular category makes up an overwhelming 72% 
of management level and 61% of entire staff. In contrast, people of Black and 
Hispanic origins form a mere 5% of company's employees. Such a disproportionate 
workforce formation highlights the insufficiency of procedural equality in expanding 
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social inclusion and fairness and the necessity to take concrete measures to 
substantiate the meaning of equal opportunity.       
 
The thesis will not engage further in the debate of the conceptualisations of equality 
and justice, but will instead explore the connection between the political recognition 
of differences and the democratic ethos in the context of feminist politics. To be 
precise, it is not the justification of democracy or the virtue of justice/equality with 
which I am concerned here. I believe in the values of democracy and acknowledge 
the importance of the 'sameness' principle in the practices of equality, which lays 
down the groundwork for developing a just and free society. What is being underlined 
via the case of Google, however, is that the existing structural barriers and general 
perceptual discriminations continue to be operative within a democratic framework. 
Following that, the deliberate ignorance about social differences have only restricted 
capacity in improving the overall status of the already disadvantaged social minorities 
and marginalised groups. It then requires a sense of public recognition of those social 
differences, which are the very cause of their suffering in the beginning, in order to 
substantiate the foundation of democracy and remedy disparities between mainstream 
and minority. There are many scholars, such as Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, and 
Iris Marion Young, who produce abundant literature to argue the significance of 
social differences in deepening the foundation of democracy and propose various 
phrases - such as 'identity politics', 'politics of recognition', and 'politics of difference' 
- to pinpoint such re-evaluation of social differences.
42
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Among the broad scope of scholarly discussions, it is being generally identified that 
social differences, as a set of collective characteristics that differentiates one social 
group from the other, play a critical part in the constitution of individual identity and 
subjectivity. That is to say, drawing on a structuralist perspective, that individuals as 
micro-level units, whose 'relationships are embedded in macro-level, collective 
representations. Collective representations have a life and logic of their own and 
cannot be reduced to actors' perceptions or behaviour'.
43
 The depiction of micro and 
macro levels, in relation to the distinction between individual and group, indicates 
that a structural conceptualisation of social differences is needed in order to make 
sense of why some people are systematically emasculated but not the others under the 
large-scale operations of institutions and practices. The persistent and public denial of 
specific social differences thus not only undermines group relations, but also 
obstructs self-development of individuals, given that the manifestation of social 
differences is located in the (collective) presentation of individuals. For instance, 
Axel Honneth argues that 'self-esteem' 'demands a social medium that must be able to 
express the characteristic differences between human subjects in a universal and, 
more specifically, an intersubjectively obligatory way'.
44
 'For it is only due to the 
cumulative acquisition of basic self-confidence, of self-respect, and of self-esteem... 
that a person can come to see himself or herself, unconditionally,' as he further 
elaborates, 'as both an autonomous and an individuated being and to identify with his 
or her goals and desires.'
45
 Such a portrayal of the construction of 'self' points to the 
interdependency between individuals and social collectives, in which the latter 
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differentiates one person from another, while the enactment of the 'characteristic 
differences' relies on the former.  
 
Since there are extensive literatures already, it is not the objective of the thesis to 
conduct a genealogy of social differences or to map out the conceptual distinction of 
various political formations of those differences. In other words, I will not ponder 
upon, for example, whether it is 'politics of identity' or 'politics of recognition' which 
offers an appropriate conceptual dialectic to capture the political implication of social 
differences. Rather, the model of feminist politics of discursive embodiment is 
elaborated upon the premises, which are shared by the above scholars, that (1) social 
differences play important role in shaping individual identity/subjectivity and 
perception of the world; and (2) the recognition of social differences is essential in 
promoting a inclusive and effective democracy, in conjunction with the principle of 
equality as sameness. Upon those foundations, the thesis will explore the political 
representation of the discursive and material entanglement between individual woman 
and women as a social collective in contemporary democracy, with specific emphasis 
on the female body as the crucial medium within. That is, the body is the recipient 
and initiator of the world in a way that it is enabled and constraint by the social 
differences which structure social contexts and human relations, on the one hand. On 
the other hand, the bodily enactments are the essential sustenance of such social 
differences and aggregate their collectiveness. Following that, the idea of social 
differences and the discursive imperatives that are articulated around them are 
comprehensible by reason of corporeal performances, rather than being the state of a 
concept.    
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The orientation towards corporeality is how the thesis will narrate the model of 
feminist politics of discursive embodiment: how does the body become a political 
subject and how does it create something new from the old? Moreover, as democracy 
aims to provide a fair and open public forum for everyone, how can the individual 
interpretations of their social differences, which signify the political recognition of 
corporeal abilities to perform, be enacted politically? In what way can the relationship 
between the individual enactments of social differences and the political space remain 
democratic, while the respective performances may be in conflict? By revisiting the 
conceptions of women, female body, and political ethos in stages, the articulation of 
feminist politics of discursive embodiment, hopefully, can offer insights and 
reflections in response to the troublesome and progressing relationship of the plurality 
of female existences and contemporary feminist politics. In particular, can putting 
forward the diverse understandings of 'women' constitute a system of checks and 
balances to patriarchal society? Are the individual enactments a mere demonstration 
of individuality, or a symbolic empowerment in the name of a particular social 
collective? Meanwhile, how does the existential connection between individuals and 
their social collectives inform democracy? These questions have been phrased 
differently but bear correspondence with previous sections, which, expectantly, can 
help to exemplify how the thesis is stimulated upon the pluralist framework of 
politics of differences and is contextualised in the contemporary debates of feminist 
politics.  
 
Following the above problematisation, it is time to introduce the key structure of 
feminist politics of discursive embodiment that the thesis intends to articulate. 
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5. A FEMINIST POLITICS OF DISCURSIVE EMBODIMENT 
Feminist politics of discursive embodiment, as the specific subject that the thesis 
ultimately aims to articulate, is a conceptual political project that sets to tackle, and 
offers a possible interpretation on, the reciprocal connection of ‘women’, female 
corporeality, and feminist politics. I come up with ‘discursive embodiment’ to 
underline the fact that our bodily experiences are constructed upon both material and 
discursive constituents on the one hand; and, on the other hand, to capture the 
corporeal power to produce materiality and discourses in the world. Think of the 
gender distinction of femininity: apart from the physical differentiation of the female 
body from the male body, this gender quality requires collaborations from a shared 
set of social perceptions and norms, which instructs and regulates, for instance, the 
social etiquette and relations of the opposite sexes, female bodily movements and 
postures, and lifestyle choices. Moreover, the discursive nature of femininity places 
social demands on material production, like when considering clothing designs like 
skirts, bras, and high heels. Meanwhile, developing corresponding vocabularies is 
also essential for characteristics of the term to be comprehensible. Additionally, as 
Chapter 2 will demonstrate, I ground the idea of ‘discursive embodiment’ particularly 
on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological conceptualisation of the body as 
lived. The lived body rejects the Cartesian mind-body dualism and, as Merleau-Ponty 
argues, they are not 'two mutually external terms, subject and object, brought about 
by arbitrary degree. It [the union of soul and body] is enacted at every instant in the 
movement of existence.'
46
 Such re-conceptualisation of the relationship between mind 
and body breaks with a conventional gender hierarchical categorisation of man-mind 
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and woman-body, in which the first grouping is construed as superior and desirable 
and the second one as subordinate and unfavourable.
47
  
 
Following from the above, the conceptual reformation of the mind/body dichotomy 
helps the female body to repudiate the imposed inert position, in comparison with the 
opposite gender, and rise above a mere object that is being gazed. Such potential 
transcendence of corporeality recasts female bodies, to paraphrase the prominent 
claim by Carol Hanisch, as the initial access to public arena, rather than as a private 
matter. Derived from this, discursive embodiments of women, which are cultivated 
upon corporeal capabilities and individual situatedness, bear existential indications of 
how one woman is different from another woman, while both share the same social 
label as 'women' in contrast with 'men'. Such differentiation under the terminological 
'sameness', as Chapter 1 will propose, can be construed as a social serial relationship 
among women. Social seriality, which was first articulated by Jean-Paul Sartre and 
later developed by Iris Marion Young to conceptualise gender, incorporates 
individual-praxis as part of its constitution, while acknowledging the 
interchangeability of respective members and material/practical exteriority. 
Furthermore, women are a serialised social collective in a sense that they are 
constrained by the practico-inert reality of gender, which signifies a particular 
'confluence of institutional rules and interactive routines, mobilization of resources 
and physical structures' and those elements 'constitute the historical givens in relation 
                                                 
47
 For general feminist critiques of mind/body dichotomy, to list a few, see Raia Prokhovnik, Rational 
Woman: A Feminist Critique of Dualism (Routledge, 1999); Val Plumwood, Feminism and the 
Mastery of Nature (Routledge, 1993); Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Open 
University Press, 1986); and Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western 
Philosophy (Methuen, 1984). In addition to gender relation in society, Cartesian dualism also has been 
argued that affecting legal and medical practices in our daily life. See Dan L. Burk, "Feminism and 
Dualism in Intellectual Property," Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, 2007:15(2); George D. 
Pappas, "Feminist Jurisprudence," Lecture, Jurisprudence Lecture from International Center for Legal 
Studies, 02/2006; and Neeta Mehta, "Mind-Body Dualism: A Critique from a Health Perspective," 
Mens Sana Monogr, 2011:9(1).  
  
37 
to which individuals act, and which are relatively stable over time.'
48
 The 'relatively 
stable' practico-inert reality of gender underlines its consistent effects that constrain 
the individual subjects, on the one hand; while, on the other hand, it indicates its 
contingent encounters with them. That is, gender structures will not be self-altered in 
accordance with whoever is happened to be positioned under that particular moment. 
However, the potential transcendence of a lived body suggests that a woman can 
move beyond the given conditions toward plural possible futures. Therefore, the 
coincidental interactions between gender seriality and individuals may produce 
different outcomes depending on whether it is, for instance, Mary or Sue in that detail. 
 
The conceptual collaboration between gender seriality and the lived body helps to 
sketch out the existential reciprocity of the collectiveness of women and woman as an 
individual performer and, furthermore, implicitly points to the potential connection 
between discursive embodiments and the progression of feminist politics. As 
explicated earlier, discursive embodiments can only stand in a democratic pluralist 
relation with feminist politics if the political forum can recognise and accommodate 
the contingency and openness of the politicisation of those corporeal experiences. 
Since feminist politics aims to tackle the connection between equality and difference, 
the difficulty of the plurality of women and feminist politics can also be asked in 
different way: how does one construct a democratic relationship between the 
discursive embodiments of individuals and the collective imagination of women? In 
conceptualising 'discourse', David Howarth underlines that 'it is only because of the 
contingency and openness of all social relations that articulatory practices and 
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political agency are possible.'
49
 Meanwhile, the distinction between 'what is and what 
is not legitimate' established by each articulation 'is a political one, and for that reason 
it should remain contestable.'
50
 Connecting democratic pluralisation with political 
contestability, the last section of the thesis explores what political ethos can facilitate 
the reciprocity between discursive embodiments and feminist politics. An agonistic 
account will be advocated, for such ethos recognises the particularity of each 
politicisation and encourages contemplations and contestations of the inclusion-
exclusion regime. Moreover, political settlements are construed as temporal closures 
and 'can be re-examined afresh, re-argued, and re-negotiated in the light of' the new 
exemplification of discursive embodiments.’51   
 
6. OUTLINING THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The above section is a condensed version of the theoretical articulation of a feminist 
politics of discursive embodiment that I intend to develop in the thesis. Such 
conceptual exploration aims to contribute a viable and constructive, but not exclusive, 
way to channel the existential plurality into the political space, with the aim of 
exemplifying how democracy can be an open and fair form of governance. My 
examining approach is to look into different-yet-related concepts and engage with 
specific scholarly works in each chapter in the hope that the aggregation of the 
chapters will be able to enunciate the conceptualisation of a feminist politics of 
discursive embodiment. Thus, I begin with the conception of 'women' in Chapter One, 
in order to map out the existential entanglement of individuality and social 
collectivity. Within this, I particularly draw on the concept of social seriality, which 
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was initially developed by Jean-Paul Sartre and later applied by Young on the notion 
of 'gender', to capture why some individual practices are categorised as gendered and 
the others are not. It will help to show, for example, that the absence of female 
authoritative figures in the public sphere is a systematic and structural problem, 
which is interweaved with the historically unbalanced relationship between particular 
social collectives, rather than an individual issue. With the shared framework 
presented, Chapter Two offers a close inspection of the individual units that are 
comprised in the social collective of women. To break with the Cartesian dualism, I 
will introduce the phenomenological depiction of the lived body, especially Merleau-
Ponty's, as the primary social medium that enacts as well as creates the gendered 
world.       
 
Building on this, Chapter Three focuses on the corporeal capability to produce 
'plurality', with reference to Judith Butler's concept of gender performativity. This 
chapter explores further how the body acquires its understanding of social structures, 
on the one hand; and, on the other hand, how it 'individualises' social differences as 
part of its own existence. In other words, while the corporeality can be disciplined to 
reiterate gender practices, it may also have the creativity and ability to reconfigure 
them and project a different imagination of the world. Thus, I conceive the 
opportunity of politicisation as having emerged initially from the interplay of 
reiteration and reconfiguration, which can be detected in the daily (intentional or 
unintentional) performances of gender. Chapter Four then proceeds to look at the 
theme of politicising discursive embodiments. I will suggest a distinct political 
imagination of the aggregation of individual reiteration and reconfiguration as a 
(re)affirmation of female authority, which legitimise the actions of individual women 
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to counterbalance the asymmetric gender relationship, on the one hand; and, on the 
other hand, to authenticate the serial relationship among women. Put another way, the 
political reciprocity of the existential plurality and feminist politics is constituted and 
intensified through the power of female bodies to manifest individualised social 
differences on the collaborated empowering ground of a female authority. That is to 
say, the symbolic figure can help to identify why certain political claims are not 
merely about personal interests, but concern the injustices between different 
collections of individuals. But how does one deal with the different claims of the 
same unjust issue? How does the consecutive tension between competing 
politicisations not impede and spoil the very equal foundation that they stand upon, 
when the intersection of sexual and other social differences constructs the internal 
hierarchy among women? 
 
In an attempt to answer these questions, the final chapter, Chapter Five, will 
interrogate the notion of political contestability in relation to political ethos. The 
effectiveness and success of a democracy does not simply rely on having fair and 
open mechanisms and institutions in place, but also depends on the general perception 
of such political governance. To be exact, a democratic political system, which offers 
equal access to every citizen, might be endangered or abused, if there is no 
corresponding set of shared beliefs in democratic values among the public. For 
instance, political debates about the distribution of common goods can become either 
an ugly power struggle with catastrophic consequences, if the competing parties 
conceive the whole conflict as a zero-sum game; or it can be a constructive 
deliberation between frenemies, if the persons involved are willing to defend 
something beyond their current disagreements and can see the future possibility to re-
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negotiate. To tackle the political contestability of female authority in connection with 
the plurality of women, I will look into the function of political ethos and argue that 
an agonistic account, especially with reference to William Connolly, can facilitate a 
pluralist imagination of female authority which ensures the responsiveness of 
contemporary feminist politics to the challenges in hand. 
 
I acknowledge the feminist politics of discursive embodiment that proposed in this 
thesis is a specific way to theorise contemporary feminist politics and consider the 
methodology employed in such a explorative theorisation akin to the approach that 
James Tully depicted in his 2002 article, 'Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity'. 
In reflecting on the purpose and function of political theory, Tully argues the critical 
ethos in the philosophical investigation of politics is stemmed from 'a communicative 
relationship of reciprocal elucidation and mutual benefit between political philosophy 
and public affairs.'
52
 Departed from the traditional stand of universalistic theorisation, 
the value of political philosophy in Tully's understanding is hinged upon its abilities 
to contextualise the socio-political struggles and to problematise the dominate 
practices of governance and language, which shape the public perception of these 
events. By questioning the governing discourse of a struggle in its historical context, 
it becomes possible to identify the characteristics of normalisation and  liaised   
    
The interactive relationship 'starts from the present struggles and problems of politics 
and seeks to clarify and transform the normal understanding of them so as to open up 
the field of possible ways of thinking and acting freely in response.'
53
 While the 
intellection tool of abstraction is applied, political philosophy as a critical practice   
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Tully's understanding of such a study of politics   
   
Although the thesis is an explorative theorisation of a particular type of politics, the 
articulation of a feminist politics of discursive embodiment, to quote Tully, 'starts 
from and grants a certain primacy to practice.'
54
 I agree with Tully that a socio-
political practice and the theorisation of this particular practice is in a relationship of 
'open-ended dialogue '; and from this, I consider the interaction between feminist 
activists and theorists is an 'activity of reciprocal elucidation itself'.
55
 Beginning the 
introductory chapter with instances of various women's actions in the public arena is a 
way to show how such a reflective engagement may be initiated. Moreover, it is to 
recognise what feminist politics must deal with is not 'plurality' as a concept, but the 
diversified, discursive embodiments behind it, which make the idea of plurality 
intelligible and pose challenges and questions to the existing political governance. 
Therefore, while every chapter is designed to investigate each conceptual constituent 
of a feminist politics of discursive embodiment, I draw on particular instances as 
examplars in different stages, not only to illustrate a case in point, but also to 
demonstrate the analytical character of the specific concept.     
   
Orienting the thesis as a project of political philosophy, it is neither the statistical fact 
of how many women are currently disadvantaged in the world, nor the types and 
reasons of their suffering that I am concerned with here. Instead, I understand gender 
equality as a continually existing operation under democracy and would like to 
suggest a potential and critical strategy to disclose 'the conditions of possibility of the 
problematic form of governance in a re-description (often in a new vocabulary) that 
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transforms the self-understanding of those subject to and struggling within it, 
enabling them to see its contingent conditions and the possibilities of governing 
themselves differently.'
56
 Furthermore, I am aware of the particularity of the 
disclosure and the contextualised problematisation of governance and, therefore, a 
sense of uncertainty and contestability is retained in my conceptual formulation of a 
feminist politics of discursive embodiment. In other words, it is not a philosophical 
absolute Truth that I am after or able to supply here; I am, instead, proposing an 
alternative vision about how the world could be.  
 
The acknowledgement of the feminist politics of discursive embodiment as a specific 
type of political discourse brings me back to reflect on the relationship between 
feminist scholars and activists again. I admit that it is inevitable that certain aspects 
and details may not be able to be fully reconstructed or accounted in scholarly studies 
of particular feminist events. However, the systematic study or documentation of 
women's activities can be considered as a method of facilitating retrospection and 
participation at both the individual and collective level for building a feminist praxis 
of everyday life. More specifically, feminist study is a form of witnessing the bodily 
experiences and life struggles of women that have been marginalised or absent in the 
writing of history controlled by men. 'When women learn, hear, read, dance to, and 
share stories about the past they realise that what they feel has been felt in similar 
ways before, what they experience has been experienced in similar ways by their 
predecessors and what they are angry about was previously also a cause for rage. We 
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realise that there is nothing wrong with us. We begin to build the grounds for 
individual and collective voice,' as the Sisters of Resistance point out.
57
       
 
Apart from providing recognition for past experiences and validation for the present 
struggles of women, feminist study also offers critical insights and helps feminist 
activists to identify the dominant structure and hegemonic discourse which might 
undermine the objectives or the efficacy of a feminist movement. In other words, the 
intellectual theorisation of women's activities constructs a space of reflection in which 
it provides historical indications to the potential limitation of the current movement 
and invites participants to think beyond the present construction and obvious alliance. 
Overall, I employ conceptualisation and exemplification simultaneously in this thesis, 
in order to demonstrate how empirical practices can inform the clarity of feminist 
theorisation and, in turn, how the conceptual investigation can problematise the 
current forms of governance exercised in contemporary feminist movements.         
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Serialized Women: Re-conceptualising Iris M. Young's 
Gender Seriality 
 
Conceiving the idea of ‘woman’ as a contestable subject and the construction of 
‘womanhood’ as a political project, the first two chapters of the thesis focus on 
introducing the fundamental constituents of a gendered embodiment, namely gender 
structures and corporeality, before proceeding to explore their connections with 
articulating a feminist politics of discursive embodiment. Among the two essential 
components, this chapter is designated to sketch out the theoretical framework of 
‘gender’. Specifically, I focus on examining the conception of ‘gender seriality’ that 
developed by Iris M. Young, as it underlines the interconnectivity of the body and the 
world and the fluidity in the construction of gender. By beginning with a detailed 
reflection of the construction of gender, it helps to situate the locus of this thesis and 
revisit the feminist debates on the sex/gender dichotomy that is initiated in the 
introductory chapter on the one hand. On the other hand, it outlines in advance the 
referential foundation for the phenomenological enunciation of gendered body as 
lived, which will be surveyed in the next chapter.  
 
Additionally, as indicated in the first part of this chapter, Young considers gender 
inequality as a manifestation of structural injustice. Such conceptualization is in 
conjunction with her endeavour to disconnect the concept of gender with the logic of 
identity. It can be seen clearly in her effort to combine Toril Moi’s advocacy of the 
concept of the lives body with her insistence of importance of a conceptualization of 
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gender. Therefore, this chapter begins with such situatedness by showing how Young 
distinguishes the politics of positional difference from the politics of cultural 
difference and then positions feminist politics as a form of the front. Following this 
thread, I then explicate why gender series is insinuating a structured position, in 
reference to Jean-Paul Sartre’s differentiation between social series and social groups.  
 
Afterward, I moved away from the discussion of the gender structured position and 
turn to a phenomenological-informed elaboration of the female body. In this order of 
body as socialized, as a way of being-in-the-world and, finally, as lived, I 
demonstrate how Young constitutes the function of female body within the 
framework of gender seriality. Following that, this chapter concluded in her 
phenomenological analysis of feminine modality, with the attempt of bring together 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the lived body and Simone de Beauvoir’s 
articulation of the situation of women. 
 
1. FEMINIST POLITICS AS AN POLITICS OF PLURALITY 
Following the deconstructive challenge to the sex/gender distinction that connotes the 
differentiation of nature/culture, Toril Moi advocates replacing such dichotomy with 
the existential phenomenological concept of the lived body.
58
 On the one hand, the 
biological evidences have shown the existence of the intersexed body, Anne Fausto-
Sterling says that the traditional differentiation of men and women is a social norm 
posing as a fact of biological nature, and thus such sexual dimorphism should be 
challenged.
59
 On the other hand, the deconstructive feminists, such as Diana Fuss and 
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Judith Butler, have been criticizing the essentialist account of gender often neglects 
the historical and cross-cultural specification in the construction of gender. These 
deconstructive moves somehow weaken the effectiveness of a concept of gender in 
theorizing gender identity and subjectivity. Moi thus suggests reinventing in the idea 
of lived body as it can bring specific physical facts of different bodies into theory and 
capture the way they constitute our subjective sense of self. Similar suggestion also 
be made by Linda Nicholson, as she emphasizes the socio-historically differentiation 
of bodies as lived and then disconnected with a biological foundationalism.
60
 
 
Opposite to the advocacy of abandonment of gender, Iris Marion Young argues in 
favor of a concept of gender in relation to structural inequalities, while aware of the 
deconstructive challenge to the sex/gender distinction and the benefits of the idea of 
lived body. Similar to the deconstructive challenge, she also criticizes the essentialist 
approach to a common gender identity for excluding or devaluing some bodies, 
practices, and discourses by enforcing a normalization process, and at the same time, 
such approach obscures the constructed, and thus contestable, character of that gender 
identity.
61
 However, Young’s method of approaching such ‘gender issue’ is to 
disengage women’s differences from logic of identity and situates gender inequality 
as a structural problem for politics of positional difference. Following such account, 
feminist politics are understood as a form of the politics of difference and it is 
necessary to attend to existing structural processes that differently position men and 
women, in order to achieve gender equality.
62
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Politics of difference, in Young’s works, is a response to the criticisms toward the 
difference-blind principle in the dominant liberal paradigm.
63
 This principle exhibits 
the ideal of equality as sameness, in which 'the application of the same principles of 
evaluation and distribution to all persons regardless their particular social positions or 
backgrounds.'
64
 However, various scholars from different approaches have been 
criticizing such sameness principle for failing to achieve substantial equality, for its 
ignorance of social differences. For instance, Charles Taylor points out that 'the 
supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is 
in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture,' and thus powers an acknowledgement 
of specificity.
65
 Against the presupposition of the uniformity of a nation state, James 
Tully argues that 'if there is to be a post-imperial dialogue on the just constitution of 
culturally diverse societies, the dialogue must be one in which the participants are 
recognized and speak in their own language and customary ways.'
66
 For Young, the 
liberal paradigm 'ignores deep material differences in social position, division of 
labor, socialized capacities, normalized standards, and ways of living that continue to 
disadvantage members of historically excluded groups.'
67
 Owing to this, she asserts 
that democratic communications should attend to different social positions and 
drawing on social difference as a political resource. Her idea of communicative 
democracy and the proposed communicative techniques for participants to engage in 
democratic processes will be discussed in the later chapter on agonistic democracy.  
 
As mentioned above, Young, alongside with other feminists like Anne Phillips and 
Jane Flax, questions the existence of a shared gender identity and its potential 
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essentialist inclination. Perceiving feminist politics as a realization of the politics of 
difference, she suggests to disengaging social group difference, which group-based 
social movements mobilized upon, from a logic of identity in two ways. First of all, 
social groups should be conceptualized 'according to a relational rather than a 
substantialist logic;' and secondly, 'individuals construct their own identities on the 
basis of social group positioning.'
68
 Derived from these two propositions, the social 
difference plays certain roles in the construction of individuals’ identity but 
indecisively, and then individual autonomy and creativity emerged to the scene. 
Meanwhile, the similarity and difference between individuals judged in relation to 
their respective social positions. Hence, the politics of difference and its 
mobilizations and demands are not centred on a common identity, and thus, 
irreducible to any forms of the identity politics.  
 
Here, it is crucial to point out Young’s two categories of the politics of difference, 
namely the politics of positional difference and the politics of cultural difference, and 
how she conceptualizes women’s social differences as a species of structural 
difference. However, I would also show that such distinction somehow becomes 
blurred, owing to Young’s articulation of the politics of difference. Since they are in 
the genre of the politics of difference, the politics of positional difference and the 
politics of cultural difference certainly share a critical attitude towards the difference-
blind principle uphold in the liberal paradigm. Yet, in Young’s words, those two 
versions of the politics of difference differ 'in how they understand the constitution of 
social groups, and in the issues of justice that they emphasize.'
69
 The politics of 
positional difference is concerned about structural inequalities and different social 
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positioning. More specifically, '[P]ersons suffer injustice by virtue of structural 
inequality when their group social positioning means that the operation of diverse 
institutions and practices conspires to limit their opportunities to achieve well-
being.'
70
 For the politics of cultural difference, it tackles specific culture-based 
injustice, as when individuals or groups 'are not free to express themselves as they 
wish, to associate with others with whom they share forms of expression and 
practices, or to socialize their children in the cultural ways they value, or when their 
group situation is such that they bear significant economic or political cost in trying 
to pursue a distinctive way of life.'
71
  
 
Although Young distinguishes cultural differences from positional differences, it 
seems she implicitly conflates the former to the latter when arguing for the politics of 
difference and disengaging it with identity politics. In the Inclusion and Democracy, 
she defines ‘social group’ in a relational conceptualization as 'a collective of persons 
differentiated from others by cultural forms, practices, special needs or capacities, 
structures of power or privilege,' and it is not explicitly constituted, in contrast with 
associations.
72
 Following this, she seems to perceive cultural groups and other social 
groups that are constituted by social structures or positions as the same thing, in 
respect of a relational approach. Furthermore, she states that the group-based social 
movements that mobilized around the specificity of group difference, like gender, 
ethnicity, or religion are primarily responses to structural differences.
73
 Despite the 
fact that she claims the politics of positional difference is irreducible to the politics of 
cultural difference and how the former sometimes is build on the latter, it may be 
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argued that Young regards the structural difference as the fundamental form of the 
politics of difference, even for the politics of cultural difference. For she explicitly 
claims that '[W]here there are problems of lack of recognition of national, cultural, 
religious, or linguistic groups, these are usually tied to question of control over 
resources, exclusion from benefits of political influence or economic participation, 
strategic power, or segregation from opportunity. A politics of recognition, that is, 
usually is part of or a means to claims for political and social inclusion or an end to 
structural inequalities that disadvantage them.'
74
 
 
From Young’s descriptions of the politics of difference and the subsequent politics of 
positional difference above, we can see that social structures and social positions 
occupy crucial roles in her theorization of social differences and her assessment of 
social inequalities. Identifying herself as a critical social theorist, Young claims that 
occupants of structural positions 'are privileged or disadvantaged in relation to one 
another due to the adherence of actors to institutional rules and norms and the pursuit 
of their interests and goals within institutions.'
75
 Such description resembles Nancy 
Folbre’s idea of the ‘structures of constraint,’ in which she pinpoints assets, rules, 
norms, and preferences as the structural factors that within which decisions can be 
made and social action and interaction takes place.
76
 Noteworthy is that the occupants 
of social structures are also being enacted by those social norms, conventions and 
positions etc., albeit their inhibitions that emphasized here. The enactment of social 
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structures will be discussed further when we exploring Young’s conceptualization of 
gender in chapter two.  
 
Following the critical social theory approach and recalling her politics of positional 
difference, Young conceptualizes ‘gender’ as ‘an attribute of social structures’ in her 
work, ‘Lived Body vs Gender: Reflections on Social Structure and Subjectivity.’ 
Meanwhile, she provides a concise articulation of gender as 'a particular form of the 
social positioning of lived bodies in relation to one another within historically and 
socially specific institutions and processes that have material effects on the 
environment in which people act and reproduce relations of power and privilege 
among them,' while referring back to her 1994 work, 'Gender as Seriality: Thinking 
about Women as a Social Collection.'
77
 This reference suggests a revisit to Young’s 
articulation of gender seriality is crucial to understand her theorization of gender and 
its correlation with the politics of positional difference.   
 
2. GENDER SERIALITY: A STRUCTURED SOCIAL POSITION 
As indicated above, Young conceives gender as a form of a structural positioning and 
feminist politics as an exemplification of the politics of positional difference. This 
conceptualization of gender is partly aimed at disrupting the connotation of a fixed 
gender identity with feminist politics. Drawing on Sartre’s idea of a social series, 
‘gender seriality’ can be understood as a critique of feminist essentialism, on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, such a conceptualisation of gender structure provides a 
useful way to make gender inequality intelligible, which is a crucial reason for Young 
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to reject Moi's advocacy of abandoning the concept of gender in relation to the 
sex/gender debate. 
 
In his Critique of Dialectical Reason, Jean-Paul Sartre distinguishes social series 
from social groups, in the light of the internal complexity and reflexivity of social 
collectivity. The differentiation between these two forms of social collectivity, to put 
it simply, exhibited in individuals’ relationship between individuals and their 
interaction with practico-inert reality. The ‘practico-inert reality,’ as Young 
summarises, refers to a situation that is constructed by social subjects and the 
subsequent effects resulting from human actions, which make them ‘practical’ on the 
one hand; and, on the other hand, they are also experienced as ‘inert’, because the 
materiality poses as a constraints on and as resistance to actions.
78
 Sartre argues that 
members of a social group self-consciously and mutually acknowledge each other's 
existences, and they are organized actively and purposefully around shared 
objectives.
79
 This suggests a unified relation between members of a social group, in 
which they act necessarily through the medium of the practico-inert field while 
producing a collective structure to the group.
80
 The members are still separated as 
organic individuals, but their common interests, shared structure of their practico-
inert being, play the role of unification from outside and, thus, constitute the ground 
for the development of a group identity.
81
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In contrast, a social series is a form of social collective that 'neither has specific 
boundaries nor defines identity,' as Young points out.
82
 Sartre formulates social series 
as 'a mode of being for individuals both in relation to one another and in relation to 
their common being and this mode of being transforms all their structures.'
83
 
Furthermore, it is a 'practical and material reality, constituted by an infinite series of 
unique entities; and the uniqueness of each member due to the fact that it stands in the 
same relation to the one that precedes it as this one does to the one preceding it.'
84
 
Series structure, in Sartre’s understanding, is 'the most ordinary, everyday gathering: 
as a fundamental constitution of sociality.'
85
 As the members of a social series are not 
motivated by common goals and are not automatically nor self-consciously aware of 
their relationship with each other, as in the context of social group, they are connected 
passively 'by the objects around which their actions are oriented or by the objectified 
results of the material effects of the actions of the others.'
86
 'To be said to be part of 
the same series it is not necessary to identify a set of common attributes that every 
member has,' as Young further clarifies, 'because their membership is defined not by 
something they are but rather by the fact that in their diverse existences and actions 
they are oriented around the same objects or practico-inert structures.'
87
 
 
The ‘membership’ of a social series is anonymous and 'the unity of the series is 
amorphous, without determinate limits, attributes, or intentions.'
88
 Since Young 
devotes to conceptualize gender in a way that is disconnected with the logic of 
identity, the passiveness manifested in social series provides leverages to theorize 
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gender as a concept of structured social position while rejecting the conjunction with 
group identity. For she claims that 'we all find ourselves passively grouped according 
to these structural relations, in ways too impersonal to ground identity' when we are 
in the same social series.
89
 Social series is a background force that individuals must 
deal with in relation to the collective social structures and histories in which they are 
situated. It is a serial milieu that is generated by practico-inert objects, as 'the already-
there set of material things and collectivized habits against the background of which 
any particular action occurs.'
90
 Such a serialized ‘background’ is not particular or 
individualized, rather it is something like a general condition enabling human agency 
and subjectivity to come into being. The affinity between individuals within the same 
social series is, thus, developed from their similarly positioned experiences and 
similar perspective of other social positions and events.
91
  
 
Noteworthy is that Young tends to use the phrases like ‘structured positioning’ or 
‘social position’ when considering notions of, for instance, gender, ethnicity, and 
class, rather than referring them as an expression of social series. This inclination, I 
suggest, highlights Young’s theoretical position as a critical social theorist and her 
subsequent concentration on social structures when analyzing the sources of injustice. 
As individual subjects cannot choose the surroundings and conditions they are born 
into, they thus face 'an already structured configuration of power, resource allocation, 
status norms, and culturally differentiated practices,' in which individuals make their 
own identities.
92
 Also, Judith Squires interprets the unequal distribution of positions 
of political power as an indication of structural barriers to deny particular social 
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groups access to certain scarce resources.
93
 Conceiving individual lives as constrained 
and enacted by their positions in social structures such as age, gender, and class, 
hence, we can recognize Young’s strong affiliation to an institutional account of the 
roots of injustice. Meanwhile, the use of ‘social position’ or ‘structured positioning’ 
underlies her resistance to the essentialist assumption of a shared group identity in the 
context of the politics of difference, as indicated above, for it fails to appreciate 
sufficiently personal freedom and individuality.  
 
Regardless of the different phrasings, it is reasonable to suggest that Young’s 
formulation of structured social position bears the marks of Sartre’s concept of social 
seriality. This is evident in the case of gender seriality, as Young contends that 'the 
gender position of being a woman does not itself imply sharing social attributes and 
identity with all those others called women'; but, rather, the name of a series in which 
some individuals’ dispositions are conditioned and affinities of people are created by 
'the norms and expectations of heterosexual interaction and the habits developed in 
certain social activities,' without constituting their identities.
94
 Similar contention can 
be equally applied to the scenario of, for instance, race. In the context of the politics 
of difference, Young argues that ‘race’ represents a set of racialized structures in 
which some individuals experience racial categorization, stigmatization, and 
segregation, in relation to dominant norms of respectability and to the normalization 
of certain bodily characteristics.
95
 Being white or being of colour, therefore, is to 
occupy certain social position(s) that privilege someone or make as a deviant in 
accordance with dominant discourses of bodily affects. As Young claims the idea of 
structured social position is a solution to the problem of ‘pop-bead’ identity, namely 
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'[A] person’s identity is not some sum of her gender, racial, class, and national 
affinities,' we can recognize this objective is achieved on the intellectual ground of 
Sartre’s social serialty and to acknowledge the possible reason for her interchanging 
of different phrases.
96
  
 
The discussions of Sartre’s social seriality and Young’s structured social position 
above are helpful in understanding the broad framework in which Young situates her 
articulation of gender seriality as well as the theoretical ground on which she moves 
back and forth occasionally between gender series and gender position. Before 
turning to the detailed constitution of gender seriality, I would like to briefly sketch 
out the epistemological impact in connection with the idea of structured social 
position and its consequent political implications. As mentioned earlier, the politics of 
difference claims that social difference is a political resource that democratic 
communications should draw on in order to achieve justice and to facilitate 
democratic deliberations. This is because individuals obtain their ‘situated 
knowledges’, as Donna Haraway calls it, from their unique social positions, and 
'those social positionings also influence the interests and assumptions they bring to 
[political] inquiry.'
97
 Since social series reject the logic of a shared group identity, 
there is no ‘authentic’ experience or perspective that individuals who are similarly 
situated should uphold. Rather, individuals as political actors 'bring specific and 
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differing perspectives to public life and communication because of these serializes 
structural positionings,' as Young asserts.
98
 Such an understanding of individuals' 
knowledge embarks on the explicit voicing of the plurality and contestability of 
positions, and it echoes with Chantal Mouffe’s critique of deliberative democracy that 
the domain of politics 'is not a neutral terrain that could be insulated from the 
pluralism of values and where rational, universal solutions could be formulated.'
99
 A 
further account of the situated knowledge in the context of feminist politics is 
elucidated in the chapter on agonistic democracy.  
 
It is now we turn to the articulation of gender seriality in reference to the concept of 
structured social position. ‘Women,’ in Young’s conceptualization, signifies a 
collection of individuals who are similarly positioned within historically and socially 
specific material organizations and objects as enabled and constrained by the 
structural relations of, as she identifies, enforced heterosexuality, gendered 
hierarchies of power, and sexual division of labour.
100
 From this encompassing 
conceptualization of gender seriality, a thorough elaboration and close examination 
respectively into the two substantial factors emerged within, namely the materiality 
and social structures that associated with gender, is needed.  
 
3. THE HISTORICAL FACTOR IN GENDER CONSTITUTION 
However, it is crucial to be aware of a substantive notion of ‘history’ is embedded in 
the constitution of gender seriality, even when the discussions of the materiality and 
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social structures are not necessarily situated in specific historical contexts. Since the 
purposes of this thesis and Young’s articulation of gender seriality is not providing a 
historical analysis of feminist politics, a review of the historical development of 
feminist movement would not be addressed here. As Young claims that 'as a series 
woman is the name of a structural relation to material objects as they have been 
produced and organized by a prior history,' the historicity that I intend to emphasis 
here is the evident history of strong prejudice against women across the world. 
101
 
The prejudice may take different forms in different places, like that male is the sole 
heir of the crown in the Japanese Royal Family, the female genital mutilation in 
Africa, and women are not allowed to drive in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Additionally, it is until the late nineteenth century that women finally have the right 
to vote in elections. Those instances clearly signal a historical fact that women have 
suffered different types of marginalization and oppressions in human history.  
 
This painful past has profound and material effects on the environment in which 
individuals interact and reproduce power relations. For instance, the preference over 
boy than girl that motivated by patriarchy may contribute to the disproportionate birth 
rate of male and female babies in China, which is worsening under the notorious one-
child policy.
102
 Martin Heidegger and Sartre also underline the influences of history 
in their respective account of the constitution of social relations and the making of 
self. Heidegger argues that individuals will always understand themselves in terms of 
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some way of existing that has been handed down from historical heritage and the 
norms that belong to it.
103
 Some may disagree with the imperative aspect of one’s 
historical situation that derive from his existential notion of historicity, but the point 
is the historical situation that one inherited in the society holds certain authority for 
that person, via institutionalized social conventions or practices, and, not inevitably, 
affects one’s choice.104 Sartre, motivated by historical materialism and in relation to 
the struggle over subject position, claims that social relations not only occur between 
human beings, but take place within institutions that have developed historically and 
imprinted with relations of superiority and deference.
105
 ‘History’, in feminists’ 
account, conveys the story of 'the persistence of asymmetries between men and 
women, the denial of being and justice to women by men in and through concrete 
social relations and the at best partially successful struggle by women against these 
relations of domination.'
106
 A comprehensive analysis of women’s subordination in 
the world by using Sartre’s view on historicity is developed by Simone de Beauvoir. 
She examines how the repeated reproduction of power relations in history defines 
women’s place in the world as a permanent 'object' status, as the 'second' sex, in 
accordance and in comparison with men.
107
  
 
Young acknowledges the effects of history in the way that she argues that the 
individual person 'is born in a particular place and time, is raised in a particular 
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family setting, and all these have specific socio-cultural histories that stand in relation 
to the history of others in a particular way.'
108
 In terms of gender, the prior history of 
women’s subordinated, marginalized, and oppressed situation contributes to the 
materiality and social structures that are associated with gender as biased and lead to 
their different treatments toward men and women. How those ‘gendered’ social 
structures and material organizations enable or condition individuals, and in turn, how 
they perceive their social positions and interact with those ‘gendered’ social 
structures and material organizations becomes matters of contextualization and 
subjectivity. For instance, the gender discriminations that an American black woman, 
where a dreary history of slavery exists, encountered may differ from the one who 
live in Congo where suffers the turmoil of war. However, their worldly situation as 
‘the second sex,’ using Beauvoir’s vocabulary, in contrast with the status of men is a 
historical fact, which provides justifications for affirmative steps for women.
109 
 
Young asserts that women’s condition would be simply unintelligible 'if we "explain" 
it by appeal to some natural and ahistorical feminine essence.'
110
 Nevertheless, the 
force of manifestation of history to lived bodies and gendered social structures is not 
unidirectional, but mutually reinforcing between each other. Gender as a form of 
social position, under Young’s conceptualization, does not imply Heidegger’s 
formidable sense of historicality in which individuals’ authentic choice must respond 
to the claim that history makes on the people to whom one belongs, to seize its 
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‘destiny’. 111  'The situation of women within a given socio-historical set of 
circumstances, despite the individual variation in each woman’s experience, 
opportunities, and possibilities,' as Young argues, 'has a unity that can be described 
and made intelligible.'
112
 To summarize, it is the reinforcements between those 
fundamental factors, namely history, the materiality, and social structures, in the 
constitution of gender seriality create a general sense of ‘unity’ that make women’s 
situation comprehensible.  
 
The materiality, in Young’s concept of gender seriality, comprises the objects 
associated with the constitution of women’s collectivity and, most importantly, 
female bodies. While both of them are inscribed by cultural and social practices, the 
female body is the site of agency, where individuals experience their enactments and 
restrictions by structured social positions and where they manifest their subjectivity 
and uniqueness. For '[T]o be an agent means that you can take the constraints and 
possibilities that condition your life and make something of them in your own 
way.'
113
 To understand how the gendered social structures carry out their power of 
enforcements and how they may be transformed in the context of gender seriality, an 
investigation into lived bodies is certainly useful and that is the subject I now turn to. 
 
4. ARTICULATING WOMAN'S BODY 
As stated earlier, Toril Moi argues, instead of a concept of gender, an existential 
phenomenological concept of the lived body can disconnect feminist subjectivity with 
the danger of making sexual difference dimorphous, as in accordance with the 
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sex/gender distinction. Meanwhile, she asserts that '[T]he distinction between sex and 
gender is simply irrelevant to the task of producing a concrete, historical 
understanding of what it means to be a woman (or a man) in a given society.'
114
 Such 
strong claim of the irrelevance of the sex/gender distinction, from Moi’s perspective, 
should be understood specifically in the tasks of conceptualizing the sexual different 
body and subjectivity, rather than a general application to all aspects of feminist 
projects. Aware that the distinction of sex/gender is a feminist attempt to battle the 
biological sexism, Moi claims that the return to the phenomenological concept of the 
lived body, especially drawing on Beauvoir’s idea of ‘the body as a situation’, can 
break the seemingly necessary connections between biological facts and social norms. 
Since we cannot eliminate the biological existences of sex, the denial of the idea that 
'biology grounds or justifies social norms,' in her account, opens up the possibility to 
'produce societies that either multiply or eliminate gender.'
115
  
 
I also mentioned that Young agrees with Moi that the lived body can account for both 
physical and social dimensions of the human body, and thus it is beneficial for 
feminists to conceptualize women’s situation in the world. However, Young 
disagrees with Moi on the stand of renouncing the concept of gender with feminist 
theory, for she is concerned about the theorizations of women as social collective and 
gender as specific form of social structure that contributes to women’s subordinated 
status. In short, their different attitudes toward the viability of a concept of gender are 
oriented from their respective feminist concerns. While Moi uses a concept of the 
lived body as an approach to produce a feminist theory of subjectivity, Young argues 
a concept of gender is crucial for understanding one of the motivations behind 
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feminist politics, which is to trace the roots of injustices between the two sexes. In 
other words, 'feminism expresses a distinct politics…but asking a unique set of 
enlightening questions about a distinct axis of social oppression cannot be sustained 
without some means of conceptualizing women and gender as social structures.'
116
 
Acknowledging the deconstructive challenge to the sex/gender distinction and the 
critique of sexual dimorphism, Young then provides a structural account of gender 
while incorporating the notion of the phenomenological concept of lived bodies. 
 
I should briefly sketch out the timeline of Young’s works that surrounds gender 
seriality and the existential phenomenological account of the lived body here. 
Young’s phenomenological articulations around female bodies and their lived 
experiences, in respect of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s contribution of the lived body, 
are written before her 1994 work on gender seriality. Meanwhile, there is no direct 
reference to the phenomenological lived body presented in her 1994 article on the 
constitution of gender seriality, and her reflection on social structure and feminist 
subjectivity regarding to Moi’s advocacy of turning to a concept of the lived body 
appears in 2002. In fact, Young refers to the physical body as either a ‘female body’ 
or a ‘social body’, instead of the direct use of ‘lived body’, in her theorization of 
gender seriality. As one of the tasks of this chapter is look into those applications of 
the lived body in Young’s works that across two decades, I will also argue that a 
consistency is behind them regardless the terminology differences. 
 
In the following, I take Young’s articulation of female bodies that she specifically 
formulated in relation to gender seriality as the starting point for my investigation into 
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the theorization of gender as a structured social position. From there, I then examine 
her earlier and later works, in which she provides rather abundant materials and depth 
analysis, with particular focus on the lived body and lived experiences. Why is the 
carnal body social, even described as lived from a feminist perspective? As the map 
of Young’s idea of lived female bodies be sketched out, it will become clear that her 
establishment of the idea is grounded upon Simone de Beauvoir’s idea of body is a 
situation and, with emphasis on the concept of lived body, upon French 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology, under Merleau-Ponty’s 
construction, provides an alternative route, in the form of transcending the conflict 
between realism and idealism, to rediscover the constituted, structural relations 
between the perceived subject and the perceived world, relations of intentionality 
rather than causality.
117
 Following that, our bodies reveal themselves as the initial and 
direct access of being in this constituted world and 'the body invites the radicalization 
of our concepts by way of being the root of the creative operation that opens up the 
phenomenal field.'
118
 This existential phenomenological body bears both the marks of 
enactment and restriction from its situated surrounding, and it motivates Young to 
examine embodied being-in-the-world by describing the body modalities of sexual 
and gender difference. 
 
4a. Female Body is a Social Body 
In the above formulation of gender seriality as a specific form of social positions, 
Young had pointed out that it is the individual body that being situated and lives out 
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her unique bodily experience 'in a social-historical context of the behaviour and 
expectations of others,' without worrying about generalized group identities 
constituting her individual identity.
119
 The social-historical context where the 
individual body moves and her movements are subject to other people’s gazes, all of 
these render the material body as a potential bearer of discourse and is awaited for 
picking up or initiating her own social conditions.  
 
Beauvoir’s influential work, The Second Sex, provides a perceptive analysis of the 
prominence of other people’s gazes on individual bodies. In light of the relation 
between the body and the self, she argues 'to be present in the world implies strictly 
that there exists a body which is at once a material thing in the world and a point of 
view towards the world.'
120
 She then contends that men and women live differently 
through such bodily existence and the point of view, and women are situated as the 
prominent Other. How the female body is disciplined to reflect the dominant social 
ideals, which often associate with certain kinds of slim, white, always able, bodies, 
under the constant gaze of the others also received considerate attentions in 1970s 
feminist writing. 'In our culture not one part of a woman’s body is left untouched, 
unaltered … From head to toe, every feature of a woman’s face, every section of her 
body, is subject to modification,' Andrea Dworkin writes.
121
 Despite that, Moi argues 
a contingent relationship between individual's subjectivity and body is then developed. 
It is because that individuals are aware of their bodies 'will significantly influence 
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both what society-others-make of [me], and the kind choices [I] will make in response 
to the Other’s image of [me].'122 
 
In other words, female physical features, such as breast and uterus, and female 
corporeal activities, like pregnancy and child caring, are not merely material but 
incorporate with social meanings, which may vary across different cultural 
backgrounds. In short, the corporeal body is a social embodiment. 'Our bodies are 
trained, shaped and impressed with the prevailing historical forms of … masculinity 
and femininity,' as Bordo asserts.
123
 Take menstruation as an example. One of the 
traditional customs in Taiwanese society states that woman in her menstruation is not 
allow to enter religious temples, for people believe the biological periodical 
occurrence of bleeding is a sign of ‘uncleanness’ from a religious convention point of 
view. Thus, a female body is a social body, in which action is oriented as well as 
confined by rules.  
 
The incorporation of sociality and materiality of a body, as pointed out earlier, is the 
foreground of the phenomenological existential concept of the lived body. This is 
because, in Merleau-Ponty’s point of view, the aim of phenomenology is to study the 
essences of things by situating such essences back into existence, and 'does not expect 
to arrive at an understanding of man and the world from any starting point other than 
that of their "facticity."'
124
 Under such circumstances, the primary focus of a 
phenomenological research is not trying to bridge the gap between consciousness and 
being. In fact, the fundamental presupposition underlying phenomenology is that 
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'[T]he world is there before any possible analysis of mine, and it would be artificial to 
make it the outcome of a series of syntheses which link, in the first place sensations, 
then aspects of the object corresponding to different perspectives, when both are 
nothing but products of analysis, with no sort of prior reality.'
125
 Thus, 
phenomenology calls a radical reflection on our bodily experiences, since the body is 
our locus of being-in-the-world, or as Merleau-Ponty describes it, '[T]he body is our 
general medium for having a world.'
126
  
 
4b. Body Being-in-the-World 
David Morris suggests Martin Heidegger’s term, ‘being-in-the-world,’ 'names an 
ontological structure fundamental to beings such as ourselves; its hyphenated 
construction flags the indissoluble reciprocity of our being, the world and the relation 
of being-in.'
127
 Inheriting Heidegger’s account of ‘being-in-the-world,’ Merleau-
Ponty uses the concept of the lived body as a transcendental approach to against the 
traditional subject-object dualisms. Moi argues that his approach can 'expand our 
understanding of nature, to wrench it away from the deadening hand of positivism 
and scientism by showing that in so far as the human body is concerned, one can 
draw no clear-cut line between that which belongs to the realm of nature and that 
which belongs to the realm of meaning.'
128
 For Merleau-Ponty, '[T]he body is the 
vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a living creature, to be 
intervolved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with certain projects and be 
continually committed to them.'
129
 He explores such corresponding relationship 
between our body and the world by describing the case of the phantom limb. 'What it 
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is in us which refuses mutilation and disablement is an I committed to a certain 
physical and inter-human world, who continues to tend towards his world despite 
handicaps and amputations and who, to this extent, does not recognize them de jure,' 
and therefore constructing the phantom limb as an ambivalent presence of an arm.
130
  
 
This ambivalence of the arm’s existence, as Merleau-Ponty argues, is issued from that 
individual’s appeal to the customary world s/he is committed to before the mutilation, 
but in turn, revealing the present truth of that person’s disability.131 In other words, 
the body is in acquisition with habits, while simultaneously attending to the external 
world via that body. 'Habit is not a function of reflective thought, nor is it 
transparently accessible to reflection in pure consciousness, rather it manifests itself 
in the perceptual body,' as Taylor Carmon argues.
132
 He also points out that Merleau-
Ponty shares this perception of habit with Kantian predecessor, 'the notion of an 
integrated set of skills poised and ready to anticipate and incorporate a world prior to 
the application of concepts and the formation of thoughts and judgments.'
133
 The 
departure between the habitual body and the body at contemporaneous moment then 
depicts the body as our anchor to the world: 'for if it is true that I am conscious of my 
body via the world, that it is the unperceived term in the centre of the world towards 
which all objects turn their face, it is true for the same reason that my body is the 
pivot of the world.'
134
 Sartre provides similar point when he asserts that 'all this in so 
far as I surpass it in the synthetic unity of my being-in-the-world is my body as the 
necessary condition of the existence of a world and as the contingent realization of 
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this condition,' while arguing how our experiences of the world condition our 
perspectives 'on the world by the world itself.'
135
  
 
Following the same line, Young understands the lived body as signifying 'a unified 
idea of a physical body acting and experiencing in a specific socio-cultural context; it 
is body-in-situation. … The person always faces the material facts of her body and its 
relation to a given environment. Her bodily organs have certain feeling capacities and 
function in determinate ways.'
136
 Furthermore, she defines ‘femininity’ as denoting 'a 
set of structures and conditions that delimit the typical situation of being a woman in 
a particular way in which this situation is lived by the women themselves.'
137
 Such 
femininity is the general milieu that characterizes the gender seriality, in which the 
lived body experiences itself as a gendered practico-inert reality. More specifically, 
femininity as a specific facticity of gender is constructed by the interwoveness 
between gendered social structures and gendered materiality.  
 
As a result of material relations of one’s corporeal existence and one’s social and 
physical milieu, femininity, as a facticity, is revealed by a woman’s lived experience. 
It is because that 'our existence is too tightly caught up in the world to know itself as 
such at the point where it casts itself forth, and that it needs the field of ideality in 
order to come to know and prevail over its facticity.'
138
 How such facticity of 
femininity is acknowledged and to be dealt with are partially a matter of individuals’ 
projects, since individuals do not encounter this facticity with a blank mind, but with 
freedom and intentionality. For instance, faced with the competition between Barak 
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Obama and Hilary Clinton in 2008 Democratic Party presidential primaries, white 
feminists like Gloria Steinem and Robin Morgan urged stridently the female electors 
should vote for Hilary Clinton, as her winning of presidential nomination would 
represent a victory for feminism.
139
 Nonetheless, many black female constituents 
perceived the same competition differently, in virtue of their attachments to the 
agonizing history of racism in America. Those 'facts of embodiment social and 
physical environment appear in light of the projects a person has' then engender our 
body as a body in situation.
140
  
 
‘Body-in-situation,’ renowned by Beauvoir's observation of women’s place in the 
world as the secondary sex, is firstly developed by Sartre in the Being and 
Nothingness, in which he claims that individuals are always situated, in terms of their, 
say, nationality, gender, and social class. Sartre argues that the understanding of our 
own bodily existences cannot escape the making of our relationships with the Other; 
'[I]t is as body-in-situation that I apprehended the Other’s transcendence-transcended, 
and it is as body-in-situation that I experience myself in my alienation for the Other’s 
benefit.'
141
 We do not anatomize our bodies to comprehend the body organs and their 
function, but refer to 'all those which have been shown to me on the dissection table 
or [of] which I have seen colored drawing in books.'
142
 The dependence of the other’s 
being displayed above, for Sartre, points out that human body cannot be a self-
sufficient existence as being-in-itself, but a being-for-itself that consisting in its own 
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activity and purposive nature. Merleau-Ponty describes such purposive and active 
nature of the body in connection with ‘motility as intentionality.’ The body is the 
realization of 'consciousness projects itself into a physical world,' and, as he accounts 
further about how the body is the concrete access to the world, '[S]ight and movement 
are specific ways of entering into relationship with objects and if, through all these 
experiences, some unique function finds its expression, it is the momentum of 
existence, which does not cancel out the radical diversity of the contents, …, [but] by 
guiding them towards the intersensory unity of a ‘world’.'143 
 
Regardless of the intentionality embedded in body movements, Sartre emphasizes the 
significance of the Other in our self-identification, as 'it is the fact that the for-itself is 
not its own foundation, and this fact is expressed by the necessity of existing as an 
engaged contingent being among other contingent beings.'
144
 There are two major 
modes of ‘otherness’ presented in Young’s works on the gender issues. One is 
‘otherness’ as a serial interchangeability of subjectivity in the gender seriality. Since a 
series is the opposite of a group where members mutually recognize and positively 
identify with each other, Young argues that a woman experiences a sense of alterity 
when she uttering 'I am a woman' in the context of the gender seriality. That woman 
undergoes the serial facticity of gender and she is anonymous because her 
contingently fungible relationship with other women, as she experiences 'Other to 
herself, and Other to the others.'
145
 The individual is aware of herself as a woman in 
the sense that '[I]n the newspaper I read about a woman who was raped, and I 
empathize with her because I recognize that in my serialized experience I am rapeable, 
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the potential object of male appropriation.'
146
 This self-awareness of one’s position as 
a woman and her relation with other women who are closely situated, from Young’s 
perspective, 'depersonalizes me, constructs me as Other to her and Other to myself in 
a serial interchangeability.'
147
  
 
Such ‘depersonalization’ renders gender, in respect of social seriality, as a 
‘background’ that one must deal with but does not necessarily determine one’s 
identity. When analyzing the point of perception, Merleau-Ponty once described 
‘perception’ as 'a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the background from which 
all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them,' and thus our body is the background 
of our movements
148
 Moi provides a further illustration of Merleau-Ponty’s 
differentiation of background and foreground: '[A] background is not the meaning or 
essence of whatever takes place in the foreground: the natural processes of the body 
cannot in themselves explain the acts and thoughts of human beings. On the other 
hand, the specific background that the body is cannot be thought away or denied, or 
presumed to have no effects on the foreground.'
149
 Following this, gender seriality can 
be interpreted as a specific background, in which it provides indications and signs to 
understand how the actors’ words and behaviors are gender-coded.150 Meanwhile, to 
borrow Moi’s words, 'whereas at other times a relentless focus on the background 
would be quite misplaced,' since there is no exclusive background can dictate the 
individual’s subjectivity.151  
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Although sharing certain similarities with Merleau-Ponty’s understanding, Beauvoir 
takes the account of the body as a background and the relationship with the Other 
presented within from a different, rather obligatory angle, in relation to women’s 
situation in the world. As emphasized before, she argues that woman is in a 
subordinated status in the world, as a second sex to her male counterpart. This sense 
of inferiority implied in the asymmetric position between man and woman provides 
another form of ‘otherness,’ which Young draws on to analyze the phenomenology of 
female comportments and this is the subject I now turn to.     
 
5. INHIBITED FEMALE CORPOREALITY: THE PERMANENT 
  OTHER(S) 
Written in 1980, Iris Marion Young’s 'Throwing Like a Girl' marks a return of 
second-wave feminism to the phenomenological understanding of women’s embodied 
experiences. This particular essay is 'aimed to theorize the effects of feminine 
socialization and sexual objectification on a woman’s world-making movements 
describing us as unable to be free in movement,' as she wrote in a postscript in 
reflection that is published in 1998.
152
 Various scholars have been drawing on this 
existential phenomenological analysis on female modalities into different areas of 
research. For instance, Ann-Carlta Evaldsson explores the particularities of modality 
in the context of same-sex and cross-sex foursquare games, with attention to cultural 
and institutional structures embedded in the games; Greg Downey investigates the 
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meaning of ‘throws like a girl’ in relation to the physiological and neurological 
consequences of learning the ability of throwing, especially among Brazilians.
153
  
 
Apart from challenging Erwin Straus’ analysis on the motilities of throwing between 
two sexes, Young also exploring the specific female lived experiences of pregnancy, 
menstruation and the meaning of woman’s breast, by drawing on personal 
experiences and observations from a phenomenological approach. The attention to 
gender-specific bodily comportments and lived experiences constitute what Nick 
Crossley called ‘the gender politics of comportment.’154 The advocacy to female-
specific lived experiences can be regarded as a theoretical aversion to poststructuralist 
feminism’s negligence of the cognitive importance of experience, as well as against 
the tendency of reducing the lived experience to the analysis of language.  
 
Linda Martin Alcoff provides such criticisms toward the ignorance of the 
phenomenological articulation of lived experiences, when she reflecting on Joan 
Scott’s theorization of ‘experiences.’ In her reading of Samuel R. Delany’s memoir as 
being a black gay man, Scott recognizes the existence of ‘experience’ in our everyday 
language and attempt to politicize the discursive nature of ‘experience’ by 
questioning its originary status in historical explanation. She then drawing on 
Delany’s words and argues this is done by 'tracking "the appropriation of 
language…in both directions, over the gap," and by situating and contextualizing that 
language that one historicizes the terms by which experience is represented, and so 
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historicizes ‘experience’ itself.'155 Alcoff questions the historicizing of ‘experience’ in 
terms of language struggles and claims that '[E]xperience sometimes exceeds 
language; it is at times inarticulate.'
156
 She further urges 'a better account of the 
relationship between theory and experience, one in which theory is understood as 
itself embodied rather than simply formative of, without being formed by, bodily 
experience.'
157
 The informative transformation of lived experience to theory is 
generated from 'descriptions of specific bodies, with their own specific individual 
histories and inscriptions, rather than an abstract concept of the body or one that 
exists only in textual representation.'
158
  
 
As the phenomenological understanding of the lived body exceeds language, it 
politicizes the female body without reconstituting dualisms, for the lived body is both 
the medium and enactment of consciousness and subjectivity. According to Young, 
this peculiarity of the lived body not only challenges the traditional philosophical 
dualism of mind and body, which contributes to the subordinator status of women in 
feminists’ opinion, but disrupts with ‘a dualist language’ that operated among 
antidualist philosophers.
159
 Arguing that Merleau-Ponty assumes ‘a unified self as a 
condition of experience,’ she holds that this is how phenomenology repudiates the 
antidualist distinction between body as subject and body as object.
160
 The female 
comportments and experiences thus acquire their political significance because the 
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body is engaged in the world as pointed earlier, by taking up gendered 'habitual 
schemas and deploy[s] them, in situ, with competence and skills. It applies them and 
modifies them as and when appropriate.'
161
 While allying with Alcoff’s 
acknowledgement of the contestability of the lived experience, Diana Coole 
summarizes the worthiness of attending to female corporeal experiences by 
identifying them as 'the realm where the politics begins and, to a significant extent, 
remains. It is in experience that discourses, ideologies, and sedimented practices are 
reproduced, and it is in lived experience and perceptions of dysfunctions and lacunae 
that resistance is first motivated and appears.'
162
   
 
Perceiving the subject lives as flesh, woman’s body is value-laden with socio-
historical discursive applications that result in practical effects in her daily 
movements and relation with the others. Young, along with Christine Battersby, coins 
the pressing need to inquire into 'the status and malleability of bodies in relation to 
social status' is originated from the dichotomy of masculine/feminine, 'where the first 
is more highly valued than the second, and where the second is partly defined as a 
lack with respect to the first.'
163
 The relational dimension of such masculine/feminine 
is displayed when Young formulates the feminine 'as a set of normatively disciplined 
expectations imposed on female bodies by male-dominated society,' especially 
'[N]ormative femininity detaches persons who fall under its disciplines from 
expressions or enactments of power and authority.'
164
 Such relational facet leads to 
the issue of otherness, in which the existence of the Other is our prerequisite of being-
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in-the-world, but not in terms of alterity, rather a signification of involuntarily 
subordination as in Beauvoir’s depiction. 
 
5a. The 'Other' Who is Not 'Man' 
As indicated earlier, Young’s analysis on feminine existence in patriarchal society is 
partially but indicatively depends on Beauvoir’s delineation of the situation of women. 
More specifically, she utilizes the tension between immanence and transcendence that 
caused by women’s situation as Other to inquire into the contradiction embedded in 
modalities of the structures and conditions of the female body’s existence in the 
world.
165
 This contradiction, in short, is stemmed from the fact that woman’s 
subjectivity is being denied and being necessitated at the same time, owing to her 
situation of being-in-the-world. That is to say, by interpreting Beauvoir, Young 
argues that the immanence of woman is derived from her inessential correlation to 
man that defined by the culture and society that she engages in. She 'is thereby both 
culturally and socially denied the subjectivity, autonomy, and creativity that are 
definitive of being human and that in patriarchal society accorded the man.'
166
 
Nonetheless, 'woman is a free subject who participates in transcendence,' owing to the 
fact that she is a human existence.
167
 The tension within women’s bodily 
comportment, motility, and spatiality thus emanated.    
 
The contradiction in the feminine body modalities, as Young proclaims, is rooted in 
'the particular situation of women as conditioned by their sexist oppression in 
contemporary society.'
168
 She then elaborates on the principle circumstance of such 
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women’s situation in the world as ' of living the ever-present possibility that one will 
be gazed upon as a mere body, as shape and flesh that presents itself as the potential 
object of another subject’s intentions and manipulations, rather than as a living 
manifestation of action and intention.'
169
 The possibility of subjectivity deprivation in 
women’s situation marks the distinction between the gaze of the Other as a condition 
of self-consciousness in Sartre’s account, and as a mere objectification of body in 
itself in Beauvoir’s articulation.170 This dictatorial mode of otherness that Beauvoir 
enunciates in connection to the repressive relation between men and women is 
grounded upon Hegel’s prominent ‘master-slave dialect.’ However, she employs the 
terms ‘Subject’ and ‘Other’, instead of Hegel’s ‘master’ and ‘slave,’ in her 
phenomenological analysis of women’s alienated situation.171  
 
Under Beauvoir’s formulation, the status of the Subject and the Other, in terms of 
man and woman, is inequitable in the sense that the front is in an absolute position 
and the latter is being regarded as the inessential. 'Woman is enticed by two modes of 
alienation. Evidently to play at being a man will be for her a source of frustration, but 
to play at being a woman is also a delusion: to be a woman would mean to be the 
object, the Other-and the Other nevertheless remains subject in the midst of her 
resignation,' she once remarks.
172
 The failure to reach the same status as the 
masculine Subject and being silenced in the position as the Other, women are 
confined in their corporeal existences and is the alienated Other to their male 
counterparts. Man is disembodied as he identifies himself with a noncorporeal reality 
and renders his body as a strange Other to him. Following that, 'the body repressed or 
                                                 
169
 Ibid, p. 44 
170
 Ibid, this differentiation is underlined in the footnote 24. 
171
 See Beauvoir, 1974. 
172
 Beauvoir, 1974, p. 57. 
  
80 
denied and, then, projected-reemerges for this ‘I’ as the view of Others as essentially 
body. Hence, women become the Other; they come to embody corporeality itself,' and 
such expendability then constitutes the essence of women’s existence.173 Judith Butler 
identifies such correlation as 'the essential interdependence of the disembodied "man" 
and the corporeally determined ‘woman’,' when reflecting on Beauvoir’s prominent 
work, The Second Sex.
174
  
 
Unlike the Hegelian master and slave dialect, woman, as the oppressed Other, may 
find it difficult to appeal to a shared abusive situation and to identify themselves with 
a common history, in which she can obtain her subjectivity and demand recognition 
and reciprocity, as similar to the Hegelian slave. For Beauvoir argues that the 
diversity of women’s suppressed circumstances around the world make them 
ineffectual to recognize the origin of their otherness. An example of an Islamic veiled 
women’s situation in France, where the burka ban is implemented, may illustrate this 
point. In a simplifying manner, one may argue that an Islamic woman in France may 
experience a double-level negation of subjectivity than her fellow French women. To 
begin with, her religious practice of wearing a burka positions her as an inharmonious 
Other, who is incompatible with France’s secular milieu. In the examination of a 
three Islamic veil cases in French public schools, Joan W. Scott indicates that 'the veil 
became a screen onto which were projected images of strangeness and fantasies of 
danger-danger to the fabric of French society and to the future of the republican 
nation.'
175
 The marginalization and discrimination that she experienced in relation to 
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her religious belief may enhance her fellow feeling with other Islam men in French 
society. Regardless her sympathetic identification with other fellow Muslims, she 
may find that her suffering as an estranged Other in society signals the same 
significance as her Islamic male counterparts. For, according to Beauvoir’s 
articulation of the situation of women, she occupies an inferior status in the 
patriarchal Islamic community and hence her bodily experiences, in connection with 
her corporeality from a male’s eyes. She is also the Other to her Muslim male peers, 
and thus fails the attempts to seek equal recognition of her experiences and 
subjectivity.    
 
The plurality of individual identity complicates women’s situation in the world by 
implanting ambiguity in the source of otherness. 'Thus woman may fail to lay claim 
to the status of subject because she lacks definite resources, because she feels the 
necessary bond that ties her to man regardless of reciprocity, and because she is often 
very well pleased with her role as the Other,' as Beauvoir observes.
176
 Such tendency 
leads Coole to conclude that '[I]nstead of a dialectic that results in the victory of the 
slave, there is therefore an unproductive dichotomy that keeps women in permanent 
servitude, without recognition.'
177
 What Young observes in the feminine bodily 
comportments, with reference to Beauvoir’s account of women’s existence in the 
world, is a fundamental tension between immanence and transcendence that 
embedded within. How she articulates such contradictory in the lived body of a 
woman is the discussion I now turn to. 
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5b. The Contradiction in Woman’s Body  
Young’s phenomenological investigation of feminine modality is offered as a critique 
towards Straus’ analysis of the different developments of lateral space between the 
two sexes.
178
 She contends that Straus using a mysterious ‘feminine essence’, rather 
than on the ground of physical attributes, in his understanding of ‘masculine’ and 
‘feminine’ corporeal movements. In her words, 'Straus explains the difference in style 
of throwing by referring to a ‘feminine attitude’ in relation to the world and to space. 
The difference for him is biologically based, but he denies that it is specifically 
anatomical. Girls throw in a way different from boys because girls are ‘feminine.’'179 
Rejecting the peculiar feminine essence implied in Straus’s study of body movements, 
Young further draws on Beauvoir to highlight a potential phenomenological 
framework of the lived body can help us to comprehend the gendered modalities. In 
her articulation of women’s situation, Beauvoir explicitly provides 'a common basis 
which underlies every individual female existence in the present state of education 
and custom.'
180
 Although Young appreciates Beauvoir’s theoretical intervention in 
making women’s situation intelligible, she claims that '[B]y largely ignoring the 
situatedness of the woman’s actual bodily movement and orientation to its 
surroundings and its world, Beauvoir tends to create the impression that it is woman’s 
anatomy and physiology as such that as least in part determine her unfree status.'
181
 In 
order to counterbalance Beauvoir’s potential appeal to nature determinant, Young 
brings Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the lived body into her phenomenological 
articulation of feminine comportments as the lived body is always enculturated.  
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As indicated above, Young is allied with Moi for the latter’s advocacy of the concept 
of the lived body, for she argues that this concept repudiates the sexual dimorphism. 
Such refutation is achieved, in accordance with Merleau-Ponty, for '[T]he body is 
enculturated by habits of comportment distinctive to interactional settings of business 
or pleasure; often they are specific to locale or group.'
182
 More specifically, 'by the 
phonemes a body learns to pronounce at a very early age, by the clothes the person 
wears that mark her nation, her age, her occupational status, and in what is culturally 
expected or required of women.'
183
 Under such circumstance, the body becomes our 
primary site of cultural enactments and thus is regarded as an expressive space. 
Merleau-Ponty interprets this as a power of loco-motion, which extends individuals’ 
motor intention. 'The main areas of my body are devoted to actions, and participate in 
their value, and asking why common sense makes the head the seat of thought raises 
the same problem as asking how the organist distributes, through ‘organ space’, 
musical significance,' he argues through the instance of a music organist 
performing.
184
  
 
Yet, he does not think that our body stops at the stage of a mere expressive space. On 
the contrary, he argues that '[I]t is the origin of the rest, expressive movement itself, 
that which causes them to begin to exist as things, under our hands and eyes.'
185
 The 
body thereby is constituted and it builds itself a biological or cultural world in respect 
of its motor intentionality. 'Sometimes it is restricted to the actions necessary for the 
conservation of life, and accordingly it posits around us a biological world', he 
continues, '[S]ometimes, finally, the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the 
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body’s natural means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby 
around itself a cultural world.'
186
 Interweaving merleau-Ponty’s concept of the lived 
body and Beauvoir’s idea of the situation of women, one may argues that Young 
perceives the body’s projection of biological/cultural world in feminine modality as 
the sign of a tension between transcendence and immanence. She then articulates 
three major contradictory feminine body comportments, namely inhibited 
intentionality, ambiguous transcendence, and discontinuous unity, which I turn to 
elaborate now.     
 
When Young argues that women live in a contradiction and 'she must try to be a for-
itself-in-itself, she refers to the following situation: 'Human subjects instantiate 
transcendence inasmuch as we are conscious, creative, and formulate projects. As 
such, women instantiate transcendence. Male-dominated institutions, however, assign 
women roles that thwart this transcendence, and aim to confine women to the 
immanence of natural objects and species being.'
187
 The awareness of the male-gaze 
cultivates an air of distrust in women’s attitude towards her body and then creates 
what Young calls an ‘ambiguous transcendence’ in describing the cultural-laden 
feminine behaviours. Young observes such paradoxical performance in women’s 
physical relation to things. From the daily movements such as gait and stride to large-
scale muscles uses like lifting and jumping, she points out that women tend to refrain 
their body motions and showing a double hesitation, rather than throwing herself into 
action, owing to her lack of confidence and a sense of self-preservation. 'Only part of 
the body, that is, moves our toward a task, while the rest remains rooted in 
immanence. … Consequently, she often lives her body as a burden, which must be 
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dragged and prodded along and at the same time protected', she remarks.
188
 This 
tendency renders it difficult for female body to experience a pure transcendental 
action, which she moves 'in an open and unbroken directness upon the world in 
action,' rather a struggle between ‘reach out’ and ‘stay put’.  
 
In partially withholding of her body comportments and her double hesitations, a 
woman also indicate her ‘inhibited intentionality’ towards her corporeal existence. 
Instead of experiencing 'the harmony between what we aim at and what is given, 
between the intention and the performance,' her suspicion and self-imposed 
restrictions impedes her from straightforwardly performing physical tasks.
189
 Young 
notes the presence of ‘I-can’ and ‘I-cannot’ in feminine modality at the same time 
prompts the wasted motion that is 'resulting from the effort of testing and 
reorientation, which is a frequent consequence of feminine hesitancy.'
190
 The 
constituted tension between immanence and transcendence discloses a discontinuity 
between woman’s body and the world around her. 'Women tend to project an 
existential barrier closed around them and discontinuous with the ‘over there’ in order 
to keep the other at a distance.'
191
 Young suggests the rupture exhibited within is 
derived from these three dimensions: first of all, 'the women takes herself to be the 
object of the motion rather than its originator'; secondly, 'a woman is uncertain of her 
body’s capacities and does not feel that its motions are entirely under her control'; and 
the last, 'the feminine subject posits her motion as the motion that is looked at'.
192
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To conclude, in respect of Beauvoir’s and Merleau-Ponty’s respective works on 
phenomenological analysis of the existence of human-being, Young coins ambiguous 
transcendence, inhibited intentionality and discontinuous unity as the pivotal tool in 
understanding the lived body of women. However, as demonstrated in the early 
section, Young argues the necessity of a conception of gender in addition to the idea 
of the lived body, in order to comprehend women’s suffering of structural injustice 
and their potential to transform feminist politics. It is because that the 'woman lives 
her space as confined and closed around her, at least in part as projecting some small 
area in which she can exist as a free subject.'
193
 Gender as structured serial position 
does not determine a woman’s identity and thus there is the opportunity for she to 
transcend her immanence in her situation as a woman. Notwithstanding of such 
prospects, Young insists a set of common gendered social structure constraint the 
members of the gender series, which is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Lived Womanhood: A Phenomenological Approach to 
Female Corporeality 
 
The traditional mind/body dualism has been dominating the Western philosophical 
thinking for centuries and its influences clearly marked in our different treatments to 
the relation between body and mind. Two of the most fundamental and correlated 
effects from such Cartesian dualism are the prioritization of mind with intellectual 
purity and the negligence and discredit of body in human thinking. Those effects 
subsequently facilitate the subordination of body to mind and, with the aids of 
patriarchal society, a hierarchical discourse between men and women is developed in 
accordance with the mind/body dualism. Derived from such dualism, women are 
conventionally associated with emotion and physicality, while men with rationality 
and mentality. 'Women are somehow more biological, more corporeal, and more 
natural than men', as Elizabeth Grosz stated.
194
 Following the rationalist and 
enlightenment traditions, those equations between the sexes and the assumed 
characteristics constitute the interactions and relations between men and women, in a 
way that ascertaining the inferiority of the latter. Consequently, women have 
asymmetry power relation with men in all aspects of social and political life, with 
regards to civil rights and material possessions, in the patriarchal society. 
 
This arbitrary signification of men and women, in terms of mind/body distinction, has 
came under fierce criticisms from feminism in civil rights movements  at the 
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beginning of twentieth century. Nonetheless, the intellectual significance of bodily 
experiences is continuously under-evaluated and remain largely unspoken in the early 
feminist literatures, under the profound and prevailing influence of rationalism and 
liberalism. Moreover, the concerns over the pitfalls of biological determinism may 
reinforces the underestimation of bodily experience and increases the concentration 
on socialization process in feminist theory. However, the downplay attitude towards 
the body in feminism has been gradually transformed, with influences from the 
Marxist investigation into the relations between human labour and materiality as well 
as the poststructuralist analysis of discourses. Such alteration can be observed from 
the fact that the feminist accounts of subjectivity, agency and sexual differences are 
progressively taken on board the philosophy of embodiment and confronted with 
corporeality. One impact from such alteration is feminist interrogations into gendered 
practices as the collaboration between gender conformity and corporeality, such as de 
Beauvoir's account of 'body-in-situation' and Butler's gender peformativity.  
 
Moreover, with the widespread of the politics of difference in recent decade, the 
interconnection and interplay between sexual differences and other social differences, 
like race and religion, has steadily attracted the spotlight and even constituting the 
challenges to feminist politics. 'What is required, and what has emerged over 
subsequent years, is a theory of embodiment that could take account not simply of 
sexual difference but of racial difference, class difference and differences due to 
disability; in short the specific contextual materiality of the body', Janet Price and 
Margrit Shildrick have observed.
195
  Apart from neuropsychologists' and psychiatrists' 
attention to the phenomenological research on bodily awareness,  contemporary 
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feminists are in active investigation into the interconnections between gender and 
various aspects of life. For instance, Maria Lugones examines the issues around 
gender, race ,and sexuality between the colonizer and the colonized in the context of 
modern capitalist colonial modernity; Anne Fausto-Sterling looks into the feminist 
implications of scientific discovery of different sexes; and American critic Susan 
Sontag's reflection on the different attitudes towards women's and men's aging under 
social imagination.
196
  
 
Apart from that, a considerable amount of feminist works are invested in gaining 
insights from female physical comportments and body images as well as women's 
lived experiences like pregnancy and menstrual period. The increased interest in the 
feminist phenomenology of embodiment is questioned by the poststructuralists for its 
deeply humanist root on the one hand; and on the other hand , it is troubled by our 
conventional understanding of the immediacy of body and world and the inevitable 
translation of experiences. However, Merleau-Ponty, whose valuable works on 
phenomenological lived body inspire many,  provides an alternative thinking to 
soothe the worry over natural/social distinction in addressing daily experiences. He 
claims that 'everything is both manufactured and natural in man, as it were, in the 
sense that there is not a word, not a form of behaviour which does not owe something 
to purely biological being—and which at the same time does not elude the simplicity 
of animal life'.
197
 The ambition to disrupt the binary opposition between culture and 
nature is further pursued by feminists like de Beauvoir's idea of 'body-in-situation' 
and Butler's concept of 'heterosexual matrix'.  
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Both de Beauvoir and Butler remarkably elucidate how male and female bodies 
become gendered subjects, through the internalization and normalization of the ideal 
model of heterosexuality and the repetition of gendered practices. Furthermore, 
before Butler's prominent account of gender performativity, Donna Haraway tackles 
the untenable boundary between nature and culture via the biological and artificial 
mixed creation of cyborg to expose the a world of ambiguously nature and crafty.
198
  
Such depiction of body as the embodiment of sexual differences opens up a renowned 
approach to explore the complex constitution of gendered subjectivity, identity, and 
the category of women itself. As Coole asserts that 'experience, corporeal or 
otherwise, is not some epistemological ground zero, but it is the realm where politics 
begins and, to a significant extent, remains. It is in experience that discourses, 
ideologies, and sedimented practices are reproduced, and it is in lived experience and 
perceptions of dysfunctions and lacunae that resistance is first motivated and 
appears.'
199
   
 
Noticing the centrality of human interpretation and reflexivity of human agency in 
explaining the social world, some feminists such as Alcoff and Kathy Miriam  deploy 
a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach to deconstruct gender identity and female 
sexual agency.
200
 Apart from that, de Beauvoir's descriptive phenomenology of a 
woman's life from entering puberty to menopause motivates some feminists to look 
into how the general situation of women have an effect on her corporeal modality. 
For she declares that 'if the biological condition of women does constitute a handicap, 
it is because of her general situation ... It is in a total situation which leaves her few 
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outlets that her peculiarities take on their importance'.
201
 Resonance with de 
Beauvoir's eloquent observation, Young has written several perceptive articles in 
above fields of female corporeality and bodily experience. Her works on the throwing 
posture, childbirth, and appearance are praised by many fellow scholars as the pioneer 
in re-introducing phenomenological analysis back to feminism. For the analytical 
value of those works are expressively and controversially derived from using, for 
instance, the existentialist concept of 'being-in-the-world' as well as the 
phenomenological idea of 'lived body' to inspect and appraise her vivid personal 
experiences.  
 
Among Young's variation on the theme of her critical phenomenological intervention 
on the social meaning of female embodiments, in particularly the article on the 
different styles of throwing between boys and girls, has motivated contemporary 
feminists and scholars in other fields to explore the different aspects of corporal 
attributes. For instance, Linda Fisher deconstructs both subjective and intersubjective 
experiences by looking into a renaturalized and immanent corporeality and retrieve 
the material female voice through an account of embodied vocality.
202
 Also, Kerreen 
Reiger and Rhea Dempsey analyse birth-giving as a 'biopsychocultural' activity and 
identify cultural norms of anxiety and fear of birth can limit women's capacity to 
experience the agency of their lived body and confidence of 'performing' birthing.
203
 
Additionally, Susan Leigh Forster explores how Young's theorization of a feminine 
physicality supplies conceptual tools for rising studies in performance and dance; and 
Sandra Lee Bartky connects feminine body style with Foucault's idea of self-
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disciplining to expose how the daily practice of femininity through clothing, makeup, 
and exercising may distort the female body.
204
 Likewise, Dianne Chisholm uses 
women's climbing as a paradigm case to contrast Young's case of 'throwing', which 
aims to analyse how women evolve and cultivate their bodily motility and spatiality 
and stress the idea of the lived body over the category of gender.
205
 
 
Yet, why such diagnostic intervention is needed? 'Because much feminist reflection 
begins from the sociohistorical fact that women's bodily differences from men have 
grounded or served as excuses for structural inequalities, inquiry about the status and 
malleability of bodies in relation to social status is for us a matter of some urgency', 
as Young points out.
206
 Such claim signifies feminist attempt to disrupt the customary 
hierarchy between mind and body through capture the embodied practice of social 
and cultural norms, with the aim to rectify the asymmetric power relation between 
men and women. Therefore, contemporary feminists are enduringly invested in 
understanding de Beauvoir's claim that 'one is not born, but rather becomes , a 
women', to expose the long-established dynamic and corporeal process of 
gendering.
207
   'To be a gender', in Butler's account of de Beauvoir, 'is to be engaged 
in an ongoing cultural interpretation of bodies, and hence, to be dynamically 
positioned within a field of cultural possibilities.'
208
 In short, the centrality of body in 
the constitution of gender becomes manifested and undeniable, for it represents both 
the recipient and agent of, and is enacted and conditioned by, gender.   
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In the phenomenological feminist interventions into the category of women, Merleau-
Ponty's concept of body as lived stands out as the principle constituent in those 
configurations of female bodily experience. He perceives phenomenology as an 
alternative route to the binary of realism and idealism, in which the transcendence of 
the discipline that he emphasized can rediscover the constituted, structural relations 
between the perceived subject and the perceived world via the attention to 
intentionality, rather than causality.
209
 'His acknowledgement of the inescapability of 
ideology in its more neutral sense as a horizon of the lifeworld, and his view that 
experience is mediated by rather than determined by culture, show indeed why it is 
crucial to interrogate experience if one is interested in politics', as Coole comments 
when politicizing his phenomenological investigation.
210
 Such commentary may 
indicates the strategic inflection point of feminism in conceptualizing women's 
situation in the modern world. 
 
I have pointed out in the first chapter that Young's concept of gender seriality 
theorizes 'gender' as a particular form of social position, and 'women' is a social 
category in which those individuals are situated in accordance with a particular sets of 
practico-inert reality and sociohistorical structures. Furthermore, I mentioned here 
that, unlike other forms of materiality, body is the principle physicality that lived 
through restricted cultural possibilities in connected with the notion of gender. The 
milieu of gendered serialized existence, derived from above formulations, indicates 
the material structures that arise from people's historically congealed institutionalized 
actions and expectations that position and limit individuals in specific way that they 
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must deal with.
211
 Such milieu of gender presents body with passivity as socialized 
and contextualized, as the accent is on locality and specificity in Alcoff's account of 
the identity politics. On the other hand, it is in the actions of body that conveys the 
potential capacities of transformation and subversion of corporeality toward enforced 
gendered norms. This notion reminds us with Derrida's concept of iterability that 
cited in first chapter, in which the repeatability and alterability of language signs 
symbolise the possibility to create something 'new' from the 'old'.  
 
Butler also drawing on notion of the bodily repetition of gendered practices to picture 
how the subjection to power unenthusiastically but unavoidably produces the 
prospects for agency. 'It is also the fact that they must be repeated,' in Lloyds' 
reconstruction of Butler's advocacy of a subversive gender politics, 'however, that 
creates the space for them [women] to be repeated differently and thus is also the 
condition of possibility for action.'
212
 Following the significance and vital role of 
body in the constitution of gender that hitherto depicted, this chapter aims to provide 
a constructive consideration of female body and lived experience in the context of 
gender seriality. Women, under Young's conceptualization in terms of gender 
seriality,  indicates a collection of individuals who are positioned in resemblance 
within socio-historical material organizations and objects as well as enabled and 
constrained by the structural relations. More specifically, it is the female body that 
taking up the serialized position of gender and inscribed by cultural and social norms, 
while being the site of agency to manifest its subjectivity and uniqueness.  
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For Young, female body is a crucial component in the constitution of gender and 
therefore her investments in conceptualizing female experience and corporeal 
movements. However, there is no specific discussion to situate phenomenological 
lived body in her articulation of gender seriality, but a indicative note on materiality. 
To delineate the correlation between gender seriality and lived body therefore will be 
beneficial and is the overall objective of this chapter. In order to cast light on the 
relation between female body and gender seriality, it is the components of historical 
locality and contextualization of body that I will first lay out to ground further 
discussions. Body as existence is lived through a linear series of events, rather than at 
a particular moment in history, from a existentialist perspective. Also, the cultivation 
and institutionalization of gender norms in patriarchal society is established upon and 
presented as a discrete series of temporal instants. By examining the historicity of 
gender, as Jane Mansbridge advised, it will disclose the contingency of the 
constitution of women, and render the history of strong prejudice against women the 
evidence for affirmative actions.
213
 Moreover, such contextual inspection will help us 
to understand how social structures enculture the lived body.  
 
Following that, it becomes patent that the movements of body, the kinetic energy of 
an actor, share a dialectical relationship with other agents and organizations. Such 
dialectical interaction is a process of socialization, in which the actors learn to 
conform to and normalize certain norms, in the case of gender, like heterosexuality, 
that serves as criteria for individuals to form their choices and preference. Talcott 
Parsons has defined 'norm' as 'a verbal description of a concrete course of action, ... , 
regarded as desirable, combined with an injunction to make certain future actions 
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conform to this course'.
214
 In the traditional division of labour between the sexes, 
woman tend to be confined at home and allocated with the role of a carer in 
accordance with her biological capability of reproduction. Following that, women are 
expected by public gaze to express the characteristics of caring, warmth and loving 
that derived from the idea of carer, while being 'taught' and 'trained' to do so in both 
public and private spheres. The facet of socialization with regard to the lived body 
will then be discussed after looking into the historicity and contextualization of 
gender. Specifically, the section will survey how the female body is situated in the 
world. Young develops her conception of female body as lived partly from de 
Beauvoir's idea of 'body-in-situation'. Taking it as the starting point, I will retrieve 
such feminist situating back to the existentialist conception of 'being-in-the-world' 
and the eminent paradigm of the master-slave dialect.     
 
It is argued by feminists like de Beauvoir and many other feminists that women are 
positioned as the Other as objectified by men through the process of socialization and 
normalization of gender normatively. Feminists working in the field of moral 
psychology, such as Barbara Herman and Carol Gillian, are focused on how 
patriarchy plays in a person's motivation and subsequent action, as well as questions 
like how the systematic oppression against women are magnified by the satisfaction 
of women's deformed desires. Apart from that, other feminists like Young, Lois 
McNay and Grosz concentrated on the embodiment of gender system and the 
accompanied lived experiences, in which they deal with around the issue of the 
formation of embodied subjectivity and the persisting interrogation of the appropriate 
way of understanding biological and social embodiment. As the chapter is inspired by 
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the feminist phenomenological intervention into the corporeal effects of gender, the 
last section will taken from Young's observation of the female throwing posture and 
incorporate it with the notion of socialization and body-in-situation. Hinged upon de 
Beauvoir's concept of women as the situated Other, Young pinpoints a crucial 
contradiction in women's corporeal modality, namely a paradoxical presence of 
ambiguous transcendence and uninhibited intentionality is acknowledged. It is the co-
existence of 'I-can' and 'I-cannot' in the socio-historical-laden feminine movements 
that this chapter will finally be concluded with.   
 
1. CONTENDING THE NORMALISING GAZE OF THE FEMALE 
    BODY 
In providing an anti-essentialist account of the body and sexuality, Foucault embarks 
upon a genealogical study as a modality of social critique to analyse the entanglement 
and paradigm shift of relations between knowledge, power and the body. For him, 
such genealogical investigation, which he distinguishes it from traditional 
historiography, is aim to reveal how historically specific figures of subjectivity are 
constructed. His argument of power is constitutive also contributes to feminist 
understanding of gender and power, to enable feminists to explore how women's 
subjectivity, experiences and comportments are produced in and by the power 
relations which they devote to transform. For instance,  Jana Sawicki contends, 
drawing on Foucault's redefinition of power as exercised and is productive, that the 
understanding of women's subordination should move from simplified domination 
and victimization by male power, but textured depiction of localized forms of gender 
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power relations.
215
  Foucault's insight into the historical construction of sexual body 
also deconstruct the seemingly unruly natural fact of sexuality. 'The notion of sex 
brought about a fundamental reversal; it made it possible to invert the representation 
of the relationships of power to sexuality, causing the latter to appear, not in its 
essential and positive relation to power, but as being rooted in a specific and 
irreducible urgency which power tries as best it can to dominate', Foucault asserts.
216
  
 
Noteworthy is that Foucault's anti-essentialist articulation of sexuality did not deny 
the materiality of sexed body, in his acknowledgement of the cultural construction of 
the category of sex and its function in regimes of power. His acceptance of body may 
be regarded as a poststructuralist reaction to what he construes as a normalizing gaze 
from modern scientific reason.
217
 'Modern science and philosophy construct a specific 
account of the subject as knower, as a self-present origin standing outside of and 
opposed to objects of knowledge', as Young discusses the disembodiment of modern 
reason in relation to the pursue of authoritativeness of objective truth in modern 
discourse.
218
 She further points out that modern subjectivity is constructed 'by fleeing 
from material reality, from the body's sensuous continuity with flowing, living things, 
to create a purified abstract idea of formal reason, disembodied and transcendent.'
219
 
In order to destabilize the dualism of mind/body and the subsequently established 
subordination between the sexes, it is indispensable for contemporary feminism to 
recognize the corporeal reality of body when deconstructing the authoritative figure 
of heterosexuality. 
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Meanwhile, his consideration of body can be seen to challenge the problematic 
dissociation of culturally constructed genders from ahistorical biological bodies under 
social construction theory of sex/gender. This can be seen when Foucault envisages 
his genealogical research on the establishment of sexuality as a examination on a 
'history of bodies'.
220
 Although the accounts of materiality and social structures that in 
relation to gender  not necessarily to be pinned down in specific socio-historical 
contexts, it is undeniable that the historical authenticity of a strong prejudice against 
women does affect the construction of gender. Young points out the influence of 
history by defining the term 'women' represents 'the name of a structural relation to 
material objects as they have been produced and organized by a prior history' in terms 
of gender seriality.
221
 For instance, as mentioned in Chapter One, the statistical fact of 
the disproportionate birth rate of male and female babies under China government's 
'one-child policy' can be better explained, with reference to the historical convention 
of male member is the sole heir in the household in traditional patriarchal society.
222
 
Hence, history, from a feminist perspective, may conveys a story about 'the 
persistence of asymmetries between men and women, the denial of being and justice 
to women by men in and through concrete social relations and the at best partially 
successful struggle by women against these relations of domination'.
223
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Other instances of the marginalization and discrimination of women may take on 
different forms under different circumstances, such as female genital mutilation in 
Africa and women's driving ban in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, those 
examples did not occurred in a vacuum nor without contexts. As Martin Heidegger 
understood to exist must be historical, the meaning of those 'current' occurrences, 
argued in existential temporality terms, is a narrative constructed by 'future' 
possibility reminiscing what has been done in the 'past'.
224
 Following that, the 
transformation of a female body into a feminine body is a historical process and thus 
should be tackled with attention to the historicity of bodies. Such awareness of body 
as historical can expose the contingency of gender, borrowing Foucault's words, by 
demonstrating 'how deployments of power are directly connected to the body - to 
bodies, functions, physiological processes, sensations, and pleasures; far from the 
body having to be affected, what is needed is to make it visible through an analysis in 
which the biological and the historical are not consecutive to one another'.
225
 Such 
Foucaultian articulation of the relation between history and corporeality then is 
appreciated and retained by many feminists like McNay, Grosz and Butler, for it 
eludes from the dubious traditional gendered opposition between culture and the body 
as in other poststructuralist theorizations.  
 
In addition to Foucaultian historical imprint on the body, Heidegger and Sartre both 
underline the historical authenticity in their respective considerations of  the 
construction of subjectivity and social relations. Regarding individual making of self, 
Heidegger argues that individuals always understand and constitute their existences 
by making reference to historical heritages and norms that has been handed down 
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within one's tradition.
226
 Individual is inescapable from the influences of history 
because a person, as Young explains, 'is born in a particular place and time, is raised 
in a particular family setting, and all these have specific socio-cultural histories that 
stand in relation to the history of others in particular way.'
227
 Thus Heidegger 
concludes that one's choice will always be derived from certain 'possibility of Dasein 
that has been there', in which Dasein signifies the influential ground of past 
temporalities that may have significance for individuals.
228
 Some may disagree the 
potential social determinism arises from Heidegger's imperativeness of historicality 
on individuals. Richard Polt depicts a bitter scenario in which one's creative 
appropriation may be judged as inauthentic practice when drawing on other cultures 
other than one's own.
229
 However, this section aims to underscore the fact that the 
historical situation that one inhered in a society does hold a certain degree of 
authority for that person, in a way that individuals' choice is affected and shaped by 
interiorizing social norms and disciplined practices that cultivated throughout history. 
 
Apart from individual subjectivity, Sartre points out that even institutions and 
organizations in a society are developed with historicity and thus are imprinted with 
relations of superiority and deference, from a historical materialist perspective.
230
 
Noteworthy is that such effect of history on corporeal reality, social structures and 
institutions is not unidirectional, rather shapes and characterizes each other and 
produce what de Beauvoir articulates as women's worldly situation as 'the second sex'. 
Butler suggests that de Beauvoir understands the body as a historical constructed idea 
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and 'gendering' is a life-long process, because individuals are 'engaged in an ongoing 
cultural interpretation of bodies, and, hence, to be dynamically positioned within a 
field of cultural possibilities.'
231
 It is within the constant engagement with different 
social and cultural milieus and ethos that women's diversity and plurality emerge. For 
example, a black women who live in USA, where has a dreary history of slavery, may 
face different forms of gender discrimination in comparison with another woman who 
lives in Congo, a post-colonized country in the turmoil of war. Therefore, it is a 
matter of contextualization and subjectivity when feminists attempt to specify how 
gendered social structures and materiality enable and condition individual in a micro 
level of social setting, as well as how one makes sense of the world.  
 
Nonetheless, de Beauvoir's claim of women's situation as second sex and many other 
feminists' advocacy of women as a reasonable social category are indicative of a form 
of collectivity that ground beyond the variation of women's individuality. 'The 
situation of women within a given sociohistorical set of circumstances, despite the 
individual variation in each woman's experience, opportunities, and possibilities, has 
a unity that can be described and made intelligible', as Young contends.
232
  In my 
opinion, the 'unity' that derived from 'a given sociohistorical set of circumstances' in 
Young's claim is distinct from Heidegger's construction of historicality as a fate or 
destiny. As indicated by his critiques for the problem of social determination, 
Heidegger's formidable sense of historicality implies that one's choice can only be 
justified as authentic when it corresponds to one' own culture, to seize one's 'destiny' 
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in a given circumstance.
233
 Such resolution is unfavourable for a feminist politics that 
aspires to pluralisation and democratization. In the following, I will draw on Hannah 
Arendt's grasp of the role of history in human affair to solidify Young's claim of 
women's situation. 
 
2. FROM A HIDDEN WOMAN TO THE SYMBOLIC MOTHER  
In sketching out the role of action in human condition, Arendt made a seemingly 
contradictory observation, in which she construes human action as creating the 
condition for history while history is a story of events without authors.
234
 I will look 
into the first part of the observation to start with. Arendt argues it is the collaboration 
of acting and speaking shapes history through the revelation of agent's existence and 
human distinctness. 'Through them, men distinguish themselves instead of being 
merely distinct; they are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not 
indeed as physical objects, but qua men', as she points out.
235
 It is through action that 
individuals transcend their mere material existence and make themselves visible to 
the others as a beginning of social relations. 'With word and deed we insert ourselves 
into the human world,' Arendt explains, 'and this insertion is like a second birth, in 
which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of  our original physical 
appearance.'
236
 As human beings are prompted to act by their ability of initiating, the 
human plurality that Arendt perceived is expressed in the infinite improbability 
derived from men's unexpected behaviour. Under such circumstances, 'action' is 
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conceived as a more fundamental dimension of human condition than 'labour' and 
'work', for cease to action means cease 'to be a human life'.
237
   
 
Although human action as the source of uniqueness and the possibility of creating 
something anew in the world, Arendt intriguingly claims the decay of actor's identity 
with the person's life story becomes part of the history. Individuals use acting and 
speaking to create a beginning of their life and insert themselves into the human 
world, but their words and deeds, as existential temporalities, can only be meaningful 
when they adopt the rules and vocabularies from the existing world. It is the display 
of continuity that exhibited by history that men may claim they are equal. That is to 
say that '[I]f men were not equal, they could neither understand each other and those 
who came before them nor plan for the future and forces the needs of those who will 
come after them.'
238
 Let's consider the continuity of history in another way, as a 
representation of the existing web of human relationships, which is no less real and 
effective than materiality. Arendt does not deny that an agent is revealed and inserted 
into the human world when someone acts and speaks. But this agent, acting through 
the lived body, is the subject of his/her actions 'in the twofold sense of the word, 
namely, its actor and sufferer'.
239
 Individuals may set to act and speak a new 
beginning, however, they 'always fall into an already existing web where their 
immediate consequences can be felt.'
240
 Given that human beings do not and cannot 
live their individual stories in nothingness, it is within the history the doers grow to 
be undistinguished and nameless.  
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Arendt then concludes the reason 'why history ultimately becomes the storybook of 
mankind, with many actors and speakers and yet without tangible authors' is due to 
the fact that both individual story and history 'are the outcome of action.'
241
 As 
individual action is entangled with and only make sense in the context of the 
established web of human relationships, the audience nevertheless 'never can point 
unequivocally to [him] as the author of [its] eventual outcome', even the actor 
remains to be the subject of the story.
242
 Such formulation of history, in relation to the 
constitution of gender, echoes the idea of gender seriality is understood as a 
background in individuals' action that indicated in Chapter One. For the effects of 
gender norm has been embedded and institutionalized deeply in human relations and 
organizations, the subjects who grown up within, even achieve human distinctness 
through individual action and speech, still cannot escape from the captivation of the 
frame of reference of sexual differences. The same as Arendt highlights the 
importance of action in human conditions, Zerilli also asserts that the actor's 'doings' 
in daily life may be construed as an enactment of subjective certainty of sexual 
difference.
243
 Aside from the implicit authority of history on human actions, both 
scholars also appreciate human plurality and distinctness that achieved through 
speech and action. I will utilize Zerilli's discussion of 'symbolic mother' to illustrate 
its implication before concluding the character of history in gender seriality.   
 
By integrating Arendt's and Zerilli's thoughts,  what I plan to show succinctly here is 
how the power of actions of symbolic figure and historical precedence enables 
women to practice claim-making in political arena. Drawing on Milan Women's 
Bookstore Collective and Arendt, Zerilli suggests that women can make use of the 
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idea of 'symbolic mother', in terms of historical events, as an enabling tool to 
politicize ordinary experiences and practice freedom. 'A symbolic mother', as she 
wrote, 'is a gendered figure of origin around which to organize a feminist practice of 
freedom, a new social contract.'
244
 Such symbolic figure, according to Zerilli's 
account of Milan Women's Bookstore Collective (MWBC), is not a duplication of 
primal father who must be exterminated nor a Platonic ideal type of perfect mother, 
for the iconographic position is not absolute or transcendent.
245
  In contrast, what they 
try to advocate is a figurative model who not only can authorize but be contested by 
her fellow women via the employment of argumentations and persuasions of 
language. 'Attributing authority and value to another woman with regard to the world 
was the means of giving authority and value to oneself', as MWBC urges.
246
 Two 
notions inherent in the idea of symbolic mother are, one, a feminist practice of 
freedom; and two, a feminist exemplification of entrustment. The self-affirmation 
derived from the recognition of others can facilitates the intersubjectivity among 
women, but at the same time preserves the possibility of contestation and diversity 
because it is a practice of claim-making which grounded upon women's freedom. 
 
Zerilli neatly connects freedom with entrustment as a political practice of sexual 
difference. With the intellectual aids from MWBC, entrustment in feminist politics is 
perceived by her as a social relation that generated by the acknowledgement and 
recognition within women, yet a feminist political project in which 'answered to a 
need that was experienced as necessary: the absence of authoritative interlocutors.'
247
 
Nonetheless, such authoritative interlocutor is neither a hegemony or a superiority, 
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nor an absolute Truth. For Zrilli and the authors of MWBC, symbolic mother is 'a 
figure whose authority is self-evident and requires no agreement or action on one's 
own part.'
248
  The legitimacy of such representational figure is granted in the 
reciprocity of freedom, which is 'developed as one possible response to women's 
symbolic homelessness and their lack of relation among themselves'.
249
 The founding 
of their relationship, following that, cannot be outsourced and does not require a 
endorsement from third party, for it is a free affiliation that one woman develops with 
the other via political and democratic communications. Recalling Zerilli's idea of 
defamiliarization in Chapter One, inaugurating with the deconstruction of gendered 
grammar, the idea of 'symbolic mother' is an approach to politicize the Ordinary in 
the sense that women appeal to one another 'through the words and gestures of daily 
life, ... in proximity to everyday things.'
250
 Feminist politics, under such 
circumstances, can be regarded as a political practice of enablement of women via 
authorizing each other freely in a democracy.  
 
The feminist practice of symbolic mother indicates significance of the action of 
speech in politics. In the previous chapter, I have pointed out the iterablility and the 
subsequent of alterability of language and how Zerilli calls for a practice of doubt by 
using these two characteristics. In terms of discourse theory, speaking as articulatory 
practice can only fix meanings of language partially, due to the openness of the 
social.
251
 Put it differently, no determination can be guaranteed in the application of 
language, for every practice of Wittgenstein's rule-following is embedded with the 
possibility of failure. Those phenomena demonstrate the traits of uncertainty and 
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openness, which correspond to the political ethos of agonistic democracy. I will leave 
the elaboration of above claim to Chapter Three and Four; and it is the correlation 
between Zeriili's advocacy of symbolic mother and Arendt's concept of the relation of 
history and action that I shall argue for now. 
 
Return to the anonymity that history caused on individual actors, Arendt coins it as 
'the political nature of history', in which 'its being a story of action and deeds rather 
than of trends and forces or ideas - than the introduction of an invisible actor behind 
the scenes whom we find in all philosophies of history, which for this reason alone 
can be recognized as political philosophies in disguise.'
252
 Those 'political 
philosophers' that termed by Arendt are disguised because of their anonymity, but 
their actions and doings may continue to stimulate and inspire future generation in the 
form of, situating in feminism, women's collective story. The political philosophers in 
disguise bear ideal resemblance with the symbolic mother, in which both historical 
figures enable women to speak in women's name while waiting the others to speak 
back. 'Only the actors and speakers who re-enact the story's plot can convey the full 
meaning, not so much of the story itself,' Arendt points out the worth of retelling 
historical stories, 'but of the 'heroes' who reveal themselves in it.'
253
 As she puts action 
in the centre of human affair, it is the 'what' has been done rather than the 'who' done 
it makes historical stories more telling and appealing. The original authors in this 
account, paralleling to symbolic mother, cannot dictate how their stories be told but 
provide legitimate ground for successors to act upon. To conclude by an analogy with 
art that articulated by Arendt, '[T]he specific content as well as the general meaning 
of action and speech may take various forms of reification in art works which glorify 
                                                 
252
 Ibid, p. 185. 
253
 Arendt, 1998, p. 187. 
  
109 
a deed or an accomplishment and, by transformation and condensation, show some 
extraordinary event in its full significance.'
254
   
 
From above, we have seen how the Foucaultian concept of body challenges the 
conventional natural/cultural distinction between sex and gender, by developing a 
historical construction of body. Such highlight to the function of history can also be 
traced in existentialism like Heidegger's and Sartre's works. Feminists such as de 
Beauvoir and Butler also share their opinion and drawing on the notion of historicity 
in conceptualizing women's situation in the world as well as the institutionalization of 
gender in a society. Following this stance, Young asserts that women's subordination 
and marginalization would simply be unintelligible 'if we 'explain' [it] by appeal to 
some natural and ahistorical feminine essence.'
255
 However, such historicity of gender 
is not a 'destiny' that calling women to choose an authentic fate for themselves,  as 
Heidegger urges his fellow citizens in Weimar Germany. History, argued by Arendt, 
is constructed by human actions and in turns conditions human beings. It signifies, as 
indicated above, an already existing human relation, in which individuals make sense 
of their speech acts by inserting themselves into established language framework. 
With the aids from precedent deeds and achievements of symbolic mothers, feminist 
politics becomes a public forum in which women speak to and confront each other. 
 
The above summarization of the role of history and the idea of feminist politics 
derived from it convey us back to the subject of this chapter, namely body as the 
indispensable materiality in the articulation of gender seriality. Inscribed with cultural 
practices and social structures, the body is not merely an extended material substance 
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as opposed to a non-extended mind. According to existential phenomenologist like 
Edmond Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, it is a locus of sensations and movement 
possibilities allowing the embodied subject to experience and interpret the practical-
perceptual and situated life. And subsequently, the embodied registers can put 
forward their lived experiences by languages. In other words, the body itself denotes 
a material contradiction, for its enactment and restriction by structured social 
positions. 'To be an agent', as Young explicates the paradoxical phenomenon of 
female body, 'means that you can take the constraints and possibilities that condition 
your life and make something of them in your own way.'
256
 Foucault's identification 
of the body as the core site of his analysis on micro level power relation of sexuality 
also motivates feminists to examine how current social forces control over women's 
minds and bodies. As mentioned above, the negligence of body in traditional political 
philosophy has prompted feminist scholars to look into research subjects like female 
body and women's lived experiences. After presenting how history plays a part in the 
constitution of gender seriality, I will turn to the phenomenological dimension of 
female body, with references to Merleau-Ponty's innovating concept of lived body. 
 
3. BODY CONTRADICTIONS IN WOMEN'S WORLD 
    3a. Deconstructing Gender: the Advocacy of Body 
The Foucaultian approach to the body has raised questions to the conventional 
feminist distinction of sex and gender, because its connotation of nature and culture 
that developed by social theory scholars in early feminist movement. Following de 
Beauvoir's proclaim that 'one is not born a woman, but becomes one', some feminists 
were keen on pinpoint masculinity and femininity as products of gender socialization. 
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257
 The prominent distinction of sex and gender is developed by Gayle Rubin to 
combat the notorious biological determinism. In reviewing her antideterministic 
strategy, Alcoff describes 'Rubin conceded the naturalism of sex in order to 
denaturalize gender, thus allowing for the commonsense idea that males and females 
have different bodies, but that these bodily differences are not sufficient to explain the 
elaborate cultural practice and beliefs surrounding gendered identities'.
258
 Functioning 
as a advanced argument of de Beauvoir's eminent slogan, Rubin asserts that 'we are 
not only oppressed as women, we are oppressed by having to be women, or men as 
the case may be'.
259
 Her approach breaks the concept of women with a sexual 
categorization based on the biological division of reproduction, and strengthens 
feminists' attention to the cultural construction of gender. 
 
Many feminists embrace the sex/gender distinction and its nature/culture connotation 
and further develop the idea of gender socialization, in which they attribute the 
nurture of those two gender personalities to social learning process in people's 
upbringings. Social learning theorists like Kate Millett, Kay Deaux and Brenda Major 
have branded gender differences plainly as fundamentally cultural, rather than having 
biological bases. Millett asserts that gender is 'the sum total of the parents', the peers', 
and the culture's notions of what is appropriate to each gender by way of 
temperament, character, interests, status, worth, gesture, and expression'.
260
 Or, 
Nancy Chodorow even pushes such learning theory of gender socialization forward to 
the stage of early infancy. She holds the believe that different parenting practices on 
male and female babies are the determinant in producing feminine and masculine 
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personalities.
261
 No doubt that gender socialization has unsettled the prevalent 
discourse of biological determinism of that time and has contributed illustrious 
insights into the socio-cultural aspect of gender construction. Nonetheless, the 
sex/gender distinction constructed by social theory feminists is under attacked for the 
binary terminology and possible essentialism on the one hand; and on the other hand, 
its underestimation of the potentiality and agency of body.  
 
One of the main criticisms to the sex/gender distinction is its close resemblance with 
the traditional philosophical opposition between mind/body, which, as declared 
earlier, is conceived as contributing to women's inferiority in the world.  The weighty 
asymmetric power relation in the hierarchal forms of binary terminology, as 
implicitly adopted by the scholars of gender socialization, is clearly questionable for 
feminists who aim to deconstruct heterogeneity of gender but rooted her approach on 
the challenged subject itself. Different feminists provide similar criticisms from 
various perspectives. Presenting with biological evidence, Fausto-Sterling accuses the 
traditional differentiation of men and women is fundamentally a social norm of 
heterosexuality poses as a pretentious natural fact.
262
 Thus, sexual dimorphism, in 
here includes the distinction of men and women and the sex/gender differentiation 
derived, should be challenged. On the other hand, Butler's normative critique of 
traditional sex/gender distinction and its potential essentialist tendency is actually 
taking the form of a critique of feminist identity politics. Opposing the normative 
force accompanied with the development of masculine and feminine personalities, 
she criticizes such gender socialization account fails to recognize 'the multiplicity of 
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cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of 'women' are 
constructed.'
263
 A worry of the emerge of a rigid and fixed gendered identity can be 
sensed from her words. Concerning the upholding of those gender personalities may 
leads to gender essentialism, Butler argues such tendency may deceives us about the 
regulatory power of norms that govern our performances of gender, by masquerading 
gender identity as a natural kind of being.   
 
Apart from the negligence of the variations of body and the danger of a essentialist 
gender identity, Wendy Brown tackles the problem of gender socialization from its 
constrain on feminist politics and its appeal to the authenticity of women's experience. 
She indicates a crucial paradoxical situation that feminist politics encounters when 
situating itself as a form of identity politics: feminists incline to use the authenticity 
of women's experiences to obtain political and moral authority, but they are well-
aware that the feminine experience and identity are constructed under patriarchal term 
at the same time.
264
 In short, the authenticity of women's experience in feminist 
politics of identity functions as a political legitimacy and moral high ground, upon 
which feminists can condemn the repressive effects of patriarchal power and demand 
for the restoration of truth and reparations. In Brown's eyes, such feminist attempt to 
claim for innocence and genuineness of experience implies a rejection of politics, for 
it '...betrays a preference for extrapolitical terms and practices: for Truth (unchanging 
and incontestable) over politics (flux, contest, instability); for certainty and security) 
safety; immutability, privacy) over freedom (vulnerability, publicity); for discoveries 
(science) over decisions (judgments); for separable subjects armed with established 
rights over unwieldy and shifting pluralities adjudicating for themselves and their 
                                                 
263
 Butler, 1990, pp. 19-20. 
264
 See Wendy Brown, 'Postmodern Exposures, Feminist Hesitations,' in States of Injury: Power and 
Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton University Press, 1995).  
  
114 
future on the basis of nothing more than their own habits and arguments.'
265
 Her 
accusation, combined with the criticisms above, suggests a necessity to call the 
conventional sex/gender distinction into question. 
 
Another element that is rather under-developed in gender socialization approach is 
the function of body in the constitution of gender. Although learning theorists of 
gender seem to be aware of body as the manifestation of gender practices, they 
perceive it as a mere negative corporeal existence, which is subject to taming and 
institutionalize in the very beginning. Reflecting on the feminist idea of the body in 
the late sixties and seventies, Susan Bordo comments that the dominant feminist 
discourse at that time has '[T]hat imagination of the female body [was] of a socially 
shaped and historically 'colonized' territory, not a site of individual self-
determination.'
266
 She admires that the second-wave feminism 'inverted and 
converted' human body 'as itself a politically inscribed entity', but questioning the 
seemingly eternally obstructive relation between men and women, in relation to the 
oppressor/oppressed model, by underplaying the agency and autonomy of female 
body.
267
 With Foucaultian analysis to power and body, poststructuralist feminists 
have been working hard to shed lights on the complexity of body in the articulation of 
gendered practices. As noticed by scholars like Butler, Bartky and Kathy Davis, 
Foucaultian insights regarding disciplinary practices of the body indicate a 
contradiction: the material existence of bodies is undoubtedly modified and regulated 
by those practices on the on hand. And on the other hand, such bodies signal specific 
contexts and convey social meanings through their motility in social groupings, 
which reproduce the very practices that 'correct' them.  
                                                 
265
 Ibid, p. 37. 
266
 Bordo, 1993, p. 21 
267
 Ibid. 
  
115 
The overemphasis on socialization and the undertone of corporeality featured 
critically in the campaign of destructive challenge to the sex/gender distinction. An 
advocacy of a return to feminist phenomenology gradually emerged into the scene 
under such circumstances, with specific attention to embodiment and lived experience. 
Following the footsteps of de Beauvoir, Young and Bartky started to work on the 
experience of daily life and body movement from a phenomenological perspective. 
But Moi's enthusiastic advocacy of the 'lived body' concept can be perceived as a 
direct attack on the sex/gender distinction. Holding the rejection to the sex/gender and 
nature/culture dichotomies, Moi believes that a reinvention into a existential 
phenomenological concept of lived body can effectively brings specific physical traits 
of different bodies into feminists' consideration of our subjective sense of self.
268
 
Such advocacy enshrines Fausto-Sterling's presentation on the variation of sexes as a 
biological fact and increasingly attracts other feminists' attention. For instance, 
Nicholson claims the importance of understanding the socio-historical differenciation 
of bodies as lived, in which it helps to disconnect corporeality with a biological 
foundationalism.
269
 Through conceiving female body as lived, in my opinion, such 
concept can enables feminists to explore and examine a wider range of feminine 
experiences, in a way that celebrating the complexity of female body. 
 
As declared before, the objective of this chapter is to sketch out the role of the 
phenomenological lived body in the context of gender seriality. Although Young's 
articulation of female body in gender seriality in 1994 did resemble some conceptual 
trace of Merleau-Ponty's idea of the lived body, she never explicitly uses such 
terminology but calling physical body as either a 'female body' or a 'social body' at 
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that time. However, her respective phenomenological works on female throwing 
postures in 1980 and on conceptualizing the lived body with relation to gender, which 
has a direct discussion of Moi's argument, in 2002 both presented overtly with 
reference to the concept of the lived body. Such conceptual gap and time differences 
of those published works thus necessitate my further investigation into Young's 
deployments and articulation of body in different period. Although some 
inconsequential variations may exist in her works, I will argue that a consistency can 
be detected in her theorization of gender regardless the terminological and time 
differences. To bridge the possible split between the lived body and gender seriality 
thus constitutes the vital contribution of this chapter to the thesis. 
 
Noteworthy is that Young and Moi are diverged on the issue of abandoning the 
sex/gender model wholly, even they allied on the integration of phenomenology and 
feminism. In the following, I will firstly present their respective reasons regarding 
why a concept of gender should/should not be preserved in feminism, and I will 
suggest that such concept still merits feminism in its understanding of women's 
subordination throughout human history. Secondly, as the concept of the lived body 
is initially derived from Merleau-Ponty's works, I will then sketch out his primary 
articulation of the concept. However, it is well-acknowledged by feminists that his 
deficient account on gendered bodies and thus other intellectual sources are required 
to substantiate its application in connection with women. Among the variety of 
feminist theory, de Beauvoir's concept of 'body-in-situation' and the body as a mode 
of our 'being-in-the-world' that Young derived from her are considered to be 
perceptive and instructive in this occasion. From a phenomenological perspective, our 
bodies reveal themselves as a initial and direct access of being in the constituted 
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world. In David Morris' words, 'the body invites the radicalization of our concepts by 
way of being the root of the creative operation that opens up the phenomenal field.'
270
 
Following that, I will move on to discuss the lived experiences of women and their 
motility to conclude this chapter. 
 
The reason that body is considered to be lived is due to the fact that it not only can 
move and interact with the surrounding objects and conditions, but acquires life 
experiences and develop subjectivity from those interfaces. In short, the significance 
and real function of body can only be revealed by above phenomena. As Grosz 
contends that 'without some acknowledgement of the formative role of experience in 
the establishment of knowledges, feminism has no grounds from which to dispute 
patriarchal norms.'
271
 But she also points out 'experience cannot be taken as an 
unproblematic given, a position through which one can judge knowledges, for 
experience is of course implicated in and produced by various knowledges and social 
practices.'
272
 Here, Young's various exploration on female bodily experiences and 
comportments, as well as the later attempts by others, provide abundant materials to 
investigate the collaboration of gendered discourse and materiality, in relation to 
gender seriality. Among those explorations, it is her observation of the contradiction 
in female lived body signals such collaboration. Therefore, in the last section of the 
chapter, I will show how female modality is troubled by a tension of transcendence 
and immanence that caused by women's situation in the world.  
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    3b. Lived Body: the Manifestation and Socialization of Gender  
From above, it has been shown that gender socialization approach, based upon the 
sex/gender paradigm, may naturalizes the biological aspect of sex in order to unsettle 
the social hegemony of gender. Facing such conceptual binary model, contemporary 
feminists have been attacking the supposed femininity and common identity emerged 
from gender socialization and social learning theory. Some feminists took a radical 
stand regarding the problems of the sex/gender dualism and suggested abandoning 
such dualism completely. Among others, Moi leads the charge of the sex/gender 
distinction engenders feminist subjectivity by rendering sexual differences a 
dimorphism. 'The distinction between sex and gender is simply irrelevant to the task 
of producing a concrete, historical understanding of what it means to be a woman (or 
a man) in a given society', as she claims.
273
 It should be noted that the irrelevance of 
the distinction in her account is specifically targeting the task of conceptualizing the 
variation of sexed bodies and their impact on individual subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty's 
concept of the lived body appears to the picture, when she argues for the contingency 
between subjectivity and the body as well as the ambiguity of the latter. 'His project is 
to expand our understanding of nature, to wrench it away from the deadening hand of 
positivism and scientism by showing that in so far as the human body is concerned, 
one can draw no clear-cut line between that which belongs to the realm of nature and 
that which belongs to the realm of meaning', Moi summarizes how the 
phenomenological approach can transcend the conventional sex/gender dimorphism.  
 
Moi's support for utilizing the phenomenological concept of lived body to study 
feminist subjects is shared by scholars across different fields. For instance, Sarah-
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Vaughn Brakman and Sally J. Scholz context the equation of the natural with the 
genetic and biological and argues for a feminist embodied maternity instead, in the 
context of adoption and ART (Assisted Reproductive Technologies); Kirsten 
Jacobson analyses agoraphobia as an emblematic expression of the ongoing 
pathology of being a women in contemporary society, where women may continue to 
fully participated in the public arena.
274
 Young also recognizes the positivity of 
drawing on the phenomenological approach to female body and experience in 
feminism, and believes a descriptive dimension of these subjects will be beneficial. 
'Descriptions of lived female and feminine experience can reveal reasons that 
differently situated women may have to sympathize with one another's embodied 
situation, while at the same time remaining sufficiently vague to allow for concrete 
variation', as she declares with reference to Kruks' likewise recommendation.
275
 In 
short, a phenomenological investigation into women's respectively situated social 
position can enhance our understanding of the plurality and diversity among women, 
in relation to the politics of difference. 
 
Although Young and Moi are like-minded on the issue of the lived body, in my 
opinion, Young would not accept Moi's advance claim of 'the human body is neither 
sex nor gender, neither nature nor culture', which she derived from the ambiguity of 
human existence.
276
 In Young's opinion, our understanding of gender should be 
supplemented with a concept of  the lived body, rather than a replacement. Unlike 
Moi's attempt to theorize a feminist theory of the relation between body and 
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subjectivity, Young tackles women's issues from a different angle and places 'gender' 
in the spotlight of conceptualizing and tracing the root of disparities and injustices 
between the sexes. Oriented her argument on the viability of a concept of gender from 
a different feminist concern, she argues that 'feminism expresses a distinct politics ... 
asking a unique set of enlightening questions about a distinct axis of social oppression 
cannot be sustained without some means of conceptualizing women and gender as 
social structures.'
277
 I believe that Young would agree with Moi's opinion that 
feminist theory should not 'reaches fantastic levels of abstraction without delivering 
the concrete, situated, and materialist understanding of the body', as Moi claims that 
poststructuralist feminists have leaded us to.
278
 But the core feminist in Young's mind, 
from my understanding, is: what has been, is being and will be experienced by 
different lived bodies as enactment and restriction across time and place, in terms of 
sexual differences? More plainly, what is the object, which individuals interact with, 
that makes their sexual differences meaningful and consequential? 
 
Regardless the formats of enactments or obstruction one may encountered in relation 
to sexual differences, Young's assertion of retaining a concept of gender is set to 
capture such perpetuation of social facticity. It is quite difficult to answer the above 
question by simply putting forward a concept of the lived body, for it signals a 
variation of experiences and corporeal features, rather than theorizing a specific social 
position that everyone must cope with. A concept of gender can encapsulates an 
objective sense of a long-existed social structure of sexual differences, which leaves 
marks on the lived bodies. The concept signifies the perpetuated effects of social 
structures, such as normative heterosexuality, sexual division of labour and 
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hierarchies of power that proposed by Young, which continuously are exemplified 
through peculiar temporal materiality, namely the lived bodies.
279
 The numerous 
exemplifications of the lived body indicate the exertion of gender can result in 
multiple realizable outcomes, which is a feature of a macro level of social structure in 
Alexander Wendt's theorization.
280
 Following that, we can acquire 'a picture of large-
scale systematic outcomes of the operations of many institutions and practices which 
produce outcomes that constrain some people in specific ways at the same time that 
they enable others', via using a concept of gender as a macroscopic lens to make 
women's situation in the world intelligible. 
 
Under such circumstances, the sex/gender binary does not necessarily be interpreted 
as an unambiguous differentiation between biological sex and cultural gender. Rather, 
it should be perceived that the entanglement of corporeality and cultural practices in 
such sex/gender model can be better explained by drawing on the phenomenological 
notion of the lived body. 'The diverse phenomena that have come under the rubric of 
'gender' in feminist theory can be redescribed in the idea of lived body as some 
among many forms of bodily habitus and interactions with others that we enact and 
experience', as Young agreeably concludes the function of the lived body under 
feminist theory of gender.
281
 With above statement in mind, I will then turn to 
illustrate the meaning of our 'bodily habitus and interactions with others that we enact 
and experience', in which it highlights the conceptual facts that a lived body is always 
in a dynamic state with regard to interiority and exteriority, as de Beauvoir describes 
as a 'body-in-situation' on the one hand. And on the other hand, a lived body does not 
act alone and is in a constant interaction with others, including social milieu and 
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facticity, and it is a phenomena of 'being-in-the-world'. Moreover, those two elements 
are fundamentally build upon Merleau-Ponty's articulation of the phenomenological 
lived body, which I will begin with in the following section.               
         
4. WOMEN AS THE WORLDLY 'OTHER' SEX 
From the criticisms toward gender socialization theory and the subsequent 
deconstructive challenge to the sex/gender distinction that discussed above, it 
becomes fairly clear that a incorporation of sociality and materiality in the 
understanding of women as a social collective is favoured by contemporary feminists. 
Such amalgamation is the foreground of the existential phenomenological lived body. 
Merleau-Ponty advocates the interdependence and mutual encroachment in the 
human relations with the world and each other. From his perspective, phenomenology 
is designed to study the metaphysic of presence and its method is to investigate the 
essences of things by looking into their very own existences. A person 'does not 
expect to arrive at an understanding of man and the world from any starting point 
other than that of their "facticity".'
282
 This is an rejection to the absolute truth that 
created by analytical reflection, which, Merleau-Ponty criticises, 'is carried away by 
itself and installs itself in an impregnable subjectivity, as yet untouched by being and 
time.'
283
 'For if I am able to talk about "dreams" and "reality", to bother my head 
about the distinction between imaginary and real, and cast doubt upon the 'real', it is 
because this distinction is already made by me before any analysis'; such statement 
directly attacks our general believe about the self-evidence of our perceptions, in a 
way that aims to escape both sensationalism and transcendental idealism.
284
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As he criticizes the reductionism in both sensationalism and idealism, 
phenomenology is said to reflect 'the unreflective life of consciousness, by 'making 
explicit our primordial knowledge of the 'real', [of] describing our perception of the 
world as that upon which our idea of truth is forever based.'
285
 In order to do so, a 
new relation between the world and 'I' is envisaged by Merleau-Ponty: 'The world is 
not what I think, but what I live through. I am open to the world, I have no doubt that 
I am in communication with it, but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible.'
286
 
Following these declarations, phenomenology calls a radical reflection on our bodily 
experiences, for human body is the locus of perceptions as well as the interpreter of 
them. Put it in Merleau-Ponty's own words, '[T]he body is our general medium for 
having a world.'
287
 de Beauvoir touches on the same point in the light of the relation 
between the body and the self; as she wrote that 'to be present in the world implies 
strictly that there exists a body which is at once a material thing in the world and a 
point of view towards the world.'
288
 A dynamic and interdependent relation between 
individual subjectivity and the body thus developed and, in Moi's view, also 
underlines the contingency dimension between them. Under the existential 
phenomenological articulation, my body 'will significantly influence both what 
society--others--make of me, and the kind of choices I will make in response to the 
Other's image of me, but it is also to acknowledge that no specific form of 
subjectivity is ever a necessary consequence of having a particular body.'
289
  
 
The fundamental reorientation of the body from the mind/body dualism implies that 
corporeal embodiment is our primary and everyday mode of being-in-the-world. 
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'Being-in-the-world' in Heidegger's understanding, under Morris' interpretation, 
'names an ontological structure fundamental to beings such as ourselves; its 
hyphenated construction flags the indissoluble reciprocity of our being, the world and 
the relation of being-in.'
290
 As mentioned earlier, human being is the perceiver of the 
world in a way that who actually lived within a worldly context. Following that, 
individuals are not the sole makers of themselves in the sense that they are under 
constant influences of the others. Such dynamic interaction between perceiver and its 
environment is also noted in the historicity of the body. The next chapter will look 
into the situatedness of the lived body in gender serial structures, in order to further 
articulate a feminist politics of discursive embodiment. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
The Reiteration and Reconfiguration of Gender 
Performativity  
 
Continuing the previous discussion on how the lived body interacts with its social 
surroundings, this chapter examines closely the constitutive interplay between female 
bodies and gender serial structures. As indicated in Chapter Two, a conception of 
phenomenological embodiment is beneficial in relation to provide insights into the 
conditioning effects of gender on female bodies. Yet, it is still unclear how the lived 
body re-enacts or even renovates gender practices. It is, then, the purpose of this 
section to sketch the mechanism operative in the process of gendering, especially in 
the way in which the agency of a lived body comes into play under the constraints of 
gender structures. While the operationalisation of gender may be tackled from 
different angles, this thesis concentrates on the aspect of reiteration and the potential 
possibility of reconfiguration in gender performances. This is because the idea of 
trained body, which is articulated by Merleau-Ponty, hints at how the initial mastery 
of a lived body can be utilised as both a foundation for learning and a resource for 
producing. Those two primary abilities, in relation to the gendering process, then 
provide indications regarding how gender acts can take place in different individuals 
with certain degrees of variance, i.e. how they can be reiterated and (even if only 
slightly) reconfigured in each gendered practice. 
 
Furthermore, I intend to draw on Judith Butler’s theorisation of gender performativity 
to capture the productivity and disciplinary forces of gender hegemony, in order to 
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elucidate the correlation between bodily reiteration and reconfiguration of gender 
structures. ‘Gendering’, as this thesis portrays it, refers to the everlasting process in 
which a lived body becomes a gendered subject via disciplinary trainings and 
actualising such trainings in its daily performances. In other words, the 
constructedness of gender is detected in the way that a body is disciplined to imitate 
and repeat gendered practices. Although Butler may have coined the compulsiveness 
of gender as a 'forced recitation of norms', the trained imitation of gender acts is never 
a precise repetition of a well-defined gender paradigm.
291
 If one reviews the history of 
human activity, it can be clearly identified that the corporeal re-enactment of gender 
performances is not entirely a mechanical production of certain consistent gender 
routines. Rather, 'gendering' should be conceived as an on-going and semi-open 
socialising project, in which corporeal mastery is camouflaged in the way that 
individuals recite gender norms with subtle variations.  
 
By considering the relational interplay of reiteration and reconfiguration in the 
constitution of gender embodiment, the feminist politics of discursive embodiment 
will be able to identify the intrinsic correlation between normative powers and 
corporeal performances of gender. From this, a crucial opportunity for politicising 
and contesting the existing gender hegemony can be revealed, in relation to the 
potential variations of individual reiterations of gender acts. I should point out that 
the term 'relational interplay', which is used extensively in this chapter to define the 
situation between the roles of 'reiteration' and 'reconfiguration', is designed for 
describing an unceasing, dynamic process of interaction between two forces. During 
this, those two forces have an effect on the development of each other. Noteworthy is 
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that the relational interplay between reiteration and reconfiguration, as will be 
demonstrated in this chapter, does not intend to reach a settlement between corporeal 
performances and gender hegemony. Instead, such relational interplay is envisaged as 
a crucial mechanism to disrupt the dominant gender relations between the sexes under 
the feminist politics of discursive embodiment. More importantly, the opportunity for 
gender disruption, i.e. for deconstructing the hegemonic meanings of gender, is 
rooted in bodily actions. The corporeal capability to contest, as this chapter and 
Chapter Four will elaborate, can be transformed into the political skill to question and 
reinvent the existing feminist political ethos.  
 
Under such circumstances, the relational interplay between reiteration and 
reconfiguration bears the marks of both normative imperatives and materiality. The 
normative imperative of gender refers to the forcible reiteration of gendered practices 
in the lived body; at the same time, the realization of such gender imperatives is 
material, because its maintenance relies on corporeal actions. Following that, gender 
reconfiguration entails that the material aspect to which the possibility of change is 
owed is detected in the action of the trained body. Meanwhile, the corporeal re-
enactment is laden with the normative imperative of existing gender structures. 
Within which, the notion of mastery, which is presumed in Merleau-Ponty's trained 
body, signifies that an actor can reiterate forced gender practices with restrained 
differences. The potential individual variation of a gender reiteration is 'restrained' 
because the gendered subjectivity of individuals is enabled and constrained at the 
same time by the routine training which sustains, as well as provided by, the 
established gender hegemony. The subtle difference in re-enactments not only points 
to the constitutive tension between individuality and regulative normativity of gender, 
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but also suggests that gendering is an open-ended process. The delicate 
reconfiguration of established gender practices, as this thesis intends to argue, will 
renew the discursive territory of gender with inspiring and maybe provocative 
examples, which yield symbolic support for future contestations, open up women's 
perceptions as well as the imagination of 'women'. 
 
The relational interplay between reiteration and reconfiguration in the feminist 
politics of embodiment will be unfolded through the following sections: 'Reflecting 
on the normative imperatives and materiality of gender', 'The corporeal reiteration of 
gender performativity', 'The discursive reconfiguration of gender performance' and 
'The discursive embodiment in gender seriality'. It has been repeatedly pointed out 
that a conceptualisation of women as a heterogeneous social collective is a crucial 
task for contemporary feminist politics in a pluralist age. By considering the 
discursive and material correlations of gender in this way, I will demonstrate how 
individual women can deconstruct the disciplinary gender norms in front of the public 
eye. Furthermore, such a depiction of relational interplay of gender reiteration and 
reconfiguration pinpoints how women are informed by social differences to perform 
their assigned gender differently. Moreover, articulating reiteration and 
reconfiguration brings back the conceptual task set out in previous chapters, namely 
how a phenomenological lived body can substantiate Young's conceptualization of 
gender seriality. While the consideration on Merleau-Ponty's idea of the lived body 
enunciates the significance of corporeality in constituting the serial structure of 
gender, articulating the relational interplay between corporeal reiteration and 
discursive reconfiguration will here supplement the operative dimension of that 
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enunciation. I will therefore conclude Chapter Three with a section on 'Discursive 
embodiment in gender seriality'.  
 
1. Reflecting on Normative Imperatives and Materiality of Gender 
In the preceding chapters, I introduced and sketched out Young's primary 
development of gender seriality and Merleau-Ponty's depiction of a 
phenomenological lived body respectively, in order to set the scene for the 
articulation of a feminist politics of discursive embodiment. In this framework, I also 
pointed out that both ideas can complement each other, since the concept of a lived 
body can enlighten us to how gender structures work on individuals and the idea of 
gender seriality provides a non-essentialist approach to situate a female body. 
Nevertheless, how the gender hegemony is operationalised and transformed in 
relation to the performativity of the female body remains an open question and 
requires a detailed discussion. In particular, how does the heterogeneity of women 
emerge from female performances of gender under the conditioned environment of 
gender structures? A conceptual elucidation on the roles of gender reiteration and 
reconfiguration will therefore be useful to provide operational insights into the ways 
that individuals take up constrained possibilities 'in their own way, forming their own 
habits as variations on those possibilities, or actively try to resist or refigure them', 
while gender serial structures 'condition the action of consciousness of individual 
persons'.
292
  
 
On the one hand, the role of gender reiteration illustrates how the lived body is 
informed by its situatedness and, on the other hand, individuals demonstrate how they 
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make sense of their ideas of being-in-the-world through the ability to reconfigure 
existing practices. The following sections will sketch out the conceptual essence of 
the relational interplay of gender reiteration and reconfiguration gradually. I shall 
highlight here that the connection between corporeal reiteration and discursive 
reconfiguration of gender norms is a two-way street: One the one hand, the normative 
effect of gender structures condition the lived body via prompting the bodily 
reiteration of gender performances. On the other hand, as Merleau-Ponty perceives, 
through a presumed mastery, (or 'agency' in Butler's account of gender performativity) 
in the lived body's way of being-in-the-world, corporeal reiteration generates a 
transformative possibility of reconfiguring gender norms. Such acknowledgement 
leads to the other aspect of this relational interplay. That is, inherently individual, 
performative, bodily acts contribute alternative interpretations to the development of 
discursive effects of the existing gender structures. This contribution has 
transformative merits, which may not exhibit immediate, drastic effects, but can be 
potentially reiterated, even developed further, by future gendered corporeal practices. 
This half-constrained and half-open interaction between the discursive and the 
material aspects of gender, as I will conclude, sustains the communal ambience of 
gender serial structures, while preserving the heterogeneity that are cultivated from 
temporal individual performances of gender. 
  
I will here coin another term for gender reiteration; 'corporeal reiteration'. This is to 
underline the vision that, drawing on Butler, gender performativity is 'a citational 
chain lived and believed at the level of the body'; with the act of disruption a 
'discursive reconfiguration', accentuating the iterative power of that disrupting action 
in contesting the discursive imperative of gender hegemony. Nevertheless, I must 
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contend, such terminological differentiation should not be read as an arbitrary, 
definite categorization, which neglect that both reiteration and reconfiguration are 
resulted from the interplay of discourse and materiality. Apart from that, I also 
recognize the irreducibility of the discursive and the material, even though gender 
performances are construed as corporeal embodiments here. As Butler notices, 
following Shoshana Felman's idea of scandalous body, '[S]peech is bodily, but the 
body exceeds the speech it occasions; and speech remains irreducible to the bodily 
means of its enunciation.'
293
 In other words, the discursive and the material always 
have effects in excess of intention. More importantly, it is in this notion of excess that 
the corporeal reiteration of gender produces the possible discursive reconfiguration of 
gender hegemony. In turn, this discursive excess provides a historically-congealed 
ground for future forms of corporeality to reiterate. However, as James Loxley 
observes in Butler's account of performativity, the changing of gender structures via 
the relational interplay of reiteration and reconfiguration cannot assure effectively a 
positive progression.
294
 Since the gender structure is subjected to the ambiguity of 
human existence and the indeterminacy of serial members' individual projects, as 
noted in the previous chapters, the corporeal reiteration and the subsequent discursive 
reconfiguration are also vulnerable for the same reason. For example, women's 
political and civil rights may be granted by democracy but not necessarily the 
autonomy over women's body, especially when it comes to issue of reproduction.  
 
Of course, the issue around reproduction, such as abortion, surrogacy, and 
contraception, is more than a matter for feminist theory alone as it is entangled with 
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other ethical and moral questions, and often, with religious concerns. Nonetheless, 
what feminist ethos, let's say, around the reproduction issue should be cultivated, via 
the reiteration and reconfiguration of gender, is fundamentally a question of 
democratic politicization. That is to say, in line with the ambiguous atmosphere of 
human existences, contemporary feminist politics not only should acknowledge the 
interplay of discourses and materiality, but also should be acclimatized to the 
accompanied indeterminacy and uncertainty of that interaction in its democratic 
framework. As I will argue in the next chapter, to construe the relational interplay 
between corporeal reiteration and discursive reconfiguration as a democratic method 
of political contestation, is to consider the political competition between potential 
interpretations of the excess factor as an agonistic pluralism, than an antagonistic 
battle over power.  
 
Agonistic pluralism, as William Connolly states, comprehends '[a] recurrent tension 
between already existing diversity and new movements that press upon this or that 
established assumption about', in the current case, gender.
295
 Connolly then 
encourages an 'ethos of engagement' between multidimensional constituencies, in 
which the agonistic pluralism can solicits participants 'to affirm without existential 
resentment the profound contestability of each in the eyes of others.'
296
 Such an ethos 
of engagement, in my opinion, takes form via the relational interplay between 
corporeal reiteration and discursive reconfiguration. Also, it can democratize the 
feminist politics of discursive embodiments by inviting contributors to rethink 
politically some 'previously unstated implications, toward an ethic of cultivation as 
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you become alert to new forces arising in the world.'
297
 Following the above, the 
relational interplay between corporeal reiteration and discursive reconfiguration 
constructs a circuitous route between discourse and material, and, as I will elaborate 
upon, bridging the access between individuals and the world. With the intrinsically 
entwined discourses and materiality in mind, I will turn to the subject of corporeal 
reiteration in the next section with cautiousness, to elaborate the first operational 
dimension of gender construction. Connecting Merleau-Ponty's idea of the trained 
body with Butler's articulation of gender performativity, the amplification of 
corporeal reiteration will demonstrate not only the constructedness of gender, but also 
that the possibility of reconfiguration is embedded in the body. 
 
2. The Corporeal Reiteration of Gender Performativity 
In the previous section, I suggested that the corporeal reiteration of gender is itself a 
gendering process, in which the female body is enabled as a feminine subject in 
accordance with the situatedness of gender. To put it differently, the corporeal 
reiteration of gender refers to the fact that the normative imperative of gender 
structures prompts the lived body to re-enact certain gender practices which 
supposedly correspond to the sex of the body. In this sense, the corporeal reiteration 
of gender performativity can be understood as a normalizing process of gendering, 
with the aim to train the body to produce standardised performances. In order to 
capture the normative imperative of gender structures that enable women's 
corporeality, I will engage with Merleau-Ponty's articulation of the training process of 
the lived body with Butler's conceptualization of gender performativity. Merleau-
Ponty's account of the trained body underlines that corporal reiteration is 
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fundamentally a historically-congealed corporeal practice; and his crucial oversight of 
the lived body's sexual situatedness can be supplemented by Butler's understanding of 
gender practices. Specifically, I will concentrate on her idea of heteronormativity, to 
elucidate how the body adopts the sexual dimorphism as its way of being-in-the-
world. With the above characterization of corporeal reiteration in mind, I will further 
elucidate the training of the lived body. 
 
 2a. Merleau-Ponty: Training the Lived Body 
As presented in the last chapter, the phenomenological articulation of the body is 
lived as a condition of its being-in-the-world. That is to say, the material body can be 
construed as a metaphorical carrier, laden with the discursive meaning of the world. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, 'The relations between things or aspects of things 
having always our body as their vehicle, the whole nature is the setting of our own 
life, or our interlocutor in a sort of dialogue'.
298
 The phenomenological understanding 
of the 'lived', under such circumstances, points to the constructedness of the meaning 
of the world, given that lived experience inescapably relies on the sensory and 
motility of the body. 'Our sense of 'reality' must come from our lived experience of 
reality,' as Thomas Busch argues, 'that is, from the body's involvement in and 
transactional dealings with reality.'
299
 It is noteworthy that the 'involvement' or 
'dealings' that the body has with the world is made possible by the simultaneous 
collaboration between the passivity and activeness of the lived body. I shall expand 
upon the above statement as follows: the activeness of the lived body is exemplified 
in the way that individuals, through their particular praxis, project their intentionality 
via bodily actions, in accordance with their situatedness. Merleau-Ponty defines the 
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body's capacity to act itself or on one's own accord as 'mastery', or 'agency' in other 
conceptual contexts.
300
 But such activeness, as hinted by the prepositional phrase 
earlier, can only happen within the already-there world,  which brings us to the 
passivity of the body. 
 
The passivity of the lived body, in a provisional sense, can be interpreted in a way 
that every bodily action is always contextualized; or to put it differently, it is a 
materialization of its surroundings to some extent. The body does not make sense of 
its existence in a vacuum, but with recourse to something other than itself, namely the 
world. As Merleau-Ponty diligently points out, ''existence' is the movement through 
which man is in the world and involves himself in a physical and social situation 
which then becomes his point of view on the world'.
301
 Individuals are cast in the 
same mould, by acquiring the corporeal habits from a ready-made physical and social 
situation. Embodied behaviour 'is irreducibly historical. It is structured through 
human values and the exigencies of the historical world', as Crossley claims.
302
 In 
short, the lived body is passive for it is 'in the world', and consequently is subject to 
the conditioning of common praxis. The manner in which the lived body adopts 
historical and habitual behavioural moulds from the world is associated with the 
notion of training, in which conventional rules are learned by the body in order to 
(re)produce acceptable carnal actions. Similar to the entanglement between the 
discursive and the corporeal, it is also difficult to discuss the passive training of the 
lived body without referring to the presumed notion of mastery in the active body. 
However, in order to proceed with this section, I will concentrate on elaborating 
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'training' as a normalizing, institutionalized procedure, in order to facilitate an 
efficient transition to the discussion of normative gender reiteration later.  
 
Perceiving the world as a physical and social situation in which individuals act, the 
idea of training, although Merleau-Ponty did not specify it as such, can be interpreted 
as follows: The world as a historical-congealed reality has specific modes of physical 
and social actions that can be (partially) imposed on individuals. Following that, 
training is a conditioning process, in which individuals learn to inscribe those 
physical/social practices in their existences, to the degree that they can reproduce 
expected habitual behaviours in correspondence to specific situations. Take, for 
example, physical movements like speaking or walking. To learn how to walk, 
children will imitate the walking posture from the people around them, and improving 
their imitation and bodily coordination through a series of attempted practices. Apart 
from imitation, reproducing similar behaviours under similar circumstances is also a 
fundamental purpose of training. When a person is trained to acquire certain skills, 
for instance, walking, that person not only observes the bodily movement of walking, 
but also obtains perceptions about the circumstances/conditions around that particular 
movement. It is both the physical coordination and the conditioning surroundings that 
are institutionalized in the lived body, after certain amounts of preparatory drill, or 
put it another way, corporeal reiteration of that act. I will rely on Merleau-Ponty's 
understanding of 'association' to elucidate how training facilitates transferable skills. 
 
Training as a form of reproduction teaches the lived body to re-enact specific modes 
of physical/social practices under more or less specific physical/social situations. For 
instance, once children have mastered the skill of walking, they can apply this 
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physical performance on various, yet similar, occasions, such as walking up hills or 
on a flat surface. This is because, drawing on Merleau-Ponty's construction of 
'association', the actor inclines to 'take[s] advantage of what he knows, and sets it in a 
"reproduction intention"', after assessing the similarity between the physical/social 
situation that he currently encounters with those he has been faced.
303
 If the actor 
cannot identify the resemblance between the present and the past, the acquired skills 
for that particular occasion then has no effect, In short, no reproduction intention 
exists, if the actor cannot make associations between the two circumstances of now 
and then. Following this, corporeal reiteration, with regard to association, 'acts only 
by making probable or attractive a reproduction intention; it operates only in virtue of 
the meaning it has acquired in the context of the former experience and in suggesting 
recourse to that experience; it is efficacious to the extent to which the subject 
recognizes it, and grasps it in the light or appearance of the past.'
304
 Such a 
characterization of re-enacting under resemblance explains why some habitual 
behaviours are categorized as gender performance and some are not, as well as why a 
person is compelled to re-enact. 
 
Merleau-Ponty further argues that once the reproduction intention is put into 
operation, 'instead of simple continuity, ... it would still be seen that in order to recall 
a former image which present perception resembles, the latter must be patterned in 
such a way that it can sustain this resemblance.'
305
 The term, 'patterned', and the 
phrase, 'sustain this resemblance', are indicative of the regulative dimension of 
training. Recall the case of children learning to walk: the fact that they are learning 
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the human mode of walking indicates that such physical training is rule-bound and 
with exclusion, which aims to standardize embodied behaviours in accordance with 
specific ends. In other words, the regulative constraint of training is revealed when a 
child, encouraged by social situatedness, learns to walk like other human-beings, 
rather than like other animals. Derived from this, the physical training of walking 
always entails a social, normative dimension, namely distinguishing the 'correct' way 
of walking from the 'wrong' one. Such a regulative division of right and wrong modes 
of walking is inscribed in individual bodies, by providing rewards and punishments 
during the training process of repeated practices. For instance, children may get a 
round of applause from the parents when their imitation of walking is 'patterned' to 
resemble what they have observed from their parents. In contrast, children may 
subject to forceful verbal or physical correction/rejection as punishments from their 
parents, if they fail to sustain that resemblance and walk, say, like a cat or a penguin.  
 
The individual experience of consequences of reward/punishment in the training 
process of specific motility gradually builds into an individuals' bodily schema. The 
lived experience that individuals have under the condition of their social/physical 
situatedness, therefore, constitutes their existences in the world. Consequently, the 
role of training is to make certain that some options are more attractive than the 
others within specific circumstances. Meanwhile, the lived body as trained is 
conditioned by the social/physical situatedness that it is in, and is compelled to 
reproduce preferable choices with recourse to the past experience of a particular type 
of action. Such understandings of training and the urge to sustain resemblance sheds 
some lights on how social structures are upheld over time, as well as alluding to the 
interaction between materiality and discursive imperatives. Corporeal reiteration 
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induced by normative discursive imperatives, and initiated through training, is 
conceived as a form of power struggle by various poststructuralists like Foucault and 
de Beauvoir. Therefore, the lived body as the primary contested site of different 
intentionalities, from the Self and the Other, points to the political aspect of our 
embodiments. 'It is because we exist by means of embodied action that it matters how 
our bodies are treated and how they perform', as Crossley declares.
306
  
 
From above, we can see how training can produce constraints on the lived body's 
actions under Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological articulation. 'All embodied 
existence manifests a tendency to inertia because of the sedimented habits of the flesh, 
due to which even cultural innovations tend to sink into the taken-for-granted 
horizons and repetitions of the lifeworld', as Coole argues.
307
 The maintenance of 
resemblance is not necessarily undesirable, when taking into account the need for a 
level of institutionalization in order to sustain an ordered collective life. However, 
Young's investigation of female throwing posture, presented in the last chapter, poses 
a sharp challenge to the boundary between  necessary and  desirable resemblance. 
From her examination, it may be argued that the throwing posture itself is required 
for accomplishing some human activities; but the self-restrained feminine throwing 
posture is a questionable phenomenon that requires further contestation on both 
corporeal and discursive levels. However, Merleau-Ponty did not provide insights 
into gendering as a form of training and the possible political implications of the 
trained body. Thus, in what follows, I will turn to Butler's critical articulation of 
corporeal reiteration in the field of gender performativity, to give a more explicit 
consideration of the trained body in the feminist politics of discursive embodiments. 
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The discussion will aim to shift the focus towards the idea that the lived body is acted 
upon by power, although under the presumption of its activity. As a result of this 
tension between acting and being acted upon, a political opportunity is recognized in 
corporeal reiteration and leads to a possible discursive reconfiguration. 
 
 2b. Butler: Training the Lived Body in the World of Heteronormativity 
In tackling the female throwing posture as a phenomenological exemplification of 
gendered practices, Young underlines the effects that normative imperatives of 
gender structures have on women's bodies in the form of 'ambiguous transcendence' 
and 'inhibited intentionality'. She argues that the cause behind these normative effects 
and the subsequent self-constrained female throwing posture is, in contrast to men, 
woman's situation in the world as the perpetuated Other. Instead of recognizing the 
active intentionality in the lived body, women, under the male gaze, are unsuccessful 
in claiming full Selfhood and consequently are confined to the immanence of  
corporeality. Incorporating this immobility into women's exploration and formulation 
of own existence, as Young observes, women are thus ineffective in utilizing the 
capacity of the whole body and awkwardly half-withdrawing from the throwing 
motion.
308
 Merleau-Ponty's idea of training can certainly explicate how the feminine 
throwing pose is conveyed from one woman to the others via, quoting Butler's phrase, 
'the repeated stylization of the body'.
309
 Nonetheless, the conception of training can 
only shed light onto the operational dimension of the gender practice. However, as 
suggested in previous chapters, it is insufficient to questioning how the structural 
differences of throwing arise between men and women. Or, to put it in another way, 
why women and men are 'trained' differently in relation to the same corporeal posture?  
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To further situate corporeal reiteration as a training process in the context of gender, I 
will briefly summarize Merleau-Ponty's understanding of sexuality, which is 
presented in the second chapter, and then point out the common critique of Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenological understanding of the lived body in its sexual being. 
Following that, I will suggest that Butler's articulation of 'heteronormativity' under 
gender performativity can provide an intelligible situatedness for the idea of the 
trained body, to unveil the constructedness of gender and its discursive effects on 
conditioning bodily practices. In particular, her conceptualization of 
'heteronormativity' indicates that the sexual dimorphism of masculinity and 
femininity compels gendered corporeal reiterations, in a way that naturalizes and 
maintains the fundamentally contingent gender system. Furthermore, Butler's claim 
that the body is constrained by a hegemonic heteronormativity indirectly suggests that, 
following Foucault, a constant tension between exterior (i.e. gender norms) and 
interior (i.e. agency/subjectivity) pressures on corporeality. In addition to this, a 
Foucauldian account of the interaction between power and agency also echoes 
Merleau-Ponty’s consideration of training and  presumed mastery. I will therefore 
trace those connections to elucidate how the contingent association between different 
modulations and sexual bodies becomes regulative.  
 
For Merleau-Ponty, sexuality is understood as a particular aspect of our being-in-the-
world in relation to the existence of sex, in which our body takes up a de facto 
situation of sex and projects our intentionality to constitute our body-to-body relation 
with the others. He manifests the phenomenological connection between sexual desire 
and bodily functions, via the case of a girl who lost her voice because of her 
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suppressed love.
310
 Sexuality thus gains its significance and meanings via intentional 
bodily actions. That is, 'existence takes up, for its own purposes, and transforms [such] 
a situation.'
311
 It is clear that Merleau-Ponty recognizes the individual intentionality in 
making explicit one's sexual situation and the accompanied indeterminate 
interpretations of such situatedness, Also, he problematizes the construal of sexuality 
as either 'governed by natural laws, or even as "a bundle of instincts"', for the 
existential connection between one's being and sexual desire.
312
 Under such 
circumstances, sexuality 'forms the "current of existence" at work in perception, 
which firmly anchors the libidinal body in the world shared with other embodied and 
desiring perceivers.'
313
 Such formulation of sexual existence, however, understates 
the power struggle between oneself and the world in the process of constituting the 
current of sexual existence. While the lived body can take up a de facto situation with 
intentionality, how it transforms this chance into reason, via the bodily capability and 
modality acquired through repeated practices, is inevitably constrained by the 
question of 'how the body is trained'.  
 
Merleau-Ponty's oversight regarding the role of gender power in constructing the 
existential connection between sexual beings and surroundings is also criticized by 
various feminists and scholars. Butler, Elizabeth McMillan, and Jillian Canode all 
contend that his conceptualization of the general Subject is essentially masculine, 
which implicitly assumes the male body as the foundation of all embodiments and, 
therefore, fails to consider other possibilities of embodied practices.
314
 For instance, 
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Merleau-Ponty draws an analogy between casual bodily movements and the role of 
sexuality in existence. We integrate sexuality into our fundamental existences and 
such a notion becomes a 'general function of unspoken transposition which we have 
already recognized in the body during our investigation of the body image.'
315
 He 
accepts that sexuality can direct our specified lived experience without us 'being 
expressly conscious of the fact'.
316
 Yet his unreserved credence of sexuality with 
general significance, as Coole abridges Butler's critique of him, may 'actually hides a 
deeper masculinist and heterosexist bias.'
317
With those critiques in mind, I world like 
to suggest that Butler's articulation of heteronormativity under gender performativity 
can help to tackle the neglected existential power struggle between heterosexual 
training and the lived body.  
 
Before detailing the notion of 'heteronormativity', its corporeal reiteration, and its 
Foucauldian connotation of power struggle, I should point out that Butler has used 
other terminological variations such as 'the heterosexual matrix' and 'heterosexual 
hegemony' in her works.
318
 And the term, heteronormativity, is pronounced by 
Michael Warner and draw on Gayle Rubin's 'sex/gender system' and Adrienne Rich's 
idea of compulsory heterosexuality.
319
 Among those terminologies, I will use 
'heteronormativity' in this thesis, for it effectively signifies an gendered social milieu, 
in which heterosexuality is conceived as natural to humanity and at the same time that 
poses itself as normatively the right way to live. Both Butler and Warner intend to 
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deconstruct the gender dimorphism that is upheld by the institutionalized 
heterosexual practices, by applying those phrases. As Warner points out that 'so much 
of heterosexual privilege lies in heterosexual culture's exclusive ability to interpret 
itself as society.'
320
 His recognition of the control over discursive interpretation of 
bodies points to the core problem of Merleau-Ponty's presentation of sexuality: In ' 
presenting sexuality as a level on which the body lives its relationship with the world 
and with others', Merleau-Ponty fails to consider that the body's relationships with the 
world and with another body may be asymmetric and distorted by historical 
precedents in the very beginning.
321
 It is thus debatable that a fair and reciprocal 
relationship is developed between the subjects in question under such circumstances.  
 
Following above, the relationship between heteronormativity and the lived body can 
be understood as follows: the idea of heteronormativity refers to the 
heterosexualization of the world, in which an gender dimorphism is constructed to 
categorize human beings into two categorizes, men and women, who are assigned 
with supposed characteristics, masculinity and femininity, respectively. Accordingly, 
the relationship between the two sexes is conditioned by heterosexual practices, as 
opposed to homosexuality. That is, men should desire women sexually and vice versa, 
rather than the same sex. Such a comparison between heterosexuality and 
homosexuality, following Butler, constitutes the 'cultural matrix', and thus the 
normative framework, of heteronormativity.
322
 'The grammatical subject is, ..., never 
self-identical, but always and only itself in its reflexive movement', as Butler reflects 
Hegelian rhetoric to explain the necessity of understanding heterosexuality via 
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homosexuality.
323
 In other words, the purpose of the distinction is to define what the 
subject is by showing what it is not. Along these lines, the differentiation between 
heterosexuality and homosexuality provides an intelligible cultural matrix for 
individuals to make sense of their sexes, in a mode of rule-following. '"Intelligible" 
genders are those which in some sense institute and maintain relations of coherence 
and continuity among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire', as Butler argues.
324
  
 
Following on from the above, the heterosexualization of the lived body is that a 
person is born as man/woman with masculine/feminine attributes, and consequently 
must desire the opposite sex. This relational association between sexuality and sexual 
practices is existential, given that the cultural matrix behind it regulates how one 
should make sense of one's life and what traits should be incorporated into one's 
existence. Under such circumstance, the cultural matrix of heterosexuality is 
normative and can be interpreted as an act of power. I will now look into the 
connections of cultural matrix and normativity, and power correspondingly. 
Heteronormativity is culturally intelligible because it has a reference framework of 
sexuality that, borrowing Lloyds' words, 'conditions who can be recognized as a 
legitimate subject.'
325
 Putting this into a normative language, the cultural matrix 
provides both 'norms for actions', i.e. what should a person do, and 'norms for being', 
i.e. what state of affairs a person must arrive at, as the evaluating criteria to assess 
individuals' validity of existence.
326
 For instance, gays and lesbians have been 
labelled as abnormal for their homosexual desire within a heterosexualized society; a 
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transvestites actions amount to heresy for defying  masculine/feminine norms. Those 
populations are considered as unintelligible and inadmissible in accordance with the 
cultural matrix of heteronormativity, and thus are denied legitimated subjecthood. To 
use Butler's term, it is a process of 'abjection'.
327
  
 
Young also provides a similar account about how the normative violence of gender 
dimorphism permeates the social milieu and thus constrains individuals. Identifying 
'normative heterosexuality', 'sexual division of labour', and 'patriarchal system' as the 
major gender structures, she argues that the privileging of heterosexual coupling 
produces fundamental impacts on the structuring of our society: 'These include the 
form and implications of many legal institutions, many rules and policies of private 
organizations in allocating positions and benefits, the structuring of schooling and 
mainstream media to accord with these institutions, as well as the assumptions many 
people make in their everyday interactions with others.'
328
 Since heterosexuality is 
institutionalized in both public and private arenas, and interpersonal and personal 
relationships, the lived body, in making sense of itself, materializes heteronormativity. 
The heterosexualization of the lived body thus points to the interplay between 
normative signification and corporeal reiteration. That is, the lived body signifies its 
position in the world of sexuality, which is constructed by the cultural matrix of 
binary sex/gender system, by reiterating heterosexual practices overtime. This process 
of signifying one's sexual existence, recalling Merleau-Ponty, can be construed as a 
work of training the body, in which the body's being-in-the-sexual-world is 
constituted by practicing heteronormativity repeatedly until proficient. Following this, 
I will now turn to the bodily reiteration of heteronormativity. 
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 2c. Constituting Gender Reiteration of Power 
To understand the lived body as the materialization of heteronormativity is to say that 
the body becomes gendered by training to recite gender imperatives in its corporeal 
and discursive actions. The recitation of gender imperatives, according to Butler, is 
performative, and suggests that the existence of gender is only manifested when the 
body actively, yet non-voluntarily, re-enacts the cultural matrix of gender.
329
 The 
'actively' here refers to the individual praxis projected by subjects; alternatively, it can 
also be the phenomenological idea of mastery of the presumed agency in a person's 
subjectivity. Owing to this, the normative effect of the cultural matrix on gender is 
discursively coercive and violently regulative, but is not deterministic, regarding 
corporeality. To put it differently, subjects have to develop their respective ventures 
within the already-there framework of common praxis, such as social class, gender, 
and ethnicity, in order to make their schemes intelligible or acceptable for the fellow 
people. This background preconditions unavoidably suggest that individuals are 
involuntarily constrained in the available formations of individual praxis that they can 
adopt. Nonetheless, the fact that an individual praxis can be articulated itself indicates 
the flexibility of common praxis as non-deterministic, even if it has the tendency to 
totalize. Reading the interplay between the body and gender structures in this way, a 
power relation can be detected. 
 
Following on from the above, I will argue in this section that the corporeal reiteration 
of gender is actually a gender reiteration of power. Conceiving gender performativity 
as a demonstration of one of the fundamental forms of power, the corporeal 
reiteration of heteronormativity is discursively prompted by gender codes, with the 
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intention to discipline the body to uphold gender hegemony. In other words, the 
cultural matrix of gender provides a set of institutionalized conventions and codes for 
actions to enable individuals, while they live in and acquire the necessary skills to 
make their way in the world. Under such circumstances, corporeal reiterations are 
always historically-congealed and, in turn, contribute to the authority of existing 
forms of hegemony. To comprehend the connection of gender, corporeality, and 
power, I will use Butler's account on (re)iterability to elucidate the necessity of 
repetition in gender performativity. This allows one to understand why the trained 
body in the world of sexuality must be gendered, rather than a seemingly neutral 
sexual being with sexually-motivated passion and desires towards another sexual 
being as depicted by Merleau-Ponty. Furthermore, as Lloyd and Loxley have 
observed, Butler may borrow the term, iterability, from Derrida, but her articulation is 
inherently associated with Foucauldian analysis of power.
330
 In addition, Merleau-
Ponty's idea of 'training' resembles Foucault's account of 'investment' on the body 
from the world, as I will elucidate below. 
 
Gender structures and gender practices stand in a reciprocal relation; gender 
performance confirms the power of gender structures, while gender structures enable 
the materialization of gender. In this back-and-forth interplay between normativity 
and performativity, Butler highlights the linguistic notion of '(re)iterability' as the 
medium of conveying meanings or the excess effects between the discursive and the 
material. As mentioned earlier, she borrows the term 'iterability', or 'citationality' from 
Derrida's linguistic analysis of writing. For Derrida, the iterability of writing text is 
the reason for it to continue to be 'communicable, transmittable, decipherable', even 
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'in the absence of such and such a person [i.e. the death of the receiver], and hence 
ultimately of every empirically determined "subject".'
331
 That is, with essential 
iterability being built into written symbols, it not only preserves the intelligibility of 
the words over time and across receivers, but also allows the words to remain 
functional, or, 'readable', even they were taken out of their original contexts, without 
however, denoting an essential meaning. Under such circumstances, the authority and 
sovereignty of an author is being challenged, for the original writer cannot determine 
how the receivers, including the intended and the unintended ones, understand those 
texts or apply them. Yet, same as the cultural intelligibility of corporeal actions, the 
possibility of alteration or the mode of iterability of words are executed within the 
already-there linguistic boundary.  
 
Although the intelligible periphery is challengeable, one cannot simply deprive the 
written symbol from any preceding contexts abruptly, and then re-signify the word 
and claiming the result of re-signification as how it should be understood, or as its 
original meaning. For a linguistic instance, it is unintelligible to suddenly use the 
word 'apple' to signify an animal, than to identify a type of fruit. However, one is 
allowed to call a technological product 'Apple', since such an application can be 
contextualized through previous linguistic usages. The linguistic rules of that 
particular word, constructed its previous iterations, must be followed to make its 
reiteration intelligible. Following that, to make a reiteration of a written symbol 
'successful', one must include the repetition of the symbol itself and there should be a 
certain level of conformity to its previous applications in its current practice. As 
Searle argues that iterability requires '[not only] the repetition of the same word in 
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different contexts, but also includes an iterability of the application of syntactical 
rules', in replying to Derrida's article, 'Signature Event Context'.
332
 Iterability as a 
necessary presupposition for the intelligibility of languages, therefore, indicates the 
implicit conventionality and historicity that are embedded into linguistic reiterations.  
 
Iterability is conventional given that a specific set of principles must be referred to 
during linguistic citations; and it is historical, since the effectiveness or authority of 
those principles is cultivated 'from the fact that the conventions that underpin them 
have accreted over time.'
333
 The recognition of the historically-developed 
effectiveness of iterability, in Derrida's eye, uncovers the constructedness, or, 
fictiveness of language systems. He rejects the plausibility of a natural reality of 
discourse, and arguing that 'the rules, and even the statements of the rules governing 
the relations of "nonfiction standard discourse" and its fictional "parasites," are not 
things found in nature, but laws, symbolic inventions, or conventions, institutions that, 
in their very normality as well as in their normativity, entail something of the 
fictional.'
334
 In demolishing the essential naturalness of nonfictional discourse, all 
forms of re/iteration and citation are construed as de-essentialized but constructed, 
due to their conventionality and historicity. Such articulation of linguistic iterability 
then becomes a conceptual tool to analyse social iterations like social movements, 
beliefs, and, most notably, gender performativity, which is developed by Butler, who 
I will now turn to. 
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The iterability of gender for Butler, as Lloyd indicates, refers to the idea that 'the 
particular repertoire of gestures and corporeal acts that generate the effect of gendered 
identity' is being repeated.
335
 Butler agrees that authoritative conventionality must 
come into play in order to make social practices intelligible, and such normative 
power is not an invariable force but embedded with uncertainty, while enabling the 
subjects to reiterate. However, as Loxley points out, Butler also contends that 
Derridean linguistic iterability cannot capture the specific and normative 
performativity of reiterations of social structures and norms, for it is articulated as the 
general presupposition of all linguistic utterances.
336
 Such a generality of linguistic 
iterability, from Butler's perspective, is 'paralysing the social analysis of forceful 
utterance.'
337
 Instead, she incorporates Foucauldian articulation of power to 
emphasize that gender reiterations are, using Lloyd's words, deeply imbricated in 
relations of domination, reprimand and control ... and they are inescapable.'
338
 The 
practice of forced marriage in Islamic communities is an demonstration of patriarchal 
and heterosexual control over marital and family system, in which women's 
physical/mental submission is 'secured' by sexual and non-sexual violence. As much 
media coverage shows, the female victims of forced marriage are commonly being 
tricked by family members, and their safety is threatened by means like confinements, 
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beating, and mental abuse.
339
 If the female victim chooses to escape, she may be in 
danger of 'honour killing', for the disgrace and shame she brings to the families.
340
  
 
In the case of forced marriage, a woman's sovereignty and autonomy over her body 
are being confiscated, by the patriarchal demand of heterosexual marriage with 
normative/physical intimidation. For Butler, such gender reiteration should be 
construed as corporeal, and the power of gender performativity is 'a citational chain 
lived believed at the level of the body,' in which the body is trained and stylized in 
'embodied rituals of everydayness'.
341
 To capture the micro level of power relations 
between social rituals of everydayness and gendered corporeality, Foucault's insight 
into power and the body is introduced by Butler, to 'contextualize' social iterability. 
Power, for Foucault, is always social and relational in the way that it is constantly 
exercised through social interactions among individuals, between them and social 
institutions.
342
 Furthermore, the characteristics of power are not merely coercive or 
suppressive but also productive, in the sense that they 'produces' knowledge, or in 
other words, orchestrates the scheme of cultural matrix of an given historical 
period.
343
 These attributes of Foucauldian power not only enables feminists to 
deconstruct the naturalness of sex/gender dichotomy, but also helps to form a textured 
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depiction of women's subordination, than a simplified understanding of domination 
and victimization by male power, as Jana Sawicki argues.
344
 
 
With these traits in mind, Butler intends to utilize the Foucauldian concept of power 
to problematize the institutionalized apparatus of heternormativity and its cultural 
intelligibility, which produce the discursive 'knowledge' to enable the subjects' 
corporeal practices of gender. In particular, the heterosexualization of the body is a 
training process in which the body learns to realize its sexual position as male/female 
in an binary system of heterosexuality, as opposed to homosexuality, by embodying 
masculine/feminine iterations. Butler's articulation of the social iterability of 
heteronormativity can therefore be construed as a gendered reiteration of power, and I 
will focus on the relationship between power and knowledge and the disciplinary 
aspect of power here. Power as a disciplinary force in Foucault's account, as Loxley 
argues, is to understand the operation of power 'as the prohibition or containment of 
energies and possibilities arising from other sources'.
345
 Like heterosexualization it is 
functioning through excluding and condemning homosexual desires. What such acts 
of power intend to form is a specific hegemonic apparatus, in which various physical 
organizations, institutionalized mechanisms, and knowledge structures are arranged in 
a way that support the exercise of power within the social body. Furthermore, as 
Loxley points out, such acts of power via the form of discipline operate not only 'by 
discursive means,' but also 'make practical interventions into the everyday embodied 
lives of those [they] set out to classify and organise.'
346
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Noteworthy is that Foucault's articulation of disciplinary power brings the attention 
back to the body, its corporeal actions, and its relation with the world. His emphasis 
on corporeality, for Butler, effectively substitutes the abstract generality of Derridean 
linguistic iterability. 'What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act 
on the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The 
human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and 
rearranges it... Thus, discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies.' as Foucault 
asserts.
347
 He also points out that the 'machinery of power' is exemplified through a 
continuous surveillance and intense scrutiny over bodily actions, in order to 'induce in 
the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic 
functioning of power', as used in disciplinary institutions like prison, mental asylum, 
and army.
348
 That is, disciplinary power can 'tame' and '(re)produce' the body at the 
same time, in accordance with the need and nature of hegemonic apparatus. While the 
body is being tamed by being accustomed to the constrained possibilities and defined 
practices designed by an instituted apparatus, it is simultaneously enabled with skills 
and capabilities to act them out by that same system, as in the case of social iterability.  
 
The productivity of power thus can cultivate the 'conscious and permanent visibility' 
of the tamed subject, by reason of 'it arranges things in such a way that the exercise of 
power is not added on from the outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to the functions 
it invests, but is so subtly present in them as to increase their efficiency by itself 
increasing its own points of contact.'
349
 Such an understanding of the relationship 
between power and the subject indicates that the disciplinarity of power is not merely 
a repressive force that only functions to quell any disobedience, like a king sends 
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heavily armed troop to stomp on the revolutionaries. Instead, it is a form of 
investment, in which the power of an apparatus 'deposits' discursive and non-
discursive skills in the body, in order to train the body to reiterate specific practices, 
which, in turn, support the authority of that hegemonic power. Following that, power 
conditions the body, rather than determines it. This investment of power to act on the 
body resembles Merleau-Ponty's articulation of training. Both him and Foucault are 
agreed on the idea that the trained/invested body can exploit the embodied techniques 
and capabilities, which are acquired through the training/investment of a specific 
apparatus, and turn them against that force of disciplinary. In short, they recognize the 
possibility of resignification in the trained/invested body. The interplay between the 
body and the resignification of discursive apparatus will be elaborated in the next 
chapter. 
 
Apart from that, Foucault's invested body and Merleau-Ponty's trained body 
supplement each other's conceptual deficiency: on the one hand, as Crossley argues, 
Foucault's acknowledgement of disciplinary power in investing the body supplements 
Merleau-Ponty's lack of discussion on the controlling force of training over the lived 
body; and on the other hand, Merleau-Ponty's presumed notion of mastery in the lived 
body, which refers to the basic corporeal motility and senses, provides the ground for 
the invested body to be able to learn, or, say, 'be invested'.
350
 Moreover, feminists like 
Amy Allen and Lois McNay also criticize Foucault's ambiguous account on the 
connection between power and subjectivity cannot demonstrate how the disciplinary 
force is not deterministic on individuals.
351
 Butler's conceptualization of social 
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iterability, in relation to gender performativity, then comes into play. I have pointed 
out earlier that Foucault's idea of power on the body places attention back on 
corporeality, and such emphasis, for Butler, allows Derridean iterability to be 
localized and thus is able to capture the constructedness of social (re)iterations. Now I 
will return to Butler's integration of the Foucauldian power into gender performativity, 
to show how the lived body is signified as a male/female body in the process of 
gender training/investment. In doing so, a conceptual picture of corporeal reiteration 
will become clear and reveal the way to politicize the discursive embodiment of 
gender. 
 
Incorporating power into iterability, gender performativity can be understood as a 
social reiteration of gender power. That is, gender hegemony exercises its power in 
dictating the knowledge structure hierarchy of sex and gender, which posits a 
supposedly natural order, namely that sex as a biological feature is followed rigidly 
by a cultural matrix of gender. 'The notion of sex brought about a fundamental 
reversal; it made it possible to invert the representation of the relationships of power 
to sexuality, causing the latter to appear, not in its essential and positive relation to 
power, but as being rooted in a specific and irreducible urgency which power tries as 
best it can to dominate', as Foucault argues.
352
 Such a 'rule-following' supposition also 
possesses a normative function to judge the intelligibility of the body and its 
performances, as well as collecting information on individuals' existence and 
activities. In particular, heteronomativity as the core structure of gender hegemony 
validates heterosexual desire by penalizing homosexuality, and applying such 
differentiation to define the appropriate relationships between and among two 
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sexes.
353
 In short, the power of gender is manifested in its control over the regime of 
gender practices, including what can be performed, in relation to the disciplinary 
force, and what is being performed, in corresponding to the productivity of power.  
 
Meanwhile, in constructing the cultural intelligibility of the body, the power of 
gender hegemony is, in turn, (re)confirmed by that very same cultural matrix. The 
confirmation is fundamentally achieved by the corporeal reality, since the 
understanding of body cannot be abruptly separated from culture. Owing to this, the 
corporeal reiteration of gender becomes fundamental in demonstrating the 
effectiveness of heternormativity. In other words, it is in the repetition of gender 
practices that the power of gender is reproduced. Butler's gender performativity then 
constructs a conceptual interplay of corporeality, gender power, and subjectivation: 
'[T]he effect of gender is produced through the stylization of the body and, hence, 
must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and 
styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self', as she 
asserts.
354
 Foucault's conceptualization of power underlines the notions of subtlety 
and productivity, which, as Young and Jeffner Allen claims, is 'through micro-
processes of social interchange that direct the boy's energies toward production, 
including the production of power.'
355
 The 'micro-processes of social interchange' can 
be the way one sex is 'viewed' by the other sex, both literally and metaphorically; or 
the way a grammatical gender governing the linguistic application of nouns, pronouns, 
and adjectives. Or the fact that a nappy/baby changing room is often located 
near/inside female restroom rather than male's. Such a location arrangement 
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implicitly assumes it is women's responsibility to take care of children in a 
heterosexual family, while neglecting other types of family like single father or same-
sex couple.
356
  
 
The above examples echo Foucault's claim that the operation of power within the 
social body can be in localized forms, in which its efficiency is improved by 
increasing its points of contact with the intended subjects. The disciplinary force of 
gender power thus is pervaded in daily routines, in particular with the way the 
corporeal reality is stylized and arranged as resulted from normative discursive 
practices. As Butler discuss Mary Douglas' articulation of body and taboos and how 
such relation defines the social of a specific historical and cultural context: 'what 
constitutes the limit of the body is never merely material, but that the surface, the skin, 
is systematically signified by taboos and anticipated transgressions; indeed, the 
boundaries of the body become, within her analysis, the limits of the social per se.'
357
 
In the process of gender signification, individuals are enabled with corporeal skills 
and understandings of the world to prompt for appropriate gendered actions under 
specific conditions. Although the aim of the training/investment of gender power on 
individual bodies is to produce what Butler calls 'an abiding gendered self', the 
enabling process of gender hegemony also risks the possibility of providing the 
fundamental tools for the intended subjects to use against the apparatus itself. 
'Agency thus inheres in the regulatory repetition of the very norms that sustain the 
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system,' as indicates the path from corporeal reiteration to discursive 
resignification.
358
  
 
With the disciplinary and productivity of power in mind, gender performativity can 
be interpreted as a particular corporeal practice of improvisation within a specific 
historically-congealed scene of gendered discursive constraints. The notion of 
presumed mastery in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological trained body conceptually 
bestows gender hegemony with an able corporeality, which allows heternomativity to 
train under the discursive formation that it also have constructed over the time. 
Moreover, the able body, as a continuous existence in itself, cannot fully break away 
from the gendered training, for the understanding of corporeal existence is always 
cultivated from its way of being-in-the-world. Such a recognition of corporeality as 
the materialization of the world indicates that the lived body is constantly positioned 
in a worldly situation and, hence, its embodiments are constituted, not determined, 
partially by the situation it is in. In short, the lived body acts within a common serial 
praxis. However, the bodily (re)iteration of gender paradigms is always incomplete 
and unsuccessful. In this way, gender performance is essentially an imitation, rather 
than the full realization of original authorship, if one is comparing the current 
performer with the unidentifiable originator. Such 'incompleteness' of gender 
reiteration, interweaving with subjectivity, thus indicates why the conditioning of 
common praxis is conceived as partial and constitutive, than absolute and determinant. 
 
More importantly, the above interplay between partial reiteration and subjectivity 
puts instability and uncertainty into the constructed nature of gender performativity. 
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'Consider gender, for instance, as a corporeal style, an "act," as it were, which is both 
intentional and performative, where "performative" suggests a dramatic and 
contingent construction of meaning', as Butler announces.
359
 That is to say that the 
partial reiteration of hegemonic (original) gender paradigm is also a creation of one's 
own in a sense. The development of agency inserts another source of originality into 
the ongoing, in comparison with the existence of individual body, (re)production of 
gender hegemony. Such 'original' authorship, however little, provides a temporal 
ground to differentiate itself from other (re)creations, in which gender hegemony 
becomes, as Butler calls, 'a constituted social temporality' that is able to be re-
signified.
360
 Since our lived bodies are always encultured and the history can be 
construed as resulted from human actions, the alteration in bodily actions have the 
chance to transform the situatedness of the lived body. In other words, as the 
corporeal reiteration of gender power can be performed differently within constrained 
scope, the lived body can politicize itself as a corporeal resistance to existed gender 
apparatus. This process of gender resignification is the other level of the reciprocal 
relationship between the discursive imperative and the materiality, which is the topic 
I will now turn to. 
 
3. The Discursive Reconfiguration of Gender Performances 
A depiction of the relational practice between corporeal reiteration and discursive 
reconfiguration, as I stated in the beginning of this chapter, can fill the operational 
gap between gender seriality, the lived body, and their politicization for constituting a 
feminist politics of discursive embodiment. The articulations of corporeal reiteration 
and discursive reconfiguration are provided separately, and they are labelled 
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respectively with the adjectives of 'corporeal' and 'discursive, for I believe such an 
arrangement can better present the clarity of each element and unfold their 
connections step by step. Regardless of such conceptual differentiation for the 
purpose of writing, I am fully aware that corporeal reiteration and discursive 
reconfiguration should not be treated as two intrinsically independent particulars, as if 
they were only connected together under specific theoretical circumstances. Instead, 
those two aspects are inherently interweaved with each other in their relational 
constitutions. Particularly, as I will argue below, such relational practices actually 
resemble the co-existence of discipline and productivity in Foucauldian power. That 
is, while corporeal reiterations (re)confirm the authority of gender apparatus, the 
difference in reiterations produces a deconstructive force to that power formation, in 
relation to the function of discursive reconfiguration. I will articulate this point and 
then situate it in the context of gender seriality here, with the intention of providing a 
feminist vision of politicizing discursive embodiments in contemporary politics of 
difference. 
 
In the previous section, I have shown that Foucault argues that power functions with 
both the forces of disciplinarity and productivity within the social body and on 
individuals, in order to sustain the authority of a dominant normative apparatus. Such 
conceptualization indicates the crucial energy in maintaining the power of a 
normative apparatus is provided by human actions, including linguistic utterances, 
bodily comportments, and social relations. More specifically, power must invest the 
targeted subjects with certain skills, capabilities, or forms of action, in order to 
discipline the bodies in the way it intends to. In other words, power produces a 
subjugated and skilled body via disciplining processes. Butler then drawing on 
  
162 
Foucauldian power to articulate the construction of gender performativity as a 
particular form of social iterability. The heteronormativity of gender apparatus 
regulates the lived body via a series of localized trainings, which are dispersed in 
daily routines and social institutions like dress codes, linguistic grammas, and body 
postures. Under the close scrutiny and constant surveillance, the lived body then 
internalizes the normative gaze of gender in its embodiments, and using gender 
reiterations as a method to define its corporeal boundary in the sexual world. The 
normativity of gender apparatus thus disguises itself as one of the fundamental parts 
of everydayness, an assumed nature act in corporeality, rather than resulted from long 
sequences of gender training. 
 
Nevertheless, as training operates alongside subjectification, Butler asserts that the 
gendering process also provides the conditions for the body to form a gendered 
subjectivity.
361
 As the trained subject, who is invested by gender systems with 
necessary skills and capabilities and thus fully equipped to perform its gender role, 
can utilize its mastery over corporal functions and senses to improvise gender 
reiterations in accordance with different situations. Such spontaneity is fundamental 
for gender performativity, given that gendering, as a life-long experience, cannot 
prepared the lived body for every possible situation before positioning the body in the 
sexual world. Moreover, it is only in the act of gender reiteration that the existence of 
gender apparatus presents itself. In other words, gendered movements and the 
background of gender are, 'in fact, only artificially separated stages of a unique 
totality.'
362
 The ability of responding to the unexpected or, say, to translate 
strangeness into something familiar points to the creative side of corporality, an 
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indication of subjective control over the body. The creativity of the body is originated 
from its essential activeness, which refers to fundamental motilities and senses of the 
lived body. Connecting this with Merleau-Ponty's idea of presumed mastery in the 
trained body: the subject must be able to act, before that person can reiterate gender 
acts. In other words, the mastery that is inscribed in the lived body is the corporeal 
ground for different forms of social apparatus to work on.  
 
In addition to that, the mastery of the lived body is further facilitated by the body's 
engagement in a cultural world, in which a person begins to aware the bodily fact of 
'I-can' and developing a corporeal subjectivity. Crossley points out that Merleau-
Ponty upholds that the lived body 'is not an object of its own awareness in any 
straightforward sense', even 'it develops an awareness and understanding of its 
environment.'
363
 What such a statement indicates is that subjectivity is not a pre-
existing feature, although the lived body has an essential corporeal motility and 
sensations, in terms of inscribed mastery. The abstraction of subjectivity from 
corporeality as an independent existence would implicitly return to Cartesian dualism 
of mind and body, which is a concept that Merleau-Ponty devotes to its challenge to 
phenomenology. Instead, the development of subjectivity is achieved through the 
lived body's incorporation of its environment, as learning to walk, speak, and inhabit 
in the world. Such a phenomenological understanding of subjectivity thus suggests 
that the process of subjectification can only happen when the lived body with 
inscribed mastery is being invested by the social world. As the mastery of the lived 
body cannot be useful in a vacuum world, it is the social world provides indispensible 
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techniques and knowledge structures for the lived body to consciously acknowledge 
of its mastery and, recalling the purpose of trainings, to (re)produce social modalities. 
 
Following this, the constitution of subjectivity is interlaced with the 
training/investment from social apparatus, when taking disciplinary and productive 
forces of Foucauldian power into account. In particular, the development of 
subjectivity is rooted in corporeality and both share a formative existential connection, 
as the result of a power struggle between body and social world, than a pure 
psychological state. 'It is by tracing its hazardous genesis within corporeal existence 
that phenomenology avoids positing abstract consciousness as a pure existence or 
substance', as Coole claims.
364
 As the lived body must act within the conditioning 
context of the world, subjectivity, can be regarded as a by-product of training, which 
demonstrates itself in the subject's way of coping with accidents and events, as to 
construct the body's being-in-the-world while carrying out world history. 'Taken 
exactly as I see it,' as Merleau-Ponty illustrates via the case of vision, 'it is a moment 
of my individual history, and since sensation is a reconstitution, it presupposes in me 
sediments left behind by some previous constitution, so that I am, as s sentient subject, 
a repository stocked with natural powers at which I am the first to be filled with 
wonder.'
365
 His elucidation shows how temporal existences of individuals co-exist 
with the generality of the world, in a way that the body is constituted, than 
determinate, by the world. Within which, the world deposits skills and capabilities 
indirectly in the body and, in return, the body presents the world in its embodiments.  
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To understand subjectivity as produced through the interplay between bodily mastery 
and social apparatus' training over corporeality, it becomes clear why gender is a non-
voluntary position that individuals take up and, within constrained possibilities, and 
can make their own use of it. The lived body can exhibit, as Coole calls it, 'agentic 
capacities' by recognizing the reality and making it real in the bodily existence of 
being-in-the-world.
366
 In discussing Merleau-Ponty's understanding of lived totalities, 
she recapitulates the corporality and the reality are combined 'over time through 
unpredictable affinities whereby longstanding habits or unexpected events, including, 
for example, piecemeal political resistances, are incorporated into constellations 
whose overall significance is a consequence of internal relationships and whose 
shifting patters might result in a gradual mutation but also in a more sudden gestalt 
switch if their ordering principle changes.'
367
 Following that, the body is a dynamic, 
than a stable, construction over its temporal existence, for it is the primary site of 
power struggle, in which the body is referring back and forth between individual 
projects and common praxis. Incorporating subjectification with embodiment, 
corporeal reiterations of gender apparatus, as Butler has noticed, consolidate 
instability and uncertainty in the essence of gender performativity. More precisely, 
heteronormativity, which invokes the corporeal urge to reiterate, cannot 
fundamentally determine what kind of unexpected affinity that the body can form 
during its gendered performance. Therefore, the normative hegemony always risk the 
emergence of contingent resistances, and subsequently, possible resignifications 
during the trained bodily performance.  
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The trained body of subjectivity therefore paves the way for the discursive 
reconfiguration of gender apparatus. Unlike standardised mass production by 
programmed machines, the disciplined corporeal reiteration of gender is more akin to, 
for instance, art students imitating masterpieces as a training method to sharpen 
painting skills while developing their own interpretation of those works. Such 
analogy signals that the purpose of corporeal reiterations of the lived body is to, from 
the perspective of the subject, actualize its individual projects under the constraint of 
common milieus. Within which, the reconfiguration force from the corporeality can 
be understood broadly, in a way of reading every variation of corporeal reiteration as 
invoking the uncertainty of power apparatus, and inserting individual interpretations 
into the collective history of that system. Take the idea of 'motherhood' for instance: 
even defining it in a strict sense as referring to the state of a woman being a mother in 
relation to her offspring, mothers within different social settings, like in a traditional 
heterosexual family, single-parent household, or a matriarchic background, will 
cultivate their own mothering experiences. The diverse mothering practices then 
pluralize the substance of motherhood, by becoming part of historical sediments of 
the terminology and are available for future reiterations.  
 
The force of reconfiguration can also be read in a narrower way: as an explicit 
resistance to the existing apparatus by calling the hegemonic imperatives into 
question. Butler's reflection on the case of 'drag' is an eminent example, which 
deconstructs the supposed causal and dimorphic association of 'men are masculine 
and women are feminine' and subverting heteronormativity. Another instance is the 
'Slut Walk' in 2011, which was briefly discussed in the last chapter. This mass 
demonstration openly confronted the negative connotation of the word 'slut' and its 
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moral consequences in relation to the male gaze. It can be conceived as to claim back 
women's right over her body as a fundamental place for subjective articulations, in 
which the protesters try to disconnect morality with sexual expressions. In particular, 
such claiming of 'slut' rejects the reduction of a woman into merely a passive body, 
which her active declamations, like 'Stop!' and 'I don't want this!' in the situation of 
sexual harassments, are, as some male perpetrators claim, overridden by an inert body. 
The feminist claiming thus is a purely dispute about the cultural intelligibility of 
good/bad women under hegemonic gender apparatus. Rather it is, as I believe, a 
feminist contestation regarding women's autonomy. Yet no matter how discursive 
reconfiguration is envisaged as a direct resistance or an unintentional outcome, a 
replication of past act or a individual design, it is always historically-congealed in the 
same way as corporeal reiteration. I will consider this last point with reference to 
Young's gender seriality, before concluding this chapter.  
 
4. The Discursive Embodiment in Gender Seriality 
The relational practice of corporeal reiteration and discursive reconfiguration, as 
presented above, constitutes the operational phase in elucidating the interaction 
between the lived body and gender seriality. A gendered discursive embodiment is 
thus occurred under the interplay between the discourse and the materiality of gender, 
in which the embodiment conveys both the generality and temporality of existential 
lives. In the final section of this chapter, I will further consider how the relational 
operation of corporeal reiteration and discursive reconfiguration is features in gender 
seriality, in relation to the facilitation of discursive embodiments. In particular, 
corporeal reiteration can be perceived as indicating the continuity of gender serial 
structures; and meanwhile, the discursive reconfiguration points to the preservation of 
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individuality and distinctiveness in that serial ambience. To put it differently, the 
seriality of gender that Young intends to articulate can be manifested in the 
interaction between gendered subjects' reiteration and reconfiguration of gender 
practices. Furthermore, an intelligible and distinct history of women can thus be 
sketched out and continue to be told by women's heterogeneous voices. Gendered 
discursive embodiments, as I will advocate in the next chapter, can be politicized with 
an agonistic ethos as, borrowing Rosi Braidotti's words, 'the affirmation of fluid 
boundaries, a practice of the intervals, of the interfaces, and the interstices', in order 
to democratize contemporary feminist politics.
368
 
 
The individual articulation of discursive embodiments within gender seriality can be 
enunciated in this way: the lived body actualizes itself as a gendered being, by 
incorporating the fundamental skills and knowledge matrix of gender seriality into its 
way of being-in-the-world. Under such circumstances, gender seriality, as one of the 
essential normative apparatus in human relations, conditions the individual discursive 
embodiment, by providing disciplinary trainings and normative frameworks of 
reference under the disguise of enabling its subjects. The formats of those regulative 
trainings and intelligible referencing structures of gender may vary across cultures 
and societies, but presenting themselves as the dominant common praxis in societies, 
via those historically practiced schemes. Such historicity of repeated gendered 
performativity helps to convert the contingent gender structure into a naturalized and 
institutionalized gender hegemony. Specifically, as noted before, the authority and 
effectiveness of gender power are reasserted and reproduced in individuals' non-
voluntary adoption and reiteration of gender performances. Although the subjects' 
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have the capacity to design individual projects, they integrate the common praxis of 
gender into individual praxis non-voluntarily, given that, considering the productivity 
of Focauldian power, the subjects are enabled and their subjectivity is consecutively 
produced by that dominant gender force. Also, such productivity of gender power is 
localized in daily life, in which it begins to instruct individuals indirectly even before 
they can make their own judgements. One may argue, for instance, gendering can 
start as early as the moment of a baby's sex is announced, which obliquely situates the 
baby in a culturally assigned gender position.  
 
Subsequently, the skills and modalities that individuals acquired from the training and 
cultural matrix of gender hegemony become, as one may call it, the default system to 
individual existences. Putting it differently, those modes of gendered mindset and 
modalities are always existed in the existential periphery of individual conscious, 
given that they are the introductory materials that the subjects utilize to develop their 
individual praxis and further personalities. 'In so far as consciousness is 
consciousness of something only by allowing its furrow to trail behind it, and in so 
far as, in order to conceive an object one must rely on a previously constructed 
"world of thought",' as Merleau-Ponty asserts, 'there is always some degree of 
depersonalization at the heart of consciousness.'
369
 Thus, from a phenomenological 
perspective, the gendered performative repetitions by the lived body always burdened 
with the historicity of gender hegemony. For 'it cannot be consciousness without 
playing upon significances given wither in the absolute past of nature or in its own 
personal past, and because any form of lived experience tends towards a certain 
generality whether that of our habits or that of our "bodily functions."'
370
 The serial 
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milieu of gender hegemony therefore is inherited in and is keeping at the gendered 
performance of the lived body, which is facilitated by the discursive and practical 
structures of that hegemonic power. 
 
Within the historically-congealed constrictions of gender seriality, as argued earlier, 
the lived body nevertheless can articulate individual praxis in accordance with its 
subjective intentions. Recalling the instable nature of gender performativity, as Lloyd 
points out, the fact that gender performances 'must be repeated, however, creates the 
space for them to be repeated differently, therefore providing the condition of 
possibility for action.'
371
 Since repetition is construed as an imitation than a perfect 
replication of original paradigm, the subjects are able to inject, with restrained 
flexibility, their individual authorships into their gendered practices. Considering the 
gendering training cannot prepare the subjects comprehensively, as 'individual 
authorship' here can be regarded as being invoked by individual judgements about 
different situations. Following this, a transformative possibility emerges from the 
individual imitation of hegemonic gender practices. In the next chapter, I will look 
into how this transformative possibility is politicized in contemporary feminist 
politics. I will argue that such politicization is a historical practice. On the one hand, 
it carries the historicity of gender seriality, whilst, on the other hand, creating the 
individual history of temporal existence. Furthermore, I will bring Zerilli's account of 
the symbolic mother into play, to illustrate how the symbolic corporeal practice of 
reiterating discursive reconfiguration works. The symbolic practice of reiteration and 
reconfiguration can take place across history or among peer members, and it should 
be regarded as a democratic deliberation between agonistic interlocutors. In the next 
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chapter, I will illustrate why the feminist politics of discursive embodiment is an 
agonistic democratic project.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Political Womanhood: an Agonistic Feminist Politics 
 
The third chapter has shown that the performative practice of reiteration and 
reconfiguration bridges the individual lived body and the gendered world, and allows 
individuals to cultivate their diverse gender embodiments. To pursue further the 
performative power of corporeality, this chapter looks into the politicization of 
individuals' lived experiences within gender seriality, with the intention of 
articulating a feminist politics of discursive embodiments. I will concentrate on the 
elements of politicization and political ethos in my articulation of the feminist politics 
of discursive embodiments. More specifically, I will draw on MWBC's feminist 
depiction of the 'symbolic mother' to elucidate how the live body's capability to 
reiterate and reconfigure stimulates a moment of politics. Furthermore, the 
exemplification of such political moment can be understood as a historical-congealed 
political practice of corporeality. The individual politicisations of discursive 
embodiments, understood in connection with the feminist idea of the 'symbolic 
mother', provides figurative reaffirmation to the contestability and the iterability of 
gender at the same time. Such emblematic reaffirmation of the power of corporeality 
to (re)iterate gender, as I will contend further, contributes to the authoritative 
foundation of the 'symbolic mother' practice, which indicates an agonistic ethos for 
different contestations, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, underlines the 
existential retrospective circulation between individual women and women as a social 
collective. I shall explain these statements in a holistic and detailed manner below, in 
order to refine the political conceptualization of women's bodies in gender seriality 
hitherto articulated. 
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Focusing on the elucidations of politicization and political ethos, I intend to illustrate 
an existential serial framework between individuals, social collectives, and the 
(political) world; or, to be more precise, individual women, gender seriality, and 
feminist politics in the current context. While elucidating how the politicization of 
discursive embodiments consolidates the authority of the 'symbolic mother', it will 
also shed light on how individuals as corporeal temporalities pertain to the collective 
progression of gender seriality. For the purpose of clarity, I will present here the 
conceptual structure of the feminist politics of discursive embodiments by elaborating 
the following relationships in turn: individuals and gender seriality; individuals' 
politicization and the feminist practice of the 'symbolic mother'; and finally, the 
historicity of gender seriality as the legitimate ground for future contestations. The 
brief elaborations are used to, on the one hand, summarize what has been discussed 
about the lived body and its corporeal performances in the context of gender seriality, 
and the body's capability to contest as a form of political practice from previous 
chapters. On the other hand, they are used to indicate what has not yet been sketched 
out, namely around what the political implications are about conceptualizing women's 
bodies as lived, with the embodied power to reiterate and reconfigurate, and enabled 
as well as constrained by gender seriality. In what ways does such situatedness of 
women democratize feminist politics by drawing on their diverse discursive 
embodiments? These topics around politicization will then complete the final picture 
of the relation between individuals and the (political) world, which shows that the 
corporeal temporalities orientate and fashion feminist politics and vice versa.   
 
To answer the question about how to conceptualize 'women' in contemporary pluralist 
society, I have joined together Young's gender seriality and Merleau-Ponty's 
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phenomenological lived body in the previous chapters to depict the existential 
correlation between the corporeality and gender structures. Conceiving the gendering 
process as a form of training, the gendered world enables the lived body with certain 
sets of skills and conventions, in a way that exhibiting disciplinary force to make the 
body conforms to reproduce hegemonic practices of gender. 'Our body,' however, 
Merleau-Ponty declares, 'to the extent that it moves itself about, that is, to the extent 
that it is inseparable from a view of the world and is that view itself brought into 
existence, is the condition of possibility, not only of the geometrical synthesis, but of 
all expressive operations and all acquired views which constitute the cultural 
world.'
372
 While the body is endowed with gender conventionality, the initial mastery 
that is presumed in its liveliness - i.e. motility and senses, and the fundamental 
iterability of gender hegemony - initiate the development of subjectivity and 
activeness of the corporeality. Meanwhile, I have drawn on Butler's understanding of 
gender performativity and have employed the terminology of 'reiteration and 
reconfiguration' to specify the construction of an existential relation between the lived 
body and the gendered world. That is, in reiterating the trained gender performances, 
the lived body articulates its discursive embodiment of being-in-the-world, by 
utilizing the learned contents with subjective adjustments, which insert 
reconfigurations into the gender paradigm and stimulate moments of politics.  
 
Following on from the above, discursive embodiments become an individual record 
about the way that the lived body expressively reiterates and reconfigures different 
possibilities of the perceived world. And the politicization of such embodied 
experiences, which is energized upon the liveliness of the corporeality, nurtures the 
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existential connection between the corporeality and the world. The moment of politics 
in the occurrence of gender performances, as I will argue in this chapter, provides an 
alternative source of authority to counterbalance the existed gender hegemony by 
(re)affirming the power of corporeality to (re)iterate and the contestability of gender 
at the same time. I will introduce MWBC's consideration of the feminist practice of 
the 'symbolic mother' to explicate the notion of the alternative insertion of authority 
from individual performances of gender. That is, the individual reiteration of gender 
as a reconfiguring force denotes a symbolic authority to contest the rigidity of gender 
hegemony and subsequently deposits itself as a historical sediment of the 'symbolic 
mother' and is available for future applications. Noteworthy is that such figurative 
credit of authority from individual actions is conceived as transpired upon the 
historical-congealed authority of the 'symbolic mother'. The existential connection 
between individual actions and the 'symbolic mother' is thus reminiscent of Merleau-
Ponty's declaration: 'it is from the world of perception that I borrow the notion of 
essence'.
373
 Within which, the current reiteration of authority constitutes itself as the 
transitional temporality that bridges the serial structure between the past and the 
future of women.      
 
Nevertheless, how should this feminist practice of 'symbolic mother', as a figurative 
representation of female authority, be conceived in the context of the feminist politics 
of discursive embodiments? How could the invocation of such authoritative 
motherhood occur without threatening the diversity of women in contemporary 
pluralist society? Connecting individual politicizations with the feminist practice of 
the 'symbolic mother', in what way does it fashion gender seriality? To answer these 
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questions, I will introduce William Connolly's articulation of agonistic ethos to assist 
the differentiation of the authority of the 'symbolic mother' from the patriarchal power 
system. In contrast with the patriarchal system, which is conventionally associated 
with asymmetrical power relations, the female authority of the 'symbolic mother' is 
conceived as one woman authenticates another woman's performative power to re-
signify the world as well as her respected position to validate other women's claim. 
This feminist conceptualization of authority places empowerment and contestability, 
rather than assimilation and monopolization, at its core and develops an agonistic 
ethos in its exemplifications. For the feminist politics of discursive embodiments to 
prosper, an agonistic ethos facilitates diverse contestations and resignifications by 
perceiving every politicization of discursive embodiments as, to borrow Merleau-
Ponty's words, 'merely a brief resting-place in the unending process of expression, 
another thought which is struggling to establish itself, and succeeds only by bending 
the resources of constituted language to some fresh usage.'
374
 The invocation of the 
'symbolic mother', then, confirms the equality among women rather than a hierarchy. 
 
As the previous chapters explore how individual lived bodies acquire their different 
ways of being-in-the-world of gender, this chapter looks into the political dimension 
of those personal experiences, echoing Carol Hanisch's proclamation of 'the personal 
is political'. In finalizing the conceptual architecture of the feminist politics of 
discursive embodiments, as hinted earlier, I will first present MWBC's understanding 
of the 'symbolic mother' as a feminist political practice of freedom. Following this, I 
will discern the connection between this idea of female authority and the performative 
interplay between reiteration and reconfiguration, which provides another significant 
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trajectory into the conceptualizations of gender iterability and seriality, from which I 
will draw on Connolly to elucidate how the feminist practice of the 'symbolic mother' 
construes every politicization as a democratic deliberation among agonistic 
interlocutors. With the political dimension in its place, the feminist politics of 
discursive embodiments will contribute to our understanding about how temporal 
corporeal existences interact with the general historicity of gender, on the one hand; 
and, on the other hand, how those existential temporalities contribute to the 
pluralisation of feminist politics in the long term. 
 
1. A FEMINIST PRACTICE OF FEMALE AUTHORISATION:  
    MILAN WOMEN'S BOOKSTORE COLLECTIVE'S 'THE  
    Symbolic Mother' 
 
1a. A Home Without the Mother  
Between the encounter of the lived body and gender seriality, as depicted earlier, a 
political moment can be detected upon the reiterating and reconfiguring gendered 
performance by the corporeality with presumed mastery. This political moment is 
crucial in understanding the historical progression of women as a social collective, as 
it demonstrates how a corporeal temporality performs gender differently under the 
structural constraints of gender hegemony. Within the political struggle between 
individual women and the gender hegemony, I will suggest in this section that every 
political contestation can be conceived as invoking a collective female authority to 
counterbalance and disrupt the dominating power that is exercised by gender 
hegemony. I will use the feminist figure of the 'symbolic mother' to show how these 
politicizations are validated and empowered by the existential world and, in turn, 
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contribute to the development of that authoritative symbol of women. In particular, 
what is being 'authorized' by the 'symbolic mother' is women's capability to contest 
and the (re)iterability of gender, in which they can translate their diverse 
embodiments into the configuration of the gendered world. The existential interaction 
between temporal politicizations and the collective female authority then reveals the 
historical-congealed structure of seriality and female authority that can connect 
women across generations and places.  
 
The feminist figure of the 'symbolic mother' is firstly advocated by the Milan 
Women's Bookstore Collective (MWBC) as a new social contract among women, and 
later is drawn on by Zerilli to develop her feminist project of freedom.
375
 This female 
personage, according to Zerilli, is a feminist response to 'the absence of authoritative 
interlocutors' among women under the patriarchal establishment.
376
 As the patriarchal 
system places male power as the foundation of the society, women are habitually 
excluded from the decision-making positions in social structures, like marriage and 
family systems, and this subsequently obstructs women's opportunities to develop 
close bonds among them both publicly and privately. For instance, the patrilineal 
inheritance system situates female members of a family as permanently dependant on 
the economic mercy of their male relatives, and marriages then become the only 
prosperity in their life. The housewife character, Mrs. Bennet, in Jane Austen's 
renowned 'Pride and Prejudice' is a comical but accurate illustration of such situation: 
her devotion to matchmaking one of her daughters to marry Mr. Bennet's clergyman 
cousin and heir to his estate, in order to ensure the daughters and her would not be 
homeless after the death of her husband. However, the loss of maiden name in the 
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event of marriage also indirectly represents another deprivation of a woman's 
personal connections, for example, to her birthparents and siblings. And, moreover, 
the ”giving away” of the bride from father to groom in a traditional wedding 
ceremony signifies symbolically the handover of male power from one man to the 
other. 
 
The recent controversy around gender equality rating for films instituted in Sweden 
also helps to expose the structural void of social connection among women in relation 
to the contemporary cinematic depiction of gender relations. The so-called 'Bechdel 
Test' effectively reveals that female characters in mainstream Hollywood films are 
often sidelined as a passive supporting role to leading actors, and their social 
conversations are mainly developed around men in their life, rather than personal 
concerns.
377
 The scarcity of social interactions between female roles in popular 
movies echoes MWBC's claim about the social linkage between sexual difference and 
public representation: 'society does not hold women responsible for collective life; 
that some want to be responsible, and want to participate in it, is absurdly assigned to 
the category of what they have a right to.'
378
 The excluding of women from social 
responsibility restraints women's capability of 'I-can': that is, their intentions and 
desires to contribute to the public life are being denied on the grounds of their sexual 
difference from men. And such rejection from male authority, which constitutes the 
continuity of women's life in patriarchal society, constructs women as an inert, 
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passive body that requires and can only be active under careful supervision. The act 
of excluding women from collective life itself reveals the male suspicion of women's 
inability to rise above the burden of materiality, and therefore a parental-style of 
caring and guidance should be paid by male guardians to protected females.  
 
An electronic monitoring policy that was implemented in Saudi Arabia can helpfully 
illustrate how the idea of 'parental-control' over women is taken up and exercised by 
governmental power. In 2012, the Saudi Arabia government announced a national 
policy to inform male guardians automatically if their female family members 
attempted to travel abroad.
379
 Saudi Arabia also bans women from driving on all 
public roads, due to the concern over their ability to travel without male relatives, 
which is seen to undermine public morality and female virtues.
380
 Recalling MWBC's 
claim of women's exclusion from social responsibility, both of Saudi Arabia’s 
policies can be interpreted as an actualization of such exclusion at a national level, in 
which women are confined to the private domain, i.e. family house and home country 
in above cases, via restricting their freedom of movement. These government 
measures also exemplify how the social connection among women is being drained 
off and is replaced with male authority as an exclusive justification for women's 
corporeality. A woman’s capability of realizing 'I-can', thus, is problematically 
restrained, since her own intentionality does not have priority under a strict hierarchy 
between the sexes that is operated through the norms of day-to-day life. Within which, 
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to draw on Beauvoir's terminology, women are positioned as the subordinated Other, 
who anchor themselves to the male needs and are subject to men's inspection gaze.  
 
Furthermore, insufficient ground is provided for women to cultivate social relations 
among them as either authoritative interlocutors or as equal agents. It is because, 
through the above examples, the communications or interactions between women are 
forcefully relied on male mediators, rather than allowing women to speak to each 
other face to face. One may also argue that such systematic social disruption might 
interfere with women's self-positioning in the world, in relation to the faculty of 'I-
can'. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Young provides a phenomenological angle to tackle 
the existential connection between women's corporeal performance of throwing and 
their worldly situation depicted by de Beauvoir. She argues that the phenomena of 
ambiguous transcendence and inhibited intentionality can be detected a women's 
bodily performances, owing to their subjective position as 'I' being pressurized by the 
historical-congealed patriarchal surrounding as 'the Other'.
381
 The MWBC's argument 
of the absent female authority can help to strengthen Young's theorisation of women's 
enclosed body space by arguing that the necessity of male authorization implies that a 
woman's own intentionality in her making of being-in-the-world is subject to 
patriarchal interventions, which is alien to her subjective intentions and has the power 
to overwrite her own decisions. Such external interference then can be perceived as 
constructing an existential barrier that impedes her intentionality, as well as her 
subsequent actions, in which she cannot effectively transcend her body without being 
inhibited by the controlling male gaze.    
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In addition, Young's theorization of inhibited intentionality and ambiguous 
transcendence is constructive in providing insights into the possible existential 
characteristics of women in the Saudi Arabic cases. To employ Young's 
phenomenological articulation of body posture and spatiality, one may argue that the 
institutionalized governmental constraints on women's freedom of movement project 
immanence and inhibition on women's bodies in a way that their corporeality is 
situated as rooted in place and is involuntarily to remain as partially immobile, due to 
the daily dependency on exterior authority.
382
 The existential discontinuity between a 
woman initiating her own choice of action to its realization might yield further social 
consequences if we consider the existential reciprocity between the constitution of 
individuals' being-in-the-world and the world itself. That is, as indicated above in 
relation to the MWBC's diagnosis, the driving ban or the travel monitoring system 
may obstruct the contingent accumulation of social relations among women that 
occurs every day, or, more precisely, in the social relations that individuals articulate 
through causal interactions and daily conversations, in which they exchange life 
experiences and opinions that help them to identify commonalities and differences, 
while creating a sense of belonging.  
 
'Women', under these policies with the consolidation of male control in their very 
nature, is not conceived as a self-sufficient social collective with unique historicity, 
and the members are thus unable to claim a public space of their own in the society. 
'Men know that male individuals are sufficient and necessary to the contract needed 
to sustain social life; women are superfluous. On their part, women know that men's 
society needs their presence but not their freedom', as the MWBC indicates why 
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women are being sidelined in public arena.
383
 This mere presence as a silent 
companion of men abruptly blocks the continuity of the social-historical chain of 
interlocution among women, which leaves a figurative vacuum in female sociality: 
while a mother can convey her experiences and knowledge to her daughter, for 
instance, they may find it difficult to relate those personal moments constructively 
with other women, given the absence of collective interlocution space. This 
estrangement in female sociality, then, can be understood as build up on the 
occurrence of, to put it radically, no socio-historical connection as legitimately viable 
for me to identify who the others are, and accordingly, I can neither learn from the 
past nor envisage the future of my fellow women. Recognizing the social problem 
about the empowering correlation between collective authority and individual 
freedom, the MWBC argues that a new social contract should be developed among 
women in order to nurture a social relation that is different from 'the one traditionally 
established for a woman through the few male individuals who, as bearers of their 
own personal interests, effectively ensured that she conformed with the interest of all 
men.'
384
 What is being proposed by the MWBC is a feminist practice of 'the symbolic 
mother', as revealed in the beginning of this section, and I will dissect such proposal 
with regard to Zerilli's employment of it below. 
 
1b. Women's Collective Authority: 'The Symbolic Mother' 
To reconfigure the socio-historical connection, or, say, the absence of such a 
relationship among women, the MWBC advocates the feminist practice of 'the 
symbolic mother' as a new social form of empowerment. In the following, I will first 
lay out the Collective's vision of 'the symbolic mother', especially how the MWBC 
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proposes to re-envisage sexual differences and female freedom via such an 
authoritative mother figure and, more importantly, their intent to introduce ‘that 
[sexual] difference into a system of social relations that bases its universality on the 
insignificance of female difference'.
385
 This emphasis on the unimportance of female 
difference, as I will argue, implies that the feminist idea of the mother figure does not 
intend to establish a hierarchical relationship between the sexes, nor does it intend to 
establish a hierarchy among women, which clearly distinguishes it from the 
patriarchal image of the father. Rather, the symbolic authority of the mother is, in 
effect, constructed through the equality among women by (re)affirming their 
capabilities to reiterate and reconfigure. Additionally, the MWBC's proposal has been 
picked up by Zerilli in developing her freedom-centred feminist project, in which she 
continues the theme of 'the symbolic mother' as a 'doing', while being attentive to the 
rhetorical value of making claims. The feminist practice of claim-making and 'doing', 
via the authority of 'the symbolic mother', produces the exemplarity effect to dislocate 
'the old' and demand 'the new', when the current system cannot cope with particular 
incidences.
386
 I will then recount her employment of the MWBC's proposal and 
sketch out how the authoritative mother empowers the feminist politics of discursive 
embodiments.  
 
As pointed out in the previous section, the MWBC pinpoints the absence of female 
authority as the crucial reason that women are unable to transcend their corporeality 
which, as a result, restricts their freedom of interpretation. That is, in 'the social order 
thought up by men, a woman only shares a natural relationship with another woman 
greater than herself and such a female social relation is 'variously overlaid with affect 
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and loaded with emotions, but without symbolic translation, that is to say, without 
figures or rules.'
387
 The way that the Collective ascribes individual creativity, namely 
the capability of 'symbolic translation', to the social existence of someone greater than 
a self, resembles the phenomenological idea of training the lived body. To recall the 
existential connection between the body and the world, the social hegemony in the 
world provides direction to individuals, in a way that not only in conditioning the 
body to reproduce specific behaviours and practices, but also enabling it with skills 
and capabilities. However, what concerns the MWBC is not the natural relationship 
that the body develops with the world, but how women can rise above this individual 
performance and enter the realm of the collective. 'Female experience appeared to be 
a mute body swathed in a cloud of fantasies', as the MWBC argues; 'a real body in 
lively, perceptual contact with the real world, but almost altogether lacking the means 
of symbolic reproduction of itself in relation to that world'.
388
 Thus, it is not the 
bodily function of speaking, for instance, at stake here, as far as the Collective 
concerns, but whether women can use this corporeal capability to 'communicate' with 
the world. 
 
Following on from the above, the MWBC begins a feminist pursuit for symbolic 
authority to counterbalance the social relationship between women thought up by 
men, with the objective that women can eventually 'succeed in saying by ourselves 
what we want, think, desire within ourselves, and not in imitation of, or in reaction to, 
what others say.'
389
 Women's capability of speaking from the point of 'I' than 'the 
Other', to consider the phenomenological understanding of training, then needs to be 
activated by an authoritative female exemplar who can equip and enable another 
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woman to actualize her initiations. A maternal power is thus being advocated and this 
idea of 'symbolic mother' is thought to be 'the source of social legitimacy for female 
difference, as concretely embodied for a woman by those women who validate her 
desire and support it in the face of the world.'
390
 In essence, the MWBC intends to 
utilize the feminist practice of 'the symbolic mother' not only to re-envisage a new 
social contract among women, but also to re-invest the existential relationship 
between women and the world. 'The mother is the symbolic figure of gendered 
mediation that puts women in relation with the world, opening up a vital circuit 
between the self and the other-than-self in their experience,' as the MWBC points out, 
'which otherwise remains divided between unspeakable intimacy and an extraneous 
exterior.
391
 That is, 'the symbolic mother' reconciles the tension of being an 'I' and 'the 
Other' in women's construction of the self, by acquainting her with and affirming the 
potential of 'I-can' in the public arena. Specifically, the maternal role helps to bring 
the muted female body out from the private domain and provides a public channel for 
the others to hear the symbolic translation of a woman's personal experiences.  
 
Accordingly, the new social contract among women is constituted through a process 
where 'a woman offers to another woman the measure of what she can do and what in 
her wants to come into existence'.
392
 Here, I should particularize the different aspects 
that are contained in the idea of 'the symbolic mother', in order to elucidate how such 
feminist practice substantiates the sense of collectiveness among women: as the 
political goal of the MWBC's initiation of 'the symbolic mother' is to achieve female 
freedom, the maternal representative herself is then a performer, or more precisely, an 
exemplar of the liberating transgression. To suggest this female figure is a exemplar 
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is to say that, using Aletta Norval's conception, her action 'proceeds not only through 
verbal argumentation but also, perhaps more importantly, through struggle and 
through a symbolic manifestation of a way of doing things that differs from the 
dominant or accepted way of acting.'
393
 I will use the MWBC's words to contextualize 
such understanding further: the authority of 'the symbolic mother' is evoked to free 
women 'from the obligation of justifying their difference, with all the forms of social 
servitude that obligation entails and which have been well illustrated throughout 
human.'
394
 In order to demonstrate such female freedom, a 'woman must take her 
experience as a measure of the world, her interests as a criterion for judging it, her 
desires as a motive for changing it, so that the world may then become her own 
responsibility.'
395
 
 
Two major components can be underlined from the MWBC's articulation of the 
characteristics of 'the symbolic mother': first of all, the maternal role exemplifies that 
she can recognize and exercise her capability of 'I-can' in a way that translates 
performatively her natural encounters with the world into a transcendental 
relationship. As discussed earlier, the MWBC argues that women are a 'material but 
wordless presence' in the social order thought up by men and, within which, the 
female sex stumbles upon 'the separateness of a woman's experience and the division 
she experiences on entering social life'
396
 Such separation and division, as Young 
might argue, constructs a existential boundary on women and renders a woman's 
transcendence ambiguous: that is, 'she cannot be in unity with herself but must take a 
distance from and exist in discontinuity with her body', since she 'lives her body as 
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object as well as subject.'
397
 The idea of 'the symbolic mother', then, is regarded as a 
woman who exemplifies female transcendence in her way of being-in-the-world, by 
projecting her knowledge and desires into the worldly situation, as well as willing to 
take up her responsibility in social relations, which is the second component. Taking 
responsibility in social relations is a significant aspect of this feminist practice if we 
remember how woman are 'sheltered' from social accountability via, for instance, a 
masculine claim of protecting purity and morality in a patriarchal society. Such 
guardianship protection, in some measure, contributes to the isolation of women from 
the world that is mentioned above. It is because of this that she cannot reach other 
women without the mediation or, more accurately, interruption of her male protectors. 
 
Noticing the arbitrary exclusion from social obligations, the MWBC urges that all 
women, 'in flesh and blood, have to take the place of the missing guarantee, of the 
justice still to be done, of the truth still to be learned.'
398
 This feminist calling of 
taking up responsibility can be understood in terms of women bringing forward their 
bodies and lived experiences as political resources to (re)enter the public forum and 
as a way of paying off a symbolic debt that is generated by their sexual difference and 
to (re)invest in their collective life as women. The 'symbolic debt' is, according to the 
Collective, something that 'each woman has toward other women, i.e., toward the 
symbolic mother' and thus it is 'the price of female freedom'.
399
 To put it differently, 
when 'the symbolic mother' is the legitimate ground for a woman to exercise her 
autonomy, i.e., she does not need to justify her sexual difference before materializing 
her actions, that woman cannot simply do whatever she prefers without 
acknowledging and, therefore, paying tribute to that figurative female authority. In a 
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rather paradoxical way, the existence of 'the symbolic mother' is a justification for 
female difference by underlying the unimportance of such sexual difference. Taking 
women's battle over equal rights as an example: while highlighting her sexual 
difference is the major reason for gender discrimination in rights, she claims that the 
eligibility of rights should not be founded upon such difference. Following this, a 
symbolic debt is attributed to the implementation of female freedom, which can be 
perceived as maintained by the authority of 'the symbolic mother'. More specifically, 
female freedom is coming 'from that elementary negotiation in which a woman 
exchanges with other women the recognition of her own existence for signified 
acceptance of their mutual belonging to the female sex.'
400
    
 
From the above, one can sense how the social relations among women are being 
(re)invested via paying a symbolic debt to the maternal authority, namely they take up 
their responsibility and occupy a social position in building collective life by 
exchanging recognition and acceptance among them. Through this figurative gesture 
of exchange, a possible interlocution among women may transpire, and 'the symbolic 
mother' as an interlocutor is the other aspect that I will address here. As stated before, 
the MWBC perceives 'the symbolic mother' as a way to (re)articulate social 
connections among women: on the one hand, for the maternal power to become an 
exemplar of female freedom, there must be other women to acknowledge the 
epitomizing effect of her actions. On the other hand, for a woman to be liberated from 
her sexual difference, i.e. to 'go ahead' without providing 'a raison d'être for the 
female sex and for female freedom', she needs to recognize what has been done for 
women by 'the symbolic mother' and pay her share of the symbolic debt.
401
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Authorization, moreover, is evidently not a one-woman act, but requires a person who 
is in the position to authorize and another person who is receiving it in order to be 
effective. Between this giving and receiving, a woman can find a way to relate herself 
to another woman and begin the interactive cultivation of their social connections. 
Both women start to communicate, as the MWBC argues, by utilizing their 'human 
possibility and [her] social plus' to translate 'what she suffers from reality into a 
knowledge of reality.'
402
  
 
Assembled on the authoritative ground of female freedom, women (re)invest their 
social relations by entering into a horizontal/vertical interlocution with each other, in 
which they talk freely about the symbolic translation of their different discursive 
embodiments and to discover what draws them together and what separates them 
apart. Noteworthy is that 'the symbolic mother', as an authoritative interlocutor, 
constitutes no elemental moral criteria for what collective/individual actions are 
considered as right/wrong-doings. From the MWBC's perspective, '[T]he value of 
female difference' does not require anything 'to be done so that it will exist appear 
with a guarantee that it is the right thing to do.'
403
 The female authority thus should 
not be understood as a moral universality or a power imperative that seeks to 
assimilate and monopolize temporalities. 'She', as a symbolic representative of great 
maternal power, is not being designated to replicate the Hegelian situation of master 
and slave, or distinguishing the superiority of pure mind from the inferiority of 
material body as in the Cartesian dualism. Rather than setting up a rule to follow, 'she' 
invites every woman to an un-foreclosed interlocution to 'understand, evaluate, and 
appropriate the reason behind the irregular behaviour of her fellow women who so 
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not conform to the rules prescribed by society, and on that reason may base her 
behaviour in the world'.
404
 A sense of equality in the reiteration of the authority of 'the 
symbolic mother' can thus be detected, and I will elucidate this point further. 
 
To put it differently, the reiteration of the female authority is equally open to every 
woman who renounces her belonging to the female sex, regardless of her actions or 
claims is an abnormality to mainstream morality or not. As for the matter concerning 
whether her contention or performance can hold or not, it is left to the participated 
interlocutors to make judgements. Take the confrontation between the protest groups 
'FEMEN' and 'Muslim Women Against FEMEN' (MWAF) for example: FEMEN is 
known for staging topless protests and its Tunisian member, Amina Tyler, sparked a 
fierce debate in 2013 when she posted some half naked photos online, with slogans 
like 'my body belongs to me, and is not the source of anyone's honour' and 'Fuck your 
morals' written in Arabic on her bare chest.
405
 Her message was intended to challenge 
the Islamic rhetoric around women's body and religious clothing like the burka/niqab. 
Later on, when Tyler was arrested over the accusation of contempt, the activist group 
orchestrated forceful protests in Europe with stronger political messages, such as 
'Long live the topless jihad against infidels!' and 'Our tits are deadlier than your 
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stones!' against the Muslim religion and demanding the release of Tyler.
406
 
Nevertheless, FEMEN's specific aim at the Muslim religion and its protest strategy 
caused strong reactions from Islamic women. Particularly, MWAF was formed under 
these circumstances and issued an open letter to FEMEN via social media, in which it 
charges FEMEN as imperialist and white supremacist when claiming to fight for 
women's liberation.
407
 This anti-FEMEN objective was also backed by a French 
female union, 'Les Antigones', who claimed in its manifesto that the wholeness of 
women is completed by men and the integrity of a society relies on such balance.
408
   
 
This particular rhetorical confrontation between different female collectives 
demonstrates, as the MWBC may argue, women's capability of symbolic translation. 
That is, women are capable of translating the 'blind endurance of one's own difference 
from which no woman can entirely escape' into their respective knowledge of reality: 
'consciousness of self and competence vis-à-vis one's given reality, competence to 
judge it and to change it.'
409
 Such capability is utilized upon, as one may perceive it, 
the reiteration of female freedom that is legitimized by the authoritative symbolic 
mother. With the figurative authorization from the maternal power, every women can 
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enter a interlocution and make political claims freely, in a way that translates her 
embodied experiences and, from which, to articulate her social connection or 
disconnection with other women. To reflect on the above example, one can see how 
an individual protest act for the autonomy of female body proliferates into a grand-
scale debate about, to put it roughly, the significations of the female body under 
secular and the spiritual discourses and, within which, different women from different 
continents and cultures project diverse experiences and opinions on an equal footing. 
That is, while Amina Tyler makes her protest under the banner of female liberation, 
other women are also empowered to choose how she would like to connect herself 
with that particular interpretation of liberated women: Tyler draws her connection 
with FEMEN via her protesting method and claims, which, in a sense, one may argue 
that the activist group is her 'symbolic mother' who legitimizes her contentious 
application of nudity. Such symbolic connection then is promoted further by other 
members of FEMEN and supporters when they stand out against the Tunisian 
officials regarding the arrest of Tyler. 
 
Nevertheless, Tyler and her fellow supporters do not monopolize the content of 
female freedom, and their actions certainly provoke other possibilities of articulating 
women's relationship: for instance, MWAF disconnects itself with certain women, but 
not the category of 'women' itself, by repudiating FEMEN's proclamation of the 
conflict between the Muslim religion and women's liberation. Following that, one can 
see how different women, e.g. Tyler and members of MWAF here, are being 
conscious of their given reality, e.g. living in Islamic culture(s), and transform their 
embodied relationship with the same religion into different judgements of the reality 
drastically. Furthermore, MWAF's disconnection from FEMEN provides an entry 
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point for Les Antigones, another female collective, to come into the open dialogue 
and cultivate a social relation with another union of women. By materializing the 
principal differences or similarities into words or practices, the current case 
demonstrates 'how those fragments can combine among themselves and with the 
world in an unheard-of yet sensible form; this would connect an apparently 
meaningless transgression ... to the reasons of the woman who transgresses 
consciously.'
410
 A thread of deliberative interlocution thus begins and expands with 
regard to the miscellaneous combinations of 'fragments'. For example, FEMEN also 
have staged protests against the driving ban in Saudi Arabia.
411
 However, whether the 
Islamic activists in that country would relate themselves to such support or not, or 
how they would envisage the female relationship between FEMEN and themselves, it 
is up to those Muslim protesters to make their political judgements.   
 
The above instances illustrate only fractions of how women can contemplate and 
politicize their discursive embodiments in the history of women, while there are 
numerous other exemplars that are also featured in that historical construction. In 
these politicizations, 'women' as a general term is being reiterated and/or reconfigured 
continuously by different orators, who demonstrate how political judgements can be 
made upon the collectively-constructed ground of female freedom. Such freedom of 
political judgement, to recall Butler's articulation of gender performativity and 
Merleau-Ponty's construction of presumed mastery, can be perceived as assured by 
and performing through the iterability of gender itself. That is to say, under the 
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disciplinary power of the historical-congealed milieu and paradigmatic practices of 
gender, women are 'liberated' by the authority of 'the symbolic mother' and 
empowered by the iterability of gender, in the sense that a woman can manifest her 
capabilities and intentions freely and publicly, so as to convey knowledge and invite 
reflections on what has been done, could be done, or will happen. In return, her 
manifestations of gender provide symbolic reaffirmation of, so as to legitimize, the 
iterability of gender practices. More specifically, the reassured (re)iterability retains 
the contingent occurrence of interlocution and the continuity of women's historicity in 
the way that other women can make individual assessments and judgements of the 
above-mentioned manifestations. The interdependency between the iterability of 
gender, the individual capability to make political judgements, and female freedom 
thus can be identified. Zerilli's feminist freedom project can help to illustrate this 
interdependency and the exemplar effect of 'the symbolic mother, and, from which, I 
will argue that an agonistic ethos is crucial in ensuring the activeness of such 
relationship with the progression of democratic society.     
 
2. FEMALE AUTHORISATION: A FREEDOM BUILDING  
    EXERCISE 
The MWBC's construction of the authoritative symbolic mother, as presented above, 
is a figurative representation of female power to counterbalance the patriarchal 
hegemony and to substantiate the missing social connection among women. However, 
'[A]ll women are not alike, not only because they are members of different social 
groups that divide them from each other', as Zerilli asserts, 'but also because they 
have different likes and dislikes, which, though related in some way, are not 
  
196 
exhausted by their membership in any particular social group whatsoever.'
412
 The 
inescapable interconnection between sexual differences and other social memberships 
indicates another layer of disparity that the symbolic female authority also sets out to 
resolve: that is, the unequal relationship among women, which is somehow being 
suppressed and silent in the feminist fight for gender equality. In other words, the 
disparity issue is 'about the simple fact that women are not equals even among 
themselves, and about the possible social interpretation of this fact by women 
themselves.'
413
 Acknowledging the diversity among women and the problem of 
disparity, Zerilli argues that the concept of political judgement should be re-envisaged 
in relation to female freedom. Within this, the disparity among women is offset by the 
authority of 'the symbolic mother', and women can freely put forward their significant 
differences, rather than seeking a unified objective of political pursuit. Making 
political judgements thus becomes a crucial feature in substantiating women's social 
connections and in transforming the given reality. I will revisit Zerilli's work to 
elaborate how the joint force of 'the symbolic mother', political judgement, and 
female freedom can unsettle the disparity among women and progressing 
contemporary feminist politics.  
 
In her reading of the MWBC proposal, Zerilli conceives that 'equality' as a 'relational 
concept' as well as a 'political principle', which 'takes them [differences] for granted 
as things that must be brought into a certain kind of relation with each other for 
specific purposes.'
414
 Such a political principle of equality withstands the temptation 
to propound 'equality as sameness' as 'a universalizing function that illuminates 
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particulars by subsuming them under concepts to produce a total critique.'
415
 Instead, 
it provides a figurative commonplace for strong conflicts or disagreements to be 
manifested and, subsequently, for a genuine politics to take place. With the 'location' 
in hand, Zerilli shifts her focus to the potential participants within, given that it is 
them who put forward their differences and desires and who contest the 
general/specific claims that are being made. She suggests that 'the subjects making 
the comparison, their capacity for reflection (that is, thinking the particular in the 
absence of a universal) and the sociohistorical context of their judgements' should be 
the core considerations in the feminist pursuit for equality.
416
 The political skills to 
compare, reflect, and contextualize without demanding a universal judgement 
indicates the need to rework our understanding of political judgement. With the 
advocacy to take standpoints and background factors into consideration, a political 
judgement that is made upon the political principle of equality does not intend to pose 
itself as a universal truth claim or an objective standard. Rather, making judgements 
should be a political practice 'for which plurality itself would be the basis for 
apprehending and understanding new objects and events in their freedom', and 
presents itself as an aesthetic judgement.
417
 
 
Calling an aesthetic judgement as judgements of taste, Immanuel Kant places the 
validity of such judgement on subjectivity rather than knowledge or truth.
418
 The 
subjective validity of an aesthetic judgement, as Zerilli perceives it, is acquired 
through 'making reference to others', in a way that 'each judging subject makes a 
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claim that posits the agreement of others and, if necessary, attempts to persuade 
others of her view.'
419
 Or, as stated by Kant, it is 'a subjective necessity that we 
present as objective by presupposing a common sense'.
420
 How, then, can the political 
principle of equality be achieved on the subjectively presupposed common ground? 
Furthermore, could different aesthetic judgements carry the same weight when there 
are implicit disparities among the judging subjects? With regard to those worries, 
Zerilli appeals to 'the symbolic mother' as a protective 'third term', who enables 
women via their repayments of the symbolic debts that they own to each other. A 
woman repaying the symbolic debt, as indicated before, is an act of recognition about 
her natural belonging to the female sex and her social relationship with fellow women, 
without the necessity to justify her sexual difference. The gesture of paying back is 
also a figurative deposit to female freedom, which authorizes her political actions in 
the first place. As Zerilli puts it, a woman hears 'Go ahead' and decides to 'act 
publicly in accordance with that phrase, is to take leave of feminism's injury identity, 
its politics of victimization, without denying one's membership in a group called 
women.'
421
 From which, female freedom is no longer an empty concept but a political 
practice of doing; or, to consider the notion of plurality, a political realization of 
different doings. 
 
Integrating the authority of 'the symbolic mother' with political judgement, the 
problem of disparity among women can be mitigated and, expectantly, would 
gradually be resolved by the political principle of equality. That is, every woman can 
translate her experiences of disparity or other differences into aesthetic judgements 
freely, after paying tributes publicly to the authority of 'the symbolic mother'. In the 
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meantime, her political judgement is legitimized by the subjective validity and her 
capability to present judgements, which substantiate female freedom. 'Our ability to 
come to terms with what is given ... in a way that affirms a non-sovereign human 
freedom (that is, freedom that is based in the I-can, not the I-will; freedom that begins 
in political community, not outside it) can only be achieved through a critical practice 
of judgement', as Zerilli puts it.
422
 The direct association of making a political 
judgement as a political practice of freedom, following her statement, indicates that 
the critical purchase on aesthetic judgements, to a degree, is relational and 
communicative, rather than an isolated and individual matter. Political judgements are 
relational due to the fact that what an aesthetic judgement that a woman offers is her 
differences or similarities with other women. As pointed out before, she does not 
claim a universal truth in her political judgement, but 'to give an account-not to prove, 
but to be able to say how one came to an opinion, and for what reasons one formed 
it.'
423
 Therefore, she gradually 'become[s] aware of the existence of significant 
differences among women', and such awareness 'positions others to become genuine 
interlocutors', while constructing her aesthetic judgement.
424
 
 
The open invitation to other political participants then allows other women to come 
forward as the authoritative speaker of their own lived experiences and perspectives, 
which demonstrates 'the many ways in which female humanity tries to signify its need 
for free existence'.
425
 Such occurrences of contingent interlocution not only facilitate 
the cultivation of social connections among women, but also characterize the exercise 
of political judgements as a feminist practice of world-building. As indicated in the 
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earlier section on 'the symbolic mother', the female transgression relies on women to 
obtain the ability of social translation. It refers to the skill of transforming the lived 
experiences and suffering that the given reality imposes on individuals into a unique 
knowledge of reality. Without developing such political skill, i.e. the ability to make 
the social translation of female difference, the situation of women would 'equal letting 
women stay in the place where society puts them.'
426
 Although the MWBC uses the 
term, 'knowledge of reality', the ability of social translation resembles Zerilli's re-
conceptualization of political judgement. It is implausible and contradictory to 
consider a woman's 'knowledge of reality' as universal, while agreeing her example 
legitimizes others in the same way as the others can authenticate her action. The 
feminist attempt to deviate from universal claim-making indicates that individual 
women only provide a version of knowledge of reality when making aesthetic 
judgements. Therefore, one can understand 'world-building' via political judgement in 
this way: 'the truth of the world' is gradually revealed through different significations 
of free social existence that women projected, in relation to their respective discursive 
embodiments. 
 
Apart from putting pieces of 'reality' together, making political judgement as world-
building can also be understood as creating something anew from the old. As 
mentioned earlier, the judging subjects will grow a sense of awareness of the 
differences between themselves during the process of formulating political judgement, 
or, to put it shortly, one is “able to 'think in the place of everybody else'”.427 While 
acknowledging the existing difference between oneself and others, the political aspect 
of making judgement necessitates the judging subjects to do something about the 
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existence of plurality. It is a form of political thinking and a call for political 
imagination, to help one to 'stand in other people's shoes'. As elaborated by Zerilli, 
political thinking means that 'we count the different standpoints and opinions ('it-
seems-to-me')… as the condition of an expansive notion of objectivity or worldly 
reality, and this may well involve challenges to, and changes in, our criteria.'
428
 In 
other words, the consideration of plurality and the possibility of being contested are 
not a conceptual equivalence of giving in one's position or opinion. Rather, as Zerilli 
derives from Arendt, the political combination of plurality and contestability provides 
a 'peculiar kind of objectivity that Arendt associates with the political sphere, namely, 
the objectivity or sense of reality that works on seeing an object or event from as 
many sides as possible.'
429
 Such 'peculiar objectivity' thus can authenticate the 
subjective validity of aesthetic arguments, when such judgements exhibit a political 
attempt to seek an inter-subjective agreement on the issues at hand. 
       
But how can a woman who intends to manifest her differences into an aesthetic 
judgement take plurality into consideration, and consecutively create a space of 
intersubjectivity? Or, to put it differently, how do the judging subjects consider the 
notion of plurality when one is preoccupied with subjective experiences? These 
concerns can be answered by the trait of 'imagination' that characterizes political 
judgements. Connecting freedom with creative imagination, Kant argues that 'we feel 
our freedom' when we exercise our capability of association, '(which attaches to the 
empirical [i.e., reproductive]) uses of the imagination; for although it is under that law 
[of association] that nature lends us material, yet we can process that material into 
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something quite different'.
430
 In short, imagination is an ability to transform the given 
and/or to create something anew from it. The empirical attachment of imagination 
suggests that a phenomenological route can be detected in the development of such 
capability. According to Merleau-Ponty, one can acquire the ability to 
associate/imagine through past phenomenological encounters with the world, in 
which 'all disclosure of the implicit and all cross-checking performed by analytic 
perception are included, and all the norms of actual perception vindicated-in short, a 
realm of truth, a world.'
431
 In our essential exercise of perceptions, 'the foundations of, 
or inaugurate, knowledge' are laid for future invocations. Owing to the past 
cultivation of knowledge of the world, one is therefore able to distinguish 
'indissolubly fused' objects, 'based on the foreshadowing of an imminent order which 
is about to spring upon us a reply to questions merely latent in the landscape.'
432
   
 
Merleau-Ponty's account of imagination, or as Kant calls it, the law of association is 
conjuring up the idea of the trained body with presumed mastery. The lived body is 
trained, in the sense that the deployment and utilization of bodily functions and skills 
are resulted from a series of corporeal learning, in which the body incorporates the 
cultural matrix of the world and develops its subjectivity alongside. However, as 
indicated in Chapter 3, it is far-fetched to think that one can be fully trained to deal 
with every possible situation before, metaphorically speaking, stepping into 'the 
reality', and this is where the notion of presumed mastery comes into play. The 
function of presumed mastery allows subjectification to take place at the same time as 
the body is being equipped with essential corporeal skills and preliminary knowledge 
of the world. Within this, one develops an ability to translate strangeness into 
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something familiar, and this is a lively demonstration of creative imagination. 'By 
placing them [i.e. the strangeness and something familiar] on the same footing, that of 
the unique object,' as Merleau-Ponty claims, 'synopsis makes continuity and 
resemblance between them possible.'
433
 Utilizing the trained skills, one can compare, 
reflect, and contextualize new encounters in relation to old experiences, and therefore 
makes them able to identify similarities and dissimilarities between them, by drawing 
imaginary, either in a figurative or literal sense, relationships/existential connections 
between different temporalities. One can thus see that imagination functions in a 
relational manner, as a result of its necessity to make references, in retrospection of 
previous deeds, with creativity to fashion out something anew. The variety of shapes, 
materials, and functions of chairs can be a straightforward example about how 
different designers put their creative imaginations into concrete artefacts. Deriving 
from the phenomenological analysis, the skill of imagination can certainly be 
transferred to the realm of political thinking, where a space of intersubjectivity is 
required for the existence of plurality. With the perceptual skill of imagination in 
mind, I now return to the issue of political judgement as a feminist practice of world-
building. 
 
Broadly speaking, the function of imagination in the political arena is assisting the 
judging subjects to see plurality on its own merits, to cross one's own boundary and 
come to appreciate differences, and to create new bonds from the supposed 
separations. Specifically, imagination in the exercise of political judgements is a 
means of mediation, as well as a manifestation of representative thinking, to 
constitute an intersubjective sphere, or as Arendt terms it, a 'subjective-in-between'.
434
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Diverging from universal and objective truth claims, imagination 'moves neither 
above perspectives, as if they were something to transcend in the name of pure 
objectivity, nor at the same level as those perspectives, as if they were identities in 
need of our recognition.'
435
 An aesthetic judgement is justified on the grounds of 
subjective validity and it is the social difference and the judging capability that should 
be recognized on the grounds of the political principle of equality. Moreover, what is 
being mediated via imagination is not a simple acknowledgement of the existence of 
other people, but to picture in mind a representation of their standpoints and 
difference. That is, as Arendt argues, 'being and thinking in my own identity where 
actually I am not.'
436
 By understanding other perspectives that are different from mine, 
I am being informed about what challenges or questions that I may be confronted 
with when putting forward my aesthetic judgements. But, more importantly, I am 
enabled to see the potential similarity and dissimilarity between others and me, and, 
with the effort of actual communication, may be able to find proximity between us. 
 
The imaginative element of political judgements thus equips the judging subjects with 
the power of world-building by allowing them 'to see and articulate relations between 
things that have none (in any necessary, logical sense), to create relations that are 
external to their terms.'
437
 However, as Arendt and Zerilli both notice, imagination 
cannot fundamentally replace the role of physical interlocution, a face-to-face 
communication to other judging subjects. This is because the corporeal encounter can 
help to 'update' one's skill of imagination with first-hand materials of embodiment. 
The necessity of actual interlocution thus raises questions about the political relation 
between the judging subjects: granting the political skill to signify free social 
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existence, what is the political relation between the competing interlocutors? Or, to 
put it differently, what political ethos is being cultivated when the judging subjects 
project their differences in the feminist practice of world-building? Also, in what 
ways can these political judgements transform world-building in correspondence with 
the change of social scenarios, rather than foreclosing interlocutions? Developing 
from the above discussion on political judgement and imagination, I will concentrate 
on elucidating the conceptual relationship between interlocution and political ethos in 
the next chapter.      
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Agonistic Feminist Politics of Discursive Embodiment 
 
1. PLURALITY AND POLITICISATION IN FEMINIST  
    POLITICS 
In opposition to the Cartesian hierarchical prioritisation of mind over body, a feminist 
politics of discursive embodiment grants primacy to corporeality as the existential 
medium of the world and the Self, in which gendered embodiment is manifested 
through the interchange of gender milieus and bodily practices. Contextualising in 
gender seriality, on the one hand, discursive embodiment encapsulates the enablement 
and constraint of the gender matrix on the body and, on the other hand, it entails the 
individualisation of gender differences. That is to say, the gender matrix has an 
imperative power to categorise individual bodies and discipline them to perform in 
certain manners that are correspond to their categorisations. Yet, the members of a 
particular cataloguing are situated in a serial and fluid, as opposed to an identical and 
deterministic, relationship with each other, owing to the corporeal power to develop 
individual praxis under general constraints. Instead of reproducing corporeal acts 
mechanically, the body can reiterate trained behaviours with the assistance of 
individual subjectivity to react and adjust itself in response to the situations and 
surroundings, which constitute individual discursive embodiments of the world. 
Following that, the plural essence of 'women', which provides a conceptual reference 
to differentiate bodies and make certain actions intelligible, acquires its existential 
substances from the diverse interpretations and enactments of criss-crossed social 
differences by individual female bodies. The corporeal capability to (re)signify the 
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gendered world, as articulated via previous chapters, makes present the historically 
absent and inferior female body as the primary locus of world-building and opens a 
door to conceive it as an existential site of political struggles. 
 
Elaborating on the notions of the symbolic mother and political imagination, this 
chapter seeks to sketch out a democratic ethos that can come to terms with the 
contingent and contestable nature of politicising the existential plurality of women. 
The re-conceptualisation of the female body as lived construes individual corporeality 
as always encultured and its existence and comprehension of the world are produced 
through the inter-involvement of the material and the discursive. That is to say that 
'the imbrications between embodiment, language, disposition, perception, and mood 
are always in operation' from the very moment of a body is born into a social 
world.
438
 From which, the discursive translation of corporeal embodiments has the 
body as its bedrock and the 'expressive value' of the sensory 'is the ground of the 
antepredicative unity of the perceived world, and, through it, of verbal expression 
(Darstellung) and intellectual significance (Bedeutung).'
439
 The phenomenological 
understanding of the lived body is therefore advantageous to problematising the 
historically congealed discursive constituents of a gendered corporeality, as well as 
identifying crucial deeds for political pluralism. While the idea of the symbolic 
mother figuratively authorises the previously absent female body a place of its own in 
gendered society, women are considered as empowered and liberated through their 
ability to demonstrate their experiential comprehensions of sexual difference in public 
and in recognition of each other. Complicated by human relations and social networks, 
an existential female body becomes a political female body in a way that she finds 
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resemblance, as well as distinction, between herself and other women. Standing in a 
serial relationship, she can experience intersubjectivity with another woman, for 
example, when she hears a man pronounce 'You women...' to other woman on the one 
hand. On the other hand, she can differentiate herself from that woman whom the 
speaker addresses to, by opposing the declared definition of their relationship and 
offering alternative visions, if wants to. 
 
As the exertion of political judgement and political imagination by individual women 
is affirmed by the symbolic mother, this raises concerns regarding how a democratic 
feminist politics can deal with the contradictory implementations of those political 
skills, since those involved share a legitimised equality. By paying with the symbolic 
debt of their freedom, women are assembled under the same social category, which 
entails a disciplinary force to instruct, rather than decide, the serialised member 
relations. In acknowledging the structural effects of 'women' on individual identity, 
each woman is legitimised with the freedom to put forward their comprehensions of 
the gendered world in words or actions. Women’s corporeality becomes the 
preliminary site of politicisation in that 'gendering' is 'first of all an event which grips 
my body, and this grip circumscribes the area of significance to which it has 
reference' before being verbalised as an experience or a concept.
440
 From that, female 
subjects find their bodies as a general medium to register back and forth the material 
and the discursive, to articulate or disrupt their political connections in response to a 
change in situation. How does feminist politics embrace such individual freedom to 
(re)signify the relationships among women and with the world, while asserting a 
collective voice? The political power of imaging something 'new' or 'different' allows 
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women to renovate the old rhetoric of social injustice, or to develop previously 
neglected dimensions of socio-historical scars for public judgement. While new 
politicisations can energise democracy and prevent its ossification, how does the 
visibility and differing interpretations of a past injury call for remediating and 
relieving grievance and anger, than antagonising the existing social relations? To put 
the point another way, how does a feminist politics of discursive embodiment come 
to terms with the constituted tension inherent in the translation of women’s existential 
plurality into a political plurality? 
 
2. A CONTESTABLE DEMOCRATIC ETHOS 
A feminist politics of discursive embodiment, developed cumulatively throughout the 
chapters of this thesis, depicts the plurality of women and its politicisation by 
integrating gender seriality, which provides a disciplinary yet non-deterministic social 
structure, with the lived body, which is able to cultivate a subjective intention under 
the general regulative effects of social difference. As a result, the constituted tension 
is embedded in their existential interactions, in a sense that the female body 
comprehends its 'new sense-giving intentions' of sexual difference 'only by donning 
already available meanings' from the existing gender structures.
441
 Meanwhile, the 
'available meanings suddenly link up in accordance with an unknown law' when the 
female body brings to bear its individual-praxis, 'and once and for all a fresh cultural 
entity has taken on an existence.'
442
 Under such circumstances, the regulative force of 
gender seriality always risks being counterbalanced, or even being overridden, by the 
corporeal power to re-signify. The individualised comprehensions of the world then 
manifest into different opinions and perspectives of individuals on the same subject 
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matter, and may feed back into 'the available meanings' of the existential surrounding. 
From the unremitting to and fro registering between the discursive and the material, 
the different projections of individual intentions by means of corporeality intensify 
the constituted tension, and subsequently invigorate the contestability of existing 
gender matrix. Recognising the possible collision of female existences in relation to 
their equal standings, the last picture of a feminist politics of discursive embodiment 
tackles the issue of political contestation. It will focus on establishing a political ethos 
that can renovate the antagonistic clash of different politicisations of female 
embodiment, than looking into political institutions or political actions. In short, 
politicisation can manifest into diverse shapes and take place at different levels, as 
those examples drawn on in the thesis exhibit.  
 
Furthermore, political institutions and systems are relatively inert and passive in 
responding to the rapid rise and fade of socio-political events and often are difficult to 
dismantle, partially because they are signs of stability of a society. In contrast, the 
general public are more up-to-date with socio-political issues, and their responses are 
crucial to the survival of those topics in popular discussion. In such a context, 
political ethos is therefore critical, in the sense that it is not only important to have 
appropriate institutional mechanisms and accesses in place to ensure the efficient 
function of democracy, but also decisive to have a broad understanding and 
acceptance of democratic values among the public. To put it differently, the 
endurance or dismantling of a democracy is fundamentally down to the general 
beliefs and ideas of the public, particularly how the people perceive their relations 
with each other, when strong emotions shake up their daily life or when current 
institutions or systems fail to react.  
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To recall the instance of the admission of Breivik into the University of Oslo, the 
open letter from Ottersen, the head of the University can be construed as an act of 
facilitating democratic ethos through politicising embodiments. On the one hand, as 
part of the injured Norwegian society, Ottersen incurs the strong emotions from the 
atrocity as his fellowmen. On the other hand, his professional position embodies him 
with certain social and intellectual status, as well as symbolises particular institutional 
authority, which may differentiate him from the general public. His open letter then 
can be considered as translating his plural identities and personal emotions into a 
political judgement, in an attempt to open up a dialogue between the Norwegian 
society that provoked by Breivik's cruelty and the established rules and regulations 
that the decision of admission based upon. Apart from the institutions and principles 
that Ottersen represented and the general public, the political process of speaking to 
and back also takes place between Breivik and the Norwegian population. Regardless 
the access is limited, granting Breivik his right to education may be able to assist him 
to re-train him to see plurality on its own merit, re-evaluate his prior judgements, and 
to re-imagine his relationship with a democratic society. Through the lateral 
integration of different interlocutors in public forum, the cultivation of a contestable 
political ethos and public forbearance become possible and such a facilitation, in turn, 
solidifies the mechanisms of democratic systems.   
 
What I therefore aim to articulate in this chapter is a feasible democratic ethos that 
instigates and cultivates a positive attitude of the people toward the unremittingly 
socio-political disturbances in a democracy. In a democratic society, the 
institutionalisation of a democratic framework is not the 'end-of-the story'. 
Contemporary civil societies are facing greater and broader challenges than ever from 
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both domestic and international levels: countries are wrestling between economic 
globalisation and localisation; the 'public space' is redefined by the invention of the 
internet and its accessibility is expanded by the briskly evolved digital technology; 
the people can connected with each other across geographical boundaries, yet the 
distinction it makes between users is somewhat harsher with injurious consequences. 
We can see nations suffer violent or social disturbances like terrorists attacks or union 
strikes, but autonomous, cross-continental collaborations between different people for 
common causes can also be observed, such as in the cases of SlutWalk, the 
imprisonment of Pussy Riot members, and Pride Parade for LGBT community. These 
events, as well as many others, point to a society is a intersecting and multifaceted 
organisation and full of 'hybrid identities, experimentation, and deconstructive 
discourses', which are interweaved with historical-congealed social structures and 
power relations.
443
 As the possibility of new socio-political challenges cannot be 
eradicated, a healthy democracy requires corresponding mechanisms and political 
ethos to accommodate and reconcile political conflicts under the collision of political 
judgements. To alleviate the aggression and resentment caused by differences and 
disagreements, democracy must be receptive to the providing public spaces for new 
vocabulary and (re)imaginations to emerge, a chance for them to articulate, be 
deliberated and to be judged, than simply attempt to subsume political confrontations 
under established imperatives.       
 
In terms of the plurality of female discursive embodiments and contemporary 
feminist politics, it is clear that women are starting to form different alliances across 
spaces on various issues and to stand in opposition towards the same goal. Aligned in 
                                                 
443
 Wayne Gabardi, Negotiating Postmodernism (University of Minnesota press, 2001), p. 109. 
  
213 
a serialised relationship, women have equal power to put into effect their corporeal 
capabilities in imaging and judging their relations with each other and with the world, 
via the mediation of the lived body. The idea of 'equal' here refers to both the 
democratic principle of equality, as well as the symbolic authorisation of 'being 
different' in recognition of sexual difference. Women can politicise their lived 
experiences and use language to make rhetorical representations of previous adverse 
injustice, with the intention that such social scars can be attended to and remedied. To 
put the point differently, politicising discursive embodiments is not merely about 
story-telling or making remarks about a life event, but also about being responded to. 
Between the political practice of talking back and forth, the participants can come to 
see the 'opposition' as equals who experience the world in another way like 
themselves and, from which, arises the possibility of understanding each other's 
reasons behind 'being different'. Subsequently, the contrasting political claims can be 
conceived as informing and pluralising the equally shared public space, which can 
progress the relatively inert, institutionalised political systems, than the irreconcilable 
deconstructive forces of difference. The tolerance and willingness to hear and talk to 
'someone who is different' reaffirm a general ethos of equality and recognition in the 
lived experiences of the society members and, furthermore, encourage future 
politicisations of discursive embodiments. 
 
3. JUDGING POLITICALLY: AN AGONISM 
Appreciating the progressive characteristics of inexorable contestability and power 
play in structuring human relations, I will advocate that an agonistic political ethos 
can help those involved in a  feminist politics of discursive embodiment to construe 
different political judgements and imaginations of women as a pluralist practice of 
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democracy. An agonistic version of democratic ethos can recognise the reciprocity 
between the lived body and the world around it, in a way that it 'locate[s] the political 
in the existential struggle to form identities and advance different ways of life in an 
environment of contingency, plurality, and power.'
444
 Specifically, an agonistic 
account of political ethos accepts neither that political arena and interlocutions can be 
free from power relations, nor political decisions can be attained without in-/direct 
interferences from the existing non-/official institutions or practices. Such an 
understanding resonates with the phenomenological conceptualisation of training in 
Chapter 2 and 3. Here, the lived body is 'being-in-the-world' in a sense that it 
materialises the enablement and inhibitions of the world, via an indefinite training 
process, which inscribes corporeality with established culture matrixes and essential 
skills. Even within the embedded corporeal mastery to adopt and (re)create, it is 
argued that individual innovations or reconfigurations continue to draw their 
intelligibility from practiced knowledge and reference networks, to varying degrees. 
As a result, the politicisation of discursive embodiment and manifestation of political 
skills are construed as always shadowed by power structures and hegemonic practices. 
Such an acknowledgment of existing imperatives then underscores the potential 
exclusions and negligence that accompanied those political actions. 
 
Following the above, an agonistic ethos turns away from an emphasis on the principle 
of political impartiality and universal rationality, which, for instance, are 
characterised in liberal democracy. Such a shift of focus does not mean that, for 
instance, the neutrality of public services, providing a fair and open access to 
participate, or offering reasons for political claims is no longer important in the 
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agonistic version of democratic framework. Rather, it calls the articulatory practices 
that ground the claims of neutrality or rational consensus into question, by 
underlining the impossibility to fully realise an ideal political deliberation, given that 
the participants are contextualised in a power-infused surrounding and cannot propose 
political claims without referring back to their particularities. Furthermore, as the 
Foucauldian 'power/knowledge' system argues, 'there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.'
445
 In conjuncture with 
the phenomenological lived body, political claims derived from lived experience have 
always existed within dominant structures of knowledge. 'We live in a world where 
speech is an institution,' as Merleau-Ponty avows.
446
 With 'understanding words and 
expressions' gradually turns into a rather effortless task, people 'become unaware of 
the contingent element in expression and communication,...in short, in all who 
transform a certain kind of silence into speech.'
447
 The accustomed 'silence' can refer 
to the unreflective association between the spoken word and the object or event it 
represents. For example, I do not need to recall my own experiences, form an image 
in my head, or witness the actual event, when I hear my friend says that a mutual 
acquaintance is 'upset' today. There is no clear deductive process or comparison of 
different emotions involved to achieve my comprehension of the sentence. 
 
On the other hand, the un-introspective 'silence' in the exchange of language can also 
be understood as an unquestioned reaffirmation of authority or belief, if recalling the 
Foucauldian relationship of power and knowledge. For example, the same diagnosis 
of symptoms may carry different weights or credibility depending on whether it is 
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uttered by a medical doctor or not. Similarly, soldiers normally would not question 
the orders from their superiors, similar to the relation between employees and 
employers. These cases underline how different social settings may have patent 
impacts on the effect of the same spoken words. For example, consider  the 
announcement 'you are under arrest' made by a police officer and by a friend: 
generally speaking, the different courses of action by the hearer in response to the 
declaration, i.e. obeying or defying the 'arrest', are not the result of a change in 
comprehension of the literal meaning of those spoken words. Rather, the respective 
'understandings' of the very same sentence and subsequent actions by some means 
precede 'the intellectual working out and clarification of the meaning'.
448
 In the case 
of the speaker being a police officer, the conformance of the hearer can be read as 
displaying a blind recognition toward the existing social order and a hierarchal 
relationship that the identity, 'police officer', represents, which ground the validity 
and effectiveness of that proclamation. In contrast, it is the lack of institutionalised 
authority being implicitly identified, when the words are declared by a friend of the 
hearer. Such a comparison elucidates the veiled espousal of linguistic practices and 
socio-cultural matrix in daily encounters, in which corporeality is the principle 
medium to deliver and demonstrate the effects of differentiation and structuring in its 
bodily actions.  
 
From the above, the individual encounter with a socio-cultural authoritative 
relationship is not 'founded on the recognition of some law, but on the experience of a 
bodily presence.'
449
 In particular, the enculturation of the corporeality points to the 
difficulty of claiming neutrality and universality, seeing that 'I become involved in 
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things with my body, they co-exist with me as an incarnate subject, and this life 
among things has nothing in common with the elaboration of scientifically conceived 
subject.'
450
 Differentiating the perceived world from scientific assessments, the 
phenomenological understanding of the body-in-the-world underlines the potential 
risk of mistaking our perceptions of the social world, which result from an ongoing 
disciplinary process of normalisation, as produced under objective and natural 
conditions. Furthermore, as the contrast between a police officer and a friend 
announcing 'you are under arrest' reveals, individual mastery has the ability to project 
individual-praxis, i.e. to transform the common structure into personal use 
occasionally, under the institutionalised socio-cultural structures, while relying on the 
same scheme for the intelligibility of individual purpose. If the intention of a friend is 
to make a joke by uttering 'you are under arrest', for instance, the successfulness of 
the gag requires the listener to have prior knowledge of particular social settings, such 
as the general functions and consequences of 'arrest'. With the background 
understanding of 'how the arrest should happen' in mind, the hearer then is equipped 
with the essential socio-cultural awareness to distinguish the common way of 
behaving from the deviation, and thus grasps the mockery. This illustration stresses 
the relational and contextual aspects of language practices, in which corporeality 
finds a place for individual subjectivity to navigate itself towards particular goals. 
 
Acknowledging the coded articulatory practices behind language games and human 
behaviours, an agonistic ethos, as Chantal Mouffe argues, construes each 
politicisation as 'a contingent and temporary hegemonic articulation of 'the people' 
through a particular regime of inclusion-exclusion.'
451
 Following that, political 
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enactments are provisional and reliant in a sense that they 'are revisable, settlements 
can be re-examined afresh, re-argued, and re-negotiated in the light of new 
circumstances, empirical or scientific evidence, or new normative or political 
claims.'
452
 Let's recall the controversy around FEMEN's topless protestation to 
elucidate the point: the activist group construes the female body as the concrete 
materialisation of patriarchal oppressions and the naked breast as the signature 
approach of the group, in contrast with clothing the female body, signifies the 
transformation of women's bodies from possessed by men into a site of female 
liberation. Such an articulation of the female body as a political subject has its 
particularity, in connection with the patriarchal milieu of male gaze and control over 
women in both normative and material senses. That is, FEMEN highlights the 
dimensions of objectification and commoditisation in the historical oppressions 
against women and, upon which, develops a focused reading on the exposure of nude 
breast as a critical ─and somehow the only─ weapon to combat all forms of male 
domination. A patent political frontier of us/them is thus emerged from the specific 
rhetoric, namely women and men. However, as the reaction from MWAF indicates, 
another political front can also be drawn within the 'us', i.e. women, that FEMEN 
aims to represent: the provocative protesting method marks Muslim women who wear 
religious clothes like hijab and burqa, which are designed to cover rather than reveal, 
as a clear Other within the constructed regime of Us.  
 
Although FEMEN members have staged protests against the Christian church as well 
as Saudi Arabia's driving ban against women, MWAF steps in from the perspective of 
cultural differences and casts FEMEN as cultural imperialists, by contesting their 
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definition of the incompatibility between Islamic clothing practice and the liberation 
of women. The disagreement between FEMEN and MWAF on what does or does not 
signify the liberation of women, as Mouffe may argues, 'is a political one, and for that 
reason it should remain contestable.'
453
 Similarly, just as FEMEN cannot represent a 
universal reading of women's body and sexual liberation, the discursive attacks on the 
ideology and approach of FEMEN by MWAF also do not impart the supreme truth in 
the ways of life of Muslim women. While MWAF is devoted to disassociating female 
Islamic clothing from the connotation of female oppression, there are counter-voices 
trying to argue otherwise by highlighting the correlation between state controls and 
wearing the headscarf in certain countries, such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi 
Arabia.
454
 The arguments and counter-arguments displayed in public forums shows a 
clear political intention by women to try to define an equal relationship by appealing 
to their intersected social differences. As Hannah Arendt points out, 'we are all the 
same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who 
ever lived, lives, or will live.'
455
 Feminist politics thus consists of dealing with the 
different sides of female transgression, in which 'women' should be construed as an 
inherently changeable and relational political subject. However, as MWBC asks, in 
order for a socially authoritative female origin to make connections between women, 
how can an agonistic ethos help feminist politics  resist the ambivalence of each 
(re)signification, in turn monopolising speech? Furthermore, if each politicisation 
entails a hegemonic regime of exclusion-inclusion, how does an agonistic ethos 
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facilitate the possibility of contestation without the aggregation of hostility, since the 
power struggle is deemed ineradicable?   
 
4. GATHERING UNDER THE UNIVERSAL, SIGNIFYING THE  
    PARTICULAR(S)  
In dealing with the disparity among women under generally asymmetric gender 
relations, MWBC captivatingly suggests the idea of a symbolic female authority to 
legitimise the practices of female freedom. Meanwhile, those practices of female 
transgression confirm the authenticity of the symbolic mother. For MWBC, what is 
being practiced under the banner of women's liberation is women's political skills to 
manifest their desires and to judge, in connection with sexual difference. Specifically, 
as female social relations are historically under-represented in public space, 'women 
judging women' signifies a feminist attempt to move beyond the male-dominated 
system of knowledge/power. It is not to say that MWBC tries to overthrow the 
established cultural matrix and develop a brand-new set of universal imperatives  
designated for women. Instead, the practice of judgement is advocated by a group of 
women to show their fellow women the possibility of an alternative interpretation of 
sexual difference, than one that is mediated by male guardians. In particular, the 
political practice demonstrates an understanding of 'I-can', which was previously 
undermined by the fact of 'I am a woman', and substantiating the empty social 
relationship among women by highlighting the possibility of 'being different'. That is, 
'I' am a woman and can manifest desires or make judgements without a male 
guarantor, whose assurance is simply resulted from his identity as 'man'. Furthermore, 
the 'I-can' as a woman not only denotes individual capabilities, but also projects and, 
to a degree, requires a sense of reciprocity among women. That is to say that the 
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repudiation of another women's ability to perform 'I-can' will consecutively cast 
doubt on my own realisation of 'I-can'.  
 
Nonetheless, it is not an entirely harmonious atmosphere that characterises the 
general reciprocity among women, under the political practice of female freedom. In 
contrast, a disagreeable and argumentative ambience among women is often sensed in 
complex socio-cultural issues, such as the different perceptions of Islamic clothing 
that mentioned earlier, the pro-life vs. pro-choice debate of abortion, and the 
suitability of female bishop in the Church of England.
456
 What the practice of political 
judgement brings forward under the claim of female liberation, to borrow Mouffe's 
phrases, is a feminist issue of communicating 'the political' to 'the politics'. According 
to Mouffe, 'the political' signals the antagonistic social relationship 'that is inherent in 
human relations'; as for 'politics', it 'indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses 
and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize human 
coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are 
affected by the dimension of 'the political'.'
457
 Feminist politics is then considered as 
an ordered space of 'politics' and sets to resolve the potential antagonism of 'the 
political', which groups the existential plurality of women and their irreducible 
individual-praxis under the common-praxis of 'women' as a social category. 
Transiting from 'the political' to 'politics', women find themselves in an empowered 
position to explore and judge their sexual difference and disparity, as well as to 
compare and contrast different arguments and approaches. The conceptual 
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collaboration between an agonistic ethos and the symbolic mother then helps to 
underline the power-infused contexts and contingent conditions behind the respective 
exercises of political judgement. Following that, women are being diverted from 'an 
ideal of neutral, genderless justice, and cleared our minds of the image of this kind of 
justice as well as the guilt feelings and the resentment that this neutral authority 
introduced into our relations.'
458
  
 
On the one hand, the theoretical departure from justice-as-neutrality under an 
agonistic ethos draws attention to the universal claim posited by the  political. On the 
other hand, this sheds a positive light on the politicised existential divergences of 
women as a path of pluralisation for feminist politics. To be exact, the symbolic 
gathering of women in the same public space bridges the social connection between 
them, and also turns both affable fellowship and antagonistic disagreement into flesh-
and-blood friends and foes. Through direct encounters with other fellow female 
participants and without the trouble of assembling sexual difference with claims of 
neutrality, they will be able to share honest personal experiences and upfront opinions, 
in a way that offering an alternative rhetoric of world events and not being distorted 
by (male) mediators. By doing so, women can focus on engaging in deeper 
conversations with disagreeing parties and to uncover, then reconcile, the strong 
emotions camouflaged by rational arguments. Expectedly, such concentration will 
induce women to examine closely the political construction of us/them, i.e. to 
deliberate the applicability of what separate or draw them together. In investigating 
the complicity of female existence, women remove 'the easy arguments with which 
the lack of valorising relations between women is usually explained away, and we 
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were able to reach that level where social matter intersects its symbolic 
organization.'
459
 Therefore, the public declaration of 'we are the same (as women)' is 
considered as a political statement, than a factual description of female relations, 
which treats each definition of 'we' and 'the same' as a contestable articulation in 
relation to respective politicisations of female embodiment.  
 
To further elucidate the characteristic of 'contestable articulation' between the general 
categorisation of women and the individual projection of the category, I will draw on 
Ernesto Laclau's reading of Wittgenstein's 'rule-following' in language games. In 
contemplating the individual ability to follow language rules, Laclau argues that the 
language system 'is being constantly constructed and reconstructed [by the 
individualised practices of language], between an abstract rule and the instance of its 
use in a particular context, it is not a relationship of application that occurs, but a 
relationship of articulation.'
460
 From which, it can be noted that the distinction 
between articulation and application is hinged upon the possibility of 'being 
constantly constructed and reconstructed'. Constructions and reconstructions in 
individual practices of a general language rule then indicate a contingent and 
reciprocal relation between universal imperatives and particular instances. Within 
which, the power of totalising and conditioning, which is exercised by linguistic 
imperatives, is recognised. Such recognition of regulating effects constitute the 
threads of resemblance between individual practices of those language rules. 
Nonetheless, the boundary of a general rule is 'penetrated by a basic instability and 
precariousness', in a way that the regulative imperative of language cannot prevent 
individual intentions from entering into the process of articulating the relationship 
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between general language rules and individual utterances.
461
 The reconstruction of a 
vocabulary can often be seen in commercial branding, such as 'Lotus' and 'Jaguar', 
which represent a specific class of car manufacturers, than mere references to 
particular types of flower and animals. The resignification of the two words clearly 
did not overthrow their original significations of natural life forms, but the border of 
such connotations is being expanded when the reference groups are being symbolised, 
in corresponding to the intent of the brand founders. 
 
A similar tentativeness of boundaries in individual articulations of general linguistic 
rules is also seen in the way that social identity demarcates individual bodies. That is, 
the constitution of a social identity relies on privileging certain characteristics from 'a 
whole field of differences, and made to embody this totalizing function', which 
essentially is a 'representation of an impossible whole'.
462
 'The externalization of auto-
negativity and its 'embodiment' in the other is an exclusionary limit structuring the 
political terrain and the articulation within it,' as Torben Bech Dyrberg elaborates, 
'thus fixing the identity of both self and other.'
463
 From which, the articulatory 
practice comes into play in privileging what the identity is by consolidating what it is 
not. The articulation of the exterior and interior of an identity indicates that a political 
frontier is being established and a sense of antagonism is being invoked, given that 
the act of privileging signifies a necessary exclusion, as well as limitation, of certain 
differences. 'Without limits through which a (non-dialectical) negativity is 
constructed we would have an indefinite dispersion of differences whose absence of 
systematic limits would make any differential identity impossible. But this very 
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function of constituting differential identities through antagonistic limits is what,' as 
Laclau claims, 'at the same time, destabilizes and subverts those differences.'
464
 A 
radical contestability is thus featured in the equation of identity articulation: Through 
the methods of privileging and excluding, the particular difference(s) of a social 
identity is articulated as a universal picture to the marginalisation of other forms of 
difference. Owing to the asymmetrical status between the dominant and the 
discounted differences, the articulated general frontier is prone to inherent 
antagonism, which may cause critical challenges and call for re-articulations of the 
present political boundary, when the objective circumstances and conditions change.  
 
The essence of an agonistic ethos, as pointed out before, is hinged on its deep-seated 
acknowledgement of the inescapable inclusion/exclusion that is drawn by every 
political construction. 'There are always other possibilities that have been repressed 
and that can be reactivated', as Mouffe argues, the contingent distinction of us/them 
through articulatory practices 'is susceptible of being challenged by counter-
hegemonic practices, i.e. practices which will attempt to disarticulate the existing 
order so as to install another form of hegemony.'
465
 Following that, the concentration 
of an agonistic ethos of political conflict can be paraphrased as concerning the 
likelihood of reactivating previously repressed possibilities under the established 
scheme. In discussing the function of political reconciliation in a divided society, 
Andrew Schaap suggests the cultivation of 'agonistic respect' or 'resonableness' is 
central to its success and, as Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker suggest, 
reconciling adversaries is 'about breaking with the violence of the past and initiating 
political arrangements that will secure such reasonability and reflection', instead of 
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'settling accounts'.
466
 The above accounts all point to the possibility of disarticulating 
the current hegemonic installation which is fundamental in keeping political 
competitors on agonistic terms. Owing to this, the transitional sphere between the 
plurality of actions and the objective of pluralism is urgently in need of conceptual 
elaboration, as the alteration of political scenery relies on the dis/articulation of 
political conflict. As the enactment of agonistic ethos does not predict or presume a 
specific formation of pluralism, the thesis will not dwell on the objective of pluralism, 
but embark upon a conceptual enquiry about pluralisation in this section. 
 
To contextualise this in terms of a feminist politics of discursive embodiment, the 
theoretical prioritisation of pluralisation over pluralism can be reformulated as 
follows: the conceptual integration of gender seriality and the phenomenological lived 
body effectively provides a possible way to envisage the diversification of female 
embodiments under the general category of 'women'. An existential reciprocity is thus 
articulated from corporeal embodiments and the constitution of gender seriality: that 
is, the disciplinary imperative of gender matrix is casted, on the one hand, as both 
constraining and enabling corporeality to a varying extent. On the other hand, these 
variations of gender performances become historically congealed constituents of 
gender structures, in such a way that corporeal demonstrations reiterate and/or 
reconfigure gender hegemony, and so figuratively ground and promise future bodily 
practices of gender. Such symbolic ‘grounding’ and ‘promising’ from corporeal 
performances suggests a conceptual seriality that not only connects women across 
generations but also among contemporaries. In particular, individual women are 
standing in a serial position with each other in a sense that, to draw on Connolly’s 
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understanding of William James, the formation of corporeal experience 'comes 
replete with connections' and 'discloses a flux in which elements from the past fold 
into the present and both of those into future anticipation.'
467
 That is to say that 
women, as existential registers of the gendered world, 'draw[s] on a latent history and 
reworks that history in the moment of its representing. ... Representation becomes the 
mode of projecting an implicit past, and instating it as part of present.'
468
 The 
progression of the gendered world therefore hinges upon the development of 
corporeal capabilities and experiences. 
 
The relentless injections of individual-praxis into the gendered world indicate the 
indeterminacy and contingency of the formation of feminist politics, given that, as 
Sartre argues, the female body as 'lived cannot be named without being reinvented. 
One will be changed by the Other, discourse and lived experience.'
469
 The reinvention 
and interconnection of women in feminist politics can be sensed when we look into 
how affirmative actions, like gender quotas, are adopted in addition to the demand for 
gender equality; or the well-being of one gender cannot be advanced independent of 
the other gender, as in the case of paternity leave and pay for both mothers and 
fathers. These examples demonstrate that the figurative encounters between female 
bodies, discursive imperatives, and other materiality would always invite reflections 
on the existing practices and systems. Within which, forces of contestation can be 
accumulated in due course and calling the established cultural matrix into question, as 
to, for instance, re-signify the conception of 'gender equality' and its practicality in 
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corresponding to the situation in question. The intensity and complexity of human 
relations and engagements with the world and each other, as illustrated above via 
different scenarios, brings to light that 'women', as a historically congealed social 
category, continues to exist in an open-ended process of becoming. 'In a world of 
becoming,' as Connolly articulates, 'the emergence of new formations is irreducible to 
patterns of efficient causality, purposive time, simple probability, or long cycles of 
recurrence.'
470
 The contrast between the contemporary cases of the SlutWalk and the 
controversy around the wearing of the Islamic Burka effectively demonstrates how 
the understanding of sexual liberation, as one of the core themes in feminist 
movements, is a phenomenon of becoming: both cases can be read as targeting the 
relation between women and their ways of clothing, implicitly or explicitly, in 
connection with the issue of 'male gaze'. However, the upholding of sexual liberation 
does not and cannot provide a decisive answer or unifying consensus to that specific 
relation, considering the different backgrounds of each story. Instead, the 
interconnectivities that embodied in those cases generate respective-yet-relevant 
arguments to reconfigure the substance of sexual liberation, while inviting future 
corporeal registers to dismantle the current (re)construction, as the idea of the 
symbolic mother suggests. 
 
Acknowledging the serial interconnectivity and the notion of 'becoming', the 
democratisation of feminist politics hinges upon political measures which acclimatise 
the plurality of discursive embodiments and reconcile their occasionally contradictory 
existences. That is, a democratic feminist politics must be aware of the antagonistic 
dimension of each politicisation, which is developed upon past injuries, 
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disagreements or unresolved injustices, alongside its rational arguments and rhetoric. 
For instance, Emily Davison, a British militant activist who thrown herself in front of 
King George V's horse at the Epsom Derby to campaign for women's suffrage; the 
outrage and reflections on 'rape myth' across India after the death of a young female 
photojournalist, Jyoti Singh, being violently and sexually assaulted in New Delhi; and 
Gulnaz, an rape victim whose excruciating experience is conceived as an act of 
adultery in Afghan and can only avoid jail sentence by marrying her attacker, simply 
to name a few.
471
 Considering the interconnectivity in human relations, people can 
draw connections and similarities between their individual experiences and those 
sufferings and, subsequently, finding causes and forming reasons to act on those 
sufferers' behalf, as well as theirs. Under such circumstances, the political action and 
argument have strong poignant attachments and can be construed as aspire to disrupt 
and reconfigure the institutionalized cultural imperatives or asymmetric social 
relations. Furthermore, the political relationships that women developed from their 
personal experiences with the same exemplary case (or, the symbolic mother) can be 
greatly diverged in corresponds to individual-praxis. The confrontational and pluralist 
aspects of politicisation denote different types of unjustifiable afflictions, which the 
sufferers are fighting to expose, or different understandings of issues, which the 
bearers are struggling to voice them to the world.  
 
Following on from the above, the remitting politicisations, with contingency and 
indeterminacy at the core of action, cannot be easily subsumed by the appeal to 
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rationality or the installation of universal consensus. The political attempt to locate 
universal agreement would potentially deny the access to possible changes and 
reconfigurations in the future and, accordingly, the realisation of pluralism. That is to 
say, as the political image of an issue in question is fixated on rationality and 
universality, the capability of political imagination will gradually become repressed 
by that single objective, than being practiced as a way to discover the otherness 
within the self. Moreover, the emphasis on consensual agreement will easily wither 
the political energy on pursuing a somewhat unsustainable goal, which would 
aggravate the resentment and aggression between the oppositional parties, instead of 
tackling and responding to the specific issue in hand. Take the example of paternity 
leave/pay: the patriarchal division of labour places the childcare duty primarily in the 
hand of mother and thus provides a rather constricted interpretation of the parents-
children relationship, such as the conventional image of 'working father, caring 
mother' and 'housewife'. Although many countries, like Britain, Sweden, and Canada, 
allow both mother and father to share paternity leaves, the social stigma and career 
concerns continue to affect general perceptions and imaginations about gender 
roles.
472
 It is not a universal consensus about the ideal gender division of labour or the 
parental archetype in an age of sexual liberation that fathers, who wish to be the 
caregiver, and mothers, who choose to return to workplaces, intend to contend or 
defend, when they politicise their discursive embodiments. Instead, those parents are 
fighting for a way to project their alternative choices into the public's imagination of 
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contemporary family life, and are looking for socio-political mechanisms, which can 
enable their projections than marginalize their choice. In short, they are trying to be 
part of a socio-political imagination than the definition of it. 
   
The agonistic pluralism, which is articulated by Connolly, can be effective and 
illustrative in capturing the perpetuated inter-connective and contingent political 
resistance that is embedded in the progression of democracy. 'We inhabit in a world 
of becoming composed of heterogeneous force-fields; and we also participate in two 
registers of temporal experience, each of which can help us to get bearings in such a 
world', as he claims.
473
 Such statement indicates that the making of our existence is 
neither a one-person job nor a linear creation in the world. Rather, the heterogeneous 
materiality, discourses and human interactions indicate a continuation of otherness in 
the constitution of self, as the lived body must go through series trainings to 
understand the operation of initial corporeal motions and capabilities, which 
discussed in the previous chapter. The engagement with other existential forces in the 
mobilisation of the self inserts a horizontal dimension of interaction to the outwardly 
linear events of time. 'We participate, rather, in a world of becoming in a universe set 
on multiple zones of temporality, with each temporal force-field periodically 
encountering others as outside forces,' as Connolly continue to point out, 'and the 
whole universe open to an uncertain degree.'
474
 On the one hand, as we move in and 
out of other temporal existences in our daily activities, a certain degree of friction can 
be anticipated to rise in the co-development and co-existence of the Self and the 
Other. On the other hand, the relational boundary of the Self may be putted through 
reflection and restructuring, while individuals are navigating themselves through the 
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dissonance between, for example, the old and the new, the past and the future, and the 
collective and the individual.  
 
The character of 'otherness inside individuality', which is depicted above, pervades 
not only the construction of the individual self but also the development of collective 
life. The political arena, as a significant tier of their collective life, receives its force 
of becoming from the different perceptions and relations of the communal structures, 
practices, and visions that individuals, who live in the same community, have. That is, 
the institutionalised social and material settings like gender, urban/rural, and classes 
put individuals in different subject positions, in which the available options and 
resources are varied from one person to the other. Subsequently, the discrepant social 
ranks and accesses among individuals provide distinct standpoints to sense and 
consider the same object/issue from different, and sometimes conflictual, angles. For 
instance, a Christian and a secularist may have contrary opinions regarding the 
importance of religious education in schools. By putting forward their respective 
perceptions and claims in public and to the governing body, they intentionally defy 
the hegemonic common-praxis that their shared life experiences are built upon. 
Additionally, the possibility of politicisation can emerge from the interactions 
between different force-fields of the existential world. In the practice of surrogacy, 
for example, the material advance of medical technology has been causing legal 
debates challenging the traditional moral codes and social discourses. Cultivated from 
the shared (and sometimes accidental) interactions between human estate and 
nonhuman processes, each individual/party in above examples project respective 
visions and understandings of their communal life and articulate political frontiers to 
bolster their political imaginations of the community. 
  
233 
Each articulatory practice of communal imagination, from a discursive perspective, 
implies a political endeavour to install a hegemonic closure, which is constructed 
upon varying degree of particularity and exclusion. The hegemony here, to draw on 
Ernesto Laclau, refers to when that 'one difference, without ceasing to be a particular 
difference, assumes the representation of an incommensurable totality. In that way, its 
body is split between the particularity which it still is and the more universal 
signification of which it is the bearer.'
475
 The discrepancy between the posed totality 
and its innate particularity provides a crucial ground for other articulatory practices to 
come in and reconfigure the political frontier that current hegemonic closure has 
constructed, via the utilisation of differential and equivalential logics. Since no 
political frontier is fundamentally decisive in defining the communal imagination, 
democracy needs a political ethos that is attentive to the built-in power struggle and 
political mechanisms that can reconcile the accompanied antagonism between 
different articulatory practices. In particular, the unremitting politicisation of different 
discursive embodiments denotes a notion of critique, which demands the members 
and institutions of political community to reflect on the existing practices and 
possibilities available to them. If such a political collection of individuals is 
committed to democracy, its 'institutional conditions must be devised that highlight 
the contingently hegemonic character of the rules, procedures, and power of these 
institutions in order to encourage conflict over the basis of social order, while also 
providing sufficient commonality that these conflicts do not destroy the conditions 
necessary to exert democratic influence over our ongoing and contingent constitution 
as subject.'
476
 The substantiation of democracy, therefore, necessitates a deep-seated 
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collaboration between institutional commitments and political actions, to avoid the 
ossification of political arena.  
 
To acknowledge the indeterminate and contingent process of 'becoming' in 
democracy, Connolly depicts an agonistic pluralist ethos that prioritises pluralisation 
over pluralism. He suspects the emphasis on pluralism itself will lead to a hegemonic 
closure of democratic imagination, which endangers the foundation of democracy as 
such concluding installation may 'help to conceal or marginalize injuries and limits in 
need of political engagement.'
477
 Such potential hegemonic closure in conventional 
imagination of pluralism is because that, according to Connolly, it habitually 
construes pluralism 'as an achievement to be protected, while the eruption of new 
drives to pluralization are often represented as perils to this achievement.'
478
 To put it 
differently, the concern over political eruptions in conventional pluralism 
paradoxically calls a halt to further pluralisation. As such, the pluralist imagination 
conceives the established framework of conflict resolution constituted from past 
struggles as a paradigm and prefers further epidemics to be dealt with within that. 
Such a notion of pluralism will gradually metamorphose the public arena into a 
conservative inertia, in which new configurations of differential and equivalential 
logics cannot be mobilised in response to new discursive experiences. From which, 
'the process of subject formation of citizens', as Wingenbach points out, becomes a 
'locus of conflict' because of 'the failure to respect those manifestations of difference  
that conflict with one's own identity' on the one hand; and on the other hand, 'a refusal 
to permit the emergence of new identities that disrupt the arrangement of stable 
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tolerance that allows peaceful pluralism to persist.'
479
 The probable ossification of a 
democratic agenda implied in conventional pluralism thus calls forward reflections on 
how to 'refashion the pluralist imagination itself'.
480
  
 
The prioritisation of pluralisation, from Connolly's perspective, offers a way to 
envisage a democratic ethos that can evaluate 'the desirability of governance through 
democratic means with a corollary politics of democratic disturbance through which 
any particular pattern of previous settlements might tossed up for grabs again.'
481
 In 
contrast with the conventional perception of pluralism, his reading of democratic 
pluralism stipulates a specific attendance to the locus of conflicts that caused by the 
variety of existential differences, namely the process of pluralisation, than focus on 
the objective fact of the existences of different value systems and practices in the 
world. From which, pluralisation becomes the crucial mechanism in connecting 
politicised disturbance and the pluralist imagination, in which active engagements in 
power struggles within public forum are encouraged and preconceived resolutions are 
dismissed, under the general frame of democratic governance. His repudiation of  
existing settlements is a scholarly endeavour to preserve contestability within political 
systems, in order to apprehend the rapid material and visceral developments of 
contemporary democracy. That is, the established arrangements from previous 
contestations should not impose themselves as a paradigmatic answer, in a way that 
either monopolises the formats of future solutions for the recurring political 
disturbances, or suppresses the recurrence itself. It is not saying that precedents are 
completely abandoned when new political disturbances happen, or no boundary 
whatsoever is pitted upon the direction of political platform. Rather, political 
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disturbances are valued as a democratic indication in the process of pluralisation, in a 
sense that they aim to redress certain socio-political issues, which are not yet being 
attended to in previous settlements, or to voice new visions while 'supporting the 
civic conditions of common governance.'
482
  
 
Following the above, political disturbances can democratise the pluralist imagination 
of a society, in a way that any concerned civic registers are welcome to enrol in the 
political platform, as to project new perspectives or contest existing political frontiers, 
than abiding by the conformity of existing definitions of pluralism. The openness and 
indeterminacy that embraced here 'increase[s] the number of positive identities and 
changes the tone of contention and collaboration between constituencies', by 
disrupting dogmatic identities and rejecting hegemonic political closures.
483
 However, 
the democratic pluralisation from political disturbances, as signalled by Connolly's 
words above, cannot operate effectively without civic desire of democratic 
governance. While allowing the contending social differences to manifest their 
diverse visions in the political realm, what is the potential adhesive that attaches them 
to the civic practice of common governance? As the politics of becoming 'emerges 
out of historically specific suffering, previously untapped energies, and emerging 
lines of possibility eluding the attention of dominant constituencies,' what political 
relationship can be cultivated between the established registers and under-represented, 
or even, unrecognised voices within democratic framework? With visceral 
attachments to political disturbances, what mechanisms can forestall a feeling of 
resentment being incited in the politicisation of discursive embodiments? Or, in short, 
under what civic conditions that the political forum is a existential space for agonistic 
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interlocutors, than for antagonistic adversaries? Taking the uncertainty of pluralist 
imagination and the interconnectivity of human relations into account, a democracy 
with deep pluralism that envisaged by Connolly should have political devices of 
'critical responsiveness', 'agonistic respect', and obliquely alluding to, rhizomatic 
assemblages in place. It is an agonistic engagement in democratic contestations being 
advocated here. I will explore the listed political mechanisms that Connolly has 
articulated for the democratic installation of pluralisation and cultivation of an 
agonistic ethos in the next section. 
 
5. AGONISTIC PLURALISATION OF FEMINIST POLITICS 
In articulating a pluralist imagination, Connolly underpins the interconnectivity and 
active tension of different politicisations as the core strengths of agonistic democratic 
ethos. In particular, he argues that the 'generosity and forbearance between 
interdependent and contending identities is not anchored in the fictive ground of a 
transcendental command or universal reason', but 'from the care for the protean 
diversity of life and from critical responsiveness to new drives to pluralization.'
484
 
Such claims can be understood as an upfront renouncement to political neutrality and 
universality, in a way that the sustainability of political pluralisation is relied on the 
active participation in the ongoing constructions of political frontiers, than distancing 
from any power plays. That is, to understand how lived bodies engage in the 
existential world or how discursive embodiments influence respective subject 
positions. The ethics of a pluralist imagination does not need to orientate itself from a 
universal figure of morality or a transcendental imperative, as if to obtain a sense of 
purity or sanctity for our political claims or decisions. Furthermore, the fixation with 
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'morality and normality weigh in heavily on the side of being, stasis, and stability 
without acknowledging how moral scales are tipped.'
485
 As moral scales or political 
transcendence continue to remain unquestioned and undisturbed, the deep-seated 
differences between the parties in question cannot be deliberated or even be detected, 
which may seriously undermine the existing democratic framework. To avert the 
silencing of old fears or suppressed differences, Connolly suggests critical 
responsiveness and agonistic respect, with assistance from the rhizomatic forms of 
assemblage, are the vital mechanisms for a democratic ethos to cultivate appreciation, 
generosity and forbearance between agonistic interlocutors. 
 
In an initial comparison, Connolly indicates that 'critical responsiveness' can be 
construed as 'an ethical relation a privileged constituency establishes with culturally 
devalued constituencies striving to enact new identities'; and meanwhile, 'agonistic 
respect' is conceived by him as 'a relation between two contending constituencies, 
each of which has gained a fair amount of recognition and power in the existing 
order.'
486
 A certain degree of hierarchy may be discerned between these two 
distinctive-yet-connected political mechanisms: as both devices are aim to facilitate 
agonistic pluralism, it can be argued that agonistic respect targets the political 
relationship between competing interlocutors, while critical responsiveness 
constitutes the general atmosphere of political forum. More specifically, agonistic 
respect can be cultivated, when an established democracy recognises the equal weight 
of each politicisation and provides open access for individuals to issue their 
respective voices. In other words, the contending parties in question can move away 
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from the desire of mutual destruction to develop a reciprocated understanding, given 
that their differences are legitimised and appropriate channels to common resources 
are granted. Under such circumstances, democratic participants 'absorb the agony of 
having elements of their own faith called into question by others, and they fold 
agonistic contestation of others into the respect that they convey toward them.'
487
 In 
the meantime, agonistic respect demonstrates a institutional commitment, as 
Wingenbach points out, to 'call attention to this impulse [of labelling difference as 
otherness] and directs it away from antagonism and toward adversarial esteem.'
488
  
 
Derived from the agonistic respect between individuals, a general role of critical 
responsiveness 'pertains to the ethical attitude of an entrenched constituency towards 
oppressed, undervalued, or unrecognized constituencies (i.e., constituencies currently 
under the threshold of legitimate recognition).'
489
 That is to say, instead of 
concentrating on human relations, critical responsiveness focuses on the interaction 
between human estates and nonhuman processes, in a sense that it intends to unearth 
the systematic injustice/suppression that is embedded in present set of political 
structures and practices. The differentiation of human and ethical relations, which 
demarcates agonistic respect and critical responsiveness, may be illustrated by the 
example of feminist politics: it can be suggested that a sense of agonistic respect 
between women, who have, for instance, different identities, sexual orientations, and 
nationalities, is being cultivated in accordance with the progression of several waves 
of feminist movements. Through the extensive and difficult fights for justice and 
rights, individual women gradually come to apprehend the equal evaluation of their 
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differences and opinions and, subsequently, develop a reciprocal appreciation towards 
the choices that each others made. Such positive reception, in my opinion, can be 
perceived as manifested in the idea of the symbolic mother, whose figurative 
authority is anchored in the collection of symbolic debt that each woman has equally 
paid as a token of womanhood. As agonistic respect steadily feedbacks to the 
existential world, the practice of critical responsiveness in feminist politics may 
become increasingly evident, as women do not need to justify their sexual difference 
and can move across wider discursive spectrum to formulate new alliances and 
address previously untold stories.   
 
Following on from the above, a rhizomatic style of political engagement may be more 
effective in exploring the multifarious lines of temporal coalition, as to consolidate 
the democratic practice of critical responsiveness. 'A rhizome ceaselessly establishes 
connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power and circumstances 
relative to the arts, science and social struggles. A semiotic chain is like a tuber 
agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic but also perceptive, mimetic, 
gestural and cognitive', as in the imagery helpfully depicted by Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari.
490
 In connection with social interconnectivity and contingency, such 
forms of assemblage, as Connolly argues, 'would not take the form of a general 
consensus, in which each constituency supports the programs in question for the same 
reasons as the others. Nor would it reflect the will of a nation, organized around a 
unified language, ethnicity, race, or religion. Nor would it amount to a simple 
coalition of interests.'
491
 Instead, rhizomatic assemblages are an overlapping, 
multifaceted network, in which different individuals can find themselves to stand in 
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separation and unity with the others at the same time, without the necessity of 
subscribing themselves to a single entity. Following that, reciprocal generosity and 
forbearance are made possible with the cultivation of agonistic respect and critical 
responsiveness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
242 
CONCLUSION  
A Possible Imagination of Political Womanhood  
‘I would have asked: Who's going to help her?  
Who's going to fight for what she's too frightened to fight for on her own?  
How does a woman stand up and find her voice?’                                                              
- Grace Middleton, 'the Village', BBC 
 
This is a quote that spoken by a fictional character of farmer's wife, Grace Middleton, 
in the BBC period drama, 'the Village', which sets in the early twentieth century, 
when she was asked by a male politician what questions would she have putted 
forward in front of the public in his election campaign meeting, if she had the courage 
to stand up and speak out. The 'she' in the quote that Grace Middleton intends to 
speak for is a female villager, Agnes, who was dismissed by the management level of 
a sweatshop factory, after mentioning that the poor working conditions may worsen 
her already-ill health. Regardless the contextual specification, the above lines can be 
generalised as concerning female empowerment and authority, the politicisation of 
female experiences, and political sisterhood. I believe those concerns are still 
valuable and pressing for continuous reflections in contemporary democratic societies, 
when sexual differences remain to be a disreputable source of social bias and injustice 
and manifesting themselves, sometimes violently and disruptively, across public and 
private spheres. Meanwhile, with gender discrimination and inequality can take on 
different formats in daily practices and discourses throughout human history , it is 
crucial for feminist politics, as a collective and public forum for challenging the 
asymmetric power relation between the sexes, to be attentive and open to the 
existential plurality that connoted in the term, 'women'. 
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In the introductory chapter, I pointed out the heterogeneity among women makes the 
conceptual articulation of 'women' a political project. Such a conceptual project is 
worthy of exploration because the continuing existence of sexual discriminations and 
the unbalanced power relationship of gender hierarchy. In other words, a systematic 
theorisation of gender is required to make sexual injustices and marginalisation 
intelligible. To theorise the reciprocal relationship between the understanding of 
'women' and the pluralisation of feminist politics, this thesis looked into the 
conceptions of gender seriality, phenomenological lived body, reiterations and 
reconfigurations between female corporeality and gender sturctures, politicising 
female embodiments, and agonistic ethos respectively in each chapter. Here, I will 
focus on how those individual constituents combine to give an overall account of a 
feminist politics of discursive embodiment and how such a specific understanding 
contribute to Young's scholarship and to feminist literatures on the theorisation of 
feminist politics.  
   
To disconnect the construction of 'women' from a essentialist gender identity, Chapter 
One introduced Iris M. Young's preliminary development of gender seriality. She 
drawn on Jean-Paul Sartre's differentiation between social group and social series and 
positions 'gender' as a form of serial relationship between individuals, in which 
members are unified passively by the objects their actions are oriented around and/or 
by the objectified results of the material effects of the actions of the others. Following 
this, the term 'women' signifies a collection of individuals who are similarly situated 
in a structural relation to material objects as they have been produced and organised 
by a prior history, which carries the material necessities of past experiences and 
discursive practices. The interaction between social structures and the materiality 
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subsequently raises questions about the role of female corporeality. The traditional 
Cartesian mind/body dualism is inadequate in capturing how historically-congealed 
materiality constraints human actions and how social structures embedded discursive 
imprints of personal projects, as the hierarchical relationship constructed in the 
dualism disconnects the body from the environment it is in. Therefore, Chapter Two 
argued a phenomenological concept of the lived body is suitable for the task in hand. 
 
Drawing on Maurice Meleau-Ponty, the corporeality is conceived as our way of 
being-in-the-world, which is a metaphorical carrier encultured with the discursive 
meanings of the world. Our bodily features have certain feeling capacities and 
functions to make us capable of strengths movements in relation to the specific 
environment around us. In other words, there is a presumed mastery equipped in the 
lived body. Owing to this capability, the body can thus be trained in a way that the 
individual body is enabled and constrained at the same time by learning a set of 
already-there skills to (re)enact particular actions under demonstrated circumstances. 
The training of the body entails a process of repetition and the development of 
subjectivity. In the context of gendering, each gender reiteration is essentially an 
imitation, rather than a perfect performance of original authorship. Under such 
circumstances, the passiveness (imitation) and activeness (subjectification) both come 
into play and the possibility of transgressing hegemonic gender practices becomes 
possible. The examination of the relational interplay in the reiteration and 
reconfiguration of gender is then the core of Chapter Three. 
 
The abilities to be trained and to retrain of a lived body pinpoint the notion of 
indeterminacy in gender performances. As gender training cannot prepare the 
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individuals for every scenarios, individual agency reveals its significance in such a 
situation: it helps the individuals to be able to respond to the unexpected or to 
translate strangeness into something familiar. In short, it is a demonstration and 
awareness of individual ability of 'I-can'. The existence of individual agency thus 
poses as an element of uncertainty to hegemonic gender practices, as those gender 
reiterations would always risk the emergence of contingent resistance and the 
potential resignification in the re-enactments. From this, it provides insights into why 
the female body is a site of politics and it is the objective of Chapter Four and Five to 
explore the politicisation of women's embodiments. 
 
In Chapter Four, I suggested the individual politicisations of female corporeality can 
help to revalue the currency of female authority and, more importantly, to cultivate 
the historically underappreciated public relationship between women. The 
development of female bond, in turn, figuratively legitimises and facilitates the future 
actions of individual women and thus the progression of feminist politics. The idea of 
the symbolic mother, which proposed by Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, is 
integrated in the politicisation of female embodiments. The cultivation of the 
authority of such a figurative maternal symbol is considered as a feminist practice to 
rework and substantiate female relationship via free practices of political judgement 
and imagination. By integrating the idea of the symbolic mother with agonistic ethos, 
a feminist politics of discursive embodiment is completed as a political operation 
prioritises the exposure of hegemonic articulation over the search of rationality or 
consensus. The function of agonistic ethos is it recognise the impossibility to 
terminate political conflicts or to eliminate power relations from democratic 
framework. As feminist politics is willing to place significance on political 
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contestation, the free practices of female authority can be a form of pluralisation and 
to investigate the disparity among women. Under such circumstances, women's social 
connections are substantiated, by enhancing the different experiences of constituency, 
heightening awareness of the relational characters of female identity, and folding 
agonistic respect into the conflicts between contending politicisation of womanhood.  
 
Of course, there are plenty literatures tackles the question of ‘what constitutes the 
concept of “women”’ or enriching the intellectual understanding of feminist politics. 
However, it is seldom to see an academic literature devoted to sketch out the 
intertwined relationship between those two issues and to develop a profound model 
from such exploration. In particular, the reciprocal relationship between the 
conceptualisation of women as an intelligible collective and the (expected) function 
of feminist politics is not often intensively discussed. It is this weak link in feminist 
works that the feminist politics of discursive embodiment that putted forth in this 
thesis can provide certain insights into. The following sections provide more detailed 
reviews the arguments made in each chapter and explore possible future directions of 
the research. 
 
1. From a Embodied Woman to a Discursive Womanhood 
    1a. Female Bodies as Lived in Gender Seriality 
Identifying the underdeveloped connection between the constitution of women and 
feminist politics, the thesis began the articulation of a feminist politics of discursive 
embodiment by introducing Iris M. Young’s initial development of gender seriality. 
As indicated in Chapter One, Young drawn on Jean-Paul Sartre’s distinction of social 
series and social group to reconceptualise the notion of gender, in order to avoid the 
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pitfalls of biological determinism and gender essentialism. Instead of marked by a 
self-conscious grouping and joined objectives that define the member relationship of 
a social group, a social series is characterised passively by the existing practical-inert 
reality and the anonymous membership, as the relationship between the social 
existences within a series is originated from the unintentional convergence of 
individual actions and objects around those engagements. Under such circumstances, 
‘women’ is construed not as a social group that defined by a logic of commonality or 
a shared identity, but signifies a cluster of individuals who happen to be situated in a 
series of similar positions in gender structures.  
 
Following above, the theoretical reconfiguration of gender as a form of social 
seriality helpfully shifts the intellectual pursue from locating the fixed identity or 
definite features of gender, to recognise the ambiguous boundary of womanhood. To 
be precise, the ‘ambiguity’ of women here denotes the idea that the construction of 
women is in a constitutive tension between openness and closure and hence should be 
a recurrent issue of feminist politics. As the advocators of the politics of difference 
clearly devoted to argue, the development of individual identity is not entirely 
controlled by a single factor, but resulted from the interaction of various social factors 
and diversified personal conditions, such as sexual orientation, social class, and 
professional occupations. The same situation also applies to the formation of women. 
With such understanding, it is foreseeable and reasonable that different, and 
sometimes conflicting, definitions of womanhood and plural trajectories toward 
gender issues would pervade the public forum of feminist politics, since individual 
women cultivate their gender subjectivity and experiences variously. Those 
politicisations may be conceived as putting forward a (temporal) closure to the issue 
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in question, however, such closing is always subject to further challenges, i.e. to be 
re-opened, due to the indeterminate and passivity of gender seriality. 
 
Once the conceptualisation of ‘women’ is departed from the intellectual chase of 
defined commonalities, it opens up a space to imagine ‘women’ in a different light 
and directs attention to how ‘women’ are being practiced in heterogeneous forms. As 
pointed out in Chapter One, Young considers the female body as a significant 
constituent in the establishment of gender seriality, as it manifests the effects of 
gender imperatives. Nevertheless, she did not give a meticulous account of how such 
manifestation takes place or what is the function of the body in connection with the 
operation of gender hegemony. Also, in the same chapter, I have noted that Young 
discussed the contribution of the phenomenological conceptualisation of the body as 
lived in capturing how the corporeality and body modalities incorporate their 
situatedness in her later feminist works. In particular, she has done a series of 
phenomenological study on the presentations of female body figures and movements 
and intimate experiences like pregnancy, which inspire many contemporary scholarly 
analyses on female corporeality and its situated surroundings. Acknowledging 
Young's specific investigation into bodily performances in her later intellectual 
pursue and the absence of such examination of women's body in her 
conceptualisation of gender seriality, I then dedicated Chapter Two to sketch out the 
functions of a female body in the progression of the gendered world, by introducing 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological representation of the body as lived. 
 
As indicated before, the Cartesian mind/body dualism has been historically 
dominating the philosophical thinking in Western societies, in which the common 
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associations of the mind as the symbol of the reason and the corporeality as the 
representation of emotion-laden materiality are established. Such attribution of 
different characteristics facilitates a hierarchical relationship between the mind and 
the body and, consequentially, leads to the significant dismissal of corporeality in the 
development of Western philosophy. Furthermore, the mind/body dualism contributes 
to the articulation of gender dimorphism, in which men are groped with the 
superiority of the mind and women are assigned to the passive body. Such ignorance 
of corporeality and the contingent ascription of power relations between two sexes 
have prompted criticisms from contemporary feminists. To understand the full picture 
of the operation of gender hegemony, it is argued that we not only should pay 
attention to what have individuals verbalised, but also observe how did each body put 
forward those verbal utterance as well as what did not presented in bodily acts. "We 
can only understand the discursive scene of subject constitution in light of these 
problems of embodiment, social norms and visual signification, and within the 
temporal modalities of anticipation, desire, fear and the spatial modalities of 
constraint, support and incitement", as Butler argues.
492
   
  
Recognising the underdevelopment of the role of body in the constitution of gender 
seriality, I then drawn on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological conception of the lived 
body to deepen Young's primary account of gender structures. As pointed out in 
Chapter Two, Merleau-Ponty conceives phenomenological approach as providing an 
alternative perspective to rise above the binary tension between realism and idealism 
in Western philosophy. He argues the construction of the objective world in 
individual bodies cannot be completely separated from lived experiences of the world, 
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which obtained through the senses.
493
 The body as lived thus indicates an essential 
sensual structure of its own which the exact context always exceeds and transcends 
the uses of language and concepts. Under such circumstances, the corporeal body 
disclose itself as the primary medium and its abilities and senses are the crucial 
methods to our world-building. In short, our body is our 'being-in-the-world'. 
 
The phenomenological understanding of the body as lived provides significant 
insights into how does a corporeality become gendered and how does gender 
imperatives being integrated into a person's existence. I tackled these questions by 
reflecting on Foucault's depiction of power play in the naturalisation of a gendered 
body. Departing from a singular depiction of power as dominance and repression, 
Foucault argues power 'produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production.'
494
 As the implicit connection between the operation of power and the 
establishment of knowledge being sketched out, it becomes clear that 'gender' is a 
hegemonic construction and its normative dictation on the body is contingent. 
Connecting the productivity of power and the lived body as the materialisation of our 
being-in-the-world, Young observes the corporeal integration of gender imperatives 
situates the female body in a state of inhibited contradiction in a series of study of 
female experiences and bodily comportments. While individuals possess the ability to 
instantiate transcendence, she argues the collaboration between superiority of men in 
patriarchal society, the historical denouncement of the female body, and the 
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enculturated male gaze confines women to a immanent situation, in which their 
capability to create, act, and transcend is restrained.
495
  
 
    1b. A Feminist Politics of Discursive Embodiment  
However, Merleau-Ponty points out the notion of presumed mastery in the lived body 
and, from which, I contended the possibility for individual women to politicise their 
lived corporeal experiences in the last three chapters of the thesis. The existence of 
the presumed mastery, according to Merleau-Ponty, is located in the senses and 
ability to move of a body. More specifically, the idea of the 'mastery' refers to the 
initial abilities of the body which enable it to experience the physical situations 
around it. Without such primary mastery, it is impossible for the body to acquire 
sensual experiences or to be able to understand and therefore incorporate moral 
imperatives and social conventions into individual subjectivity. I coined the process 
of gendering as a form of training, in which the presumed mastery of the lived body 
enables the individual subject to become gendered. 'Training' is a term that I 
borrowed from Merleau-Ponty and it is a constant practice of imitation and reiteration, 
in which the lived body is instructed to re-enact specific modes of physical/social 
activity, by recognising the resemblance between past and current situations. Such 
procedure echoes what Foucault construes as the productivity of power, as the 
disciplinary force of dominant practices regulates the body to learn to reproduce those 
hegemonic acts. 
 
On the other hand, the notion of presumed mastery in the lived body also enables 
individuals to develop their skills and subjectivity. While the body can be trained to 
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reiterate similar performances across resembled situations, as I argued in Chapter 
Three, it is also noted that such reproduction of the same act can vary (to a certain 
degree) in each recurrence. That is, a gendered individual, who is trained by gender 
hegemony to develop necessary capabilities and understandings to reiterate gender 
performances, can utilise those knowledge and skills to improvise. As the corporeal 
reiteration of gender power can be performed differently within constrained range, the 
lived body can politicise itself as a corporeal resistance to existed gender apparatus. 
More importantly, to recall the historical-congealed inhabitation that Young observes 
in female existences, the individual mastery, which enabled via the process of training, 
allows women to come to see the possibility of re-negotiating the boundary of 'I-can' 
and 'I-cannot'. In particular, I argued each variation of gender reiteration in public 
space can be broadly conceived as invoking the indeterminism and contingency of 
gender apparatus. To put it differently, the discursive reconfiguration of gender 
performances from individual women demonstrate how can a woman differentiate 
herself from the other women, by showing them what 'I-can'.     
 
    1c. Agonistic Interlocutors in the Political Forum 
As the capability of politicisation in the lived body is outlined, I used Chapter Four 
and Five to argue the collaboration between a renovated understanding of female 
authority and an agonistic ethos can facilitate democratic participation and pluralise 
contemporary feminist politics. In Chapter Four, I introduced Milan Women's 
Bookstore Collective and its idea of 'the symbolic mother'. The Italian feminist group 
argues the collective and public absence of female connections in human history. 
That is: in connection with the typical separation of public/private spheres and the 
traditional division of labour between men and women (e.g. men are breadwinners 
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and women are homemakers), women are somewhat invisible in human history and 
female interactions are missing from the public eye, since a woman's social existence 
cannot be constructed without the mediation of men. What is being identified in the 
undervaluation of female bodily experiences and the absence of female connections, 
as previous chapters have demonstrated, is an asymmetric power relation between the 
different sexes. Such acknowledgement prompts MWBC to reflect on the role of 
authority in feminist politics and an idea of 'the symbolic mother' is proposed, to 
counterbalance the patriarchal system. 
 
The idea of the symbolic mother signifies a feminist political practice of individual 
freedom, and the authority of such maternal figure is cultivated from both the 
individual and collective efforts. On the one hand, the realisation of female freedom 
relies on individual women to willingly put forward her desire/intention/difference in 
front of the public eye. Without individual participation, the term, 'female freedom', 
would simply be an empty phrase. On the other hand, while any women can be 
authorised to speak up for womanhood, she must recognise that her legitimacy and 
capability of exercising her freedom is not a mere demonstration of individual 
courage, but a result of collective investments. As history is a long continuum, there 
are women before me, whose actions and words are exemplary and constituting free 
platform for future generations to stand upon, and there will be other women who 
may call upon my practices of 'I-can' as an authorisation of their politicisations. 
 
In an ideal situation, the different exercises of female freedom, which authorised by 
the symbolic mother, would stand on an equal footing, in a sense that my way of 
being a woman is neither superior nor inferior to other women's, as our freedom is 
  
254 
guaranteed by the same source of female authority. Nevertheless, such sameness of 
women can be undermined by ineradicable factors and posing obstructions to the 
development of female connections. Such disparity inevitably taints the politicisation 
of different types of female transgression and implicitly reveals the existence of an 
inherent power struggle, which cannot be completely eradicated by democratic 
procedures or rational deliberations. If that's the case, how a woman's practices of 
female freedom cab avoid becoming a hegemonic construction? What political 
relationship can be envisaged under the Symbolic Mother? I argued an agonistic one 
in this thesis.  
 
Instead of focus on rationality or consensus, an agonistic political ethos prioritise the 
exposure of hegemonic articulation, since such political ethos recognises that it is 
impossible to put an end to political conflicts, or to exclude power relations from 
democratic politics. It is not to say that rational deliberation no longer important, but 
drawing attentions to the significance of political disturbance and disruption. For the 
feminist practice of freedom to be an operative consensus among women, feminist 
politics shouldn’t be contented with a stabilised politicisation, since the present  
political construction may be articulated with cost of other voices. As feminist 
politics is willing to place significance on political contestation, the free practice of 
female authority can finally be a form of pluralisation and to investigate the disparity 
among women, whose social connections are substantiated, by enhancing the 
different experiences of constituency, heightening awareness of the relational 
characters of female identity, and folding agonistic respect into conflicts between 
contending politicisations of womanhood. 
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2. Reflections and Looking Ahead 
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the political understanding of the 
plurality of women in the context of politics of difference. In contemporary 
democratic society, the gender issue has became rather fragmented and incidental, in 
corresponds to the problematisation of an essentialist depiction of 'women' and the 
rapid change of general social/political/economic situation between different social 
groups. However, the notions of 'gender' and 'women' continue to be the crucial 
concepts for us to understand social disparity and injustice. Meanwhile, with the 
helps of social media, an individual transformation of gender act or a local feminist 
movement can become globalised in a short period of time. Such immediacy and 
global response can also challenge the adequacy and tolerance of those particular 
constructions of political womanhood. These phenomena indicate the need for a 
model of feminist politics that can take the heterogeneity of its members into account 
and allows and facilitates the divergent debates between divergent interlocutors.       
 
The theoretical articulation of a feminist politics of discursive embodiment that 
developed in this thesis is an exact response to the above concern. And, it provides a 
consistent reflection from individual female corporeality, the social collective of 
women, and political practices of womanhood. Since the main focus of this thesis is 
theoretical, it will be worth to apply the model of a feminist politics of discursive 
embodiment in future research to examine contemporary feminist political practices 
in different contexts. The application of such mode of feminist politics, on the one 
hand, may offer a refreshing perspective into the potential dilemma that feminist 
activists faced. On the other hand, the explanatory power of this conceptual analysis 
can be examined. 
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